K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life
7
Moreover, it is interesting when this sort of
genesis view, attributed to
certain subtle
thinkers, is discussed in the Philebus (53cff). It is interesting because Socrates says that
anyone holding this view will obviously mock those who claim that pleasure is the
good. But while the aim of the subtlers is to show that no pleasure is the good or the
goal, Aristippus is, as we have seen, clearly reported as having held that pleasure is
the good or the proper final object of pursuit. Thus that Aristippus would not fit well
as a candidate for a holder of the view of the subtlers perhaps gives us further reason
to suppose he is not working within this replenishment model.
And finally, what is especially important to notice is that the replenishment view is
mostly taken to be concerned with the more typical bodily pleasures, since it is
obviously these sorts of pleasures which are best characterized as fulfillment of a
lack, relief from pain, as is made clear from, among others, Plato.
14
However, as we
have seen, pleasures in Aristippus, though they no doubt include them, are not
restricted to the bodily kind. He is, for example, said to have taken pleasure in
conversation (DL II 79), fine clothes and scents (Athen. Deip. XII 544b). I mention the
pleasures of conversing or learning since they seem quite disparate from some of the
more restrictedly sybaritic ones like satisfying a desire for sex; however, as Plato
argues for in the Republic (585bff), such pleasures can nevertheless be conceived of as
pleasures of filling or replenishment. On the other hand, the latter example regarding
the enjoyment of certain scents or perfumes is somewhat more intriguing. Both in the
Republic (584b-c) and
Philebus (51b) Plato looks
to reserve a special place, seemingly
somewhere outside of his usual replenishment analysis, for such partially aesthetic
pleasures (along with those of hearing and sight). That is, he certainly does say that
such pleasures are not preceded by any sort of distress, and even though there is
some controversy among scholars here
15
2
, it is, at least prima facie, difficult to see them
as belonging to the view that pleasure is the correcting of an imbalance or
replenishment of a natural lack. This might be taken as further suggestive of the view
that it is not the restorative model of pleasure Aristippus is promoting.
Adherents of the view that Aristippus adopts something like a bodily view of
pleasure might appeal to Plato’s Protagoras. They might appeal to the Protagoras
because the standard interpretation there seems to be that in that particular bit of the
dialogue where pleasure is discussed Socrates has in mind something like a coarse
empiricist view of pleasure, pleasure as a uniform sensation
16
14
For example, “However, most of the so-called pleasures which reach the soul through the body, as well as the
most intense ones are of this form –they are some kind of relief from pain.” (Rep. 584c)
15
See, e.g., Gosling and Taylor, 1982, Chap. 6-8.
; not only is
16
For example, see Irwin, 1977, 111; Gosling and Taylor, 1982, 177, think it tempting to treat pleasure in the
Protagoras ‘as a sensation like warmth’. This empiricist conception is commonly assumed because in the
K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life
8
phenomenological uniformity often seen in conjunction with bodily pleasure, but
Socrates often mentions examples of physical pleasures there. Thus since Aristippus
was almost certainly well acquainted with and influenced by this work
17
A major difficulty with such an appeal would be that it is not at all clear that Socrates
in the
Protagoras actually adopts the view that is standardly attributed to him.
Actually, it is in itself significant that Socrates, in this work, does not really say that
much about what he supposes pleasure to be.
, it is also
possible that he had picked up, or found corroboration in, the notion of pleasure
there standardly taken to be expressed by Socrates.
18
And indeed, something like this seems to be given further validation when Socrates
goes on to say to Prodicus “I beg indulgence of Prodicus who distinguishes among
It is true that he gives examples of
pleasant things like food, drink and sex (353c) –examples which appear to conform to
the standard view, but we ought to observe that he does so only within the context of
his description of the akratic individual on behalf of the many. The labelling and
employment of such pleasures here of course makes good protreptic sense, but it
says little about Socrates’ conception of pleasure in that dialogue as a whole.
There are however several clues throughout the dialogue which do fill out this
conception somewhat. For instance, prior to that segment of the discussion
concerning pleasure and the pleasant life (351b), Prodicus is made to distinguish
between ‘to be pleased’ and ‘to be cheered’, and to associate bodily pleasures with
the former and mental pleasures with the latter. Plato’s point here is not just to
communicate mere pedantry on the part of Prodicus. What Plato is also doing, it
might be suggested, is signalling to us that the ensuing discussion of pleasure is to be
understood in its widest or most comprehensive sense.
Moreover, later, at the near closing of the case for the denial of akrasia, Socrates says
some things which ought to strike those who adhere to the standard view as
peculiar. First, at 357b, Socrates says “what exactly this art, this knowledge is (of
pleasures and pains) we can inquire into later”. We might wonder why, if pleasure
was some simple uniform sensation, Socrates would think he has not yet exhausted
just what this art of measurement is or consists in. That Socrates would withhold
certainty with respect to this suggests he has a somewhat more open-ended
conception of pleasure (and pain) than the standard interpretation calls for.
Protagoras it appears (to these interpreters) that the only differentiation made between kinds of pleasures is
quantitative, the amount of pleasure achieved (356b), a criterion friendly to a conception of pleasure as a distinct
and commensurable sensation state (see also Irwin, 1995, 90).
17
For more on the relationship between Aristippus and the Protagoras, see Urstad, 2008, Section II.
18
On recognition of the fact that Socrates there makes little attempt to define pleasure at all, that he never delves
into its nature, see Riel, 2000, 9 and D. Frede, 1999, 349.