K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life
11
not directly experience pure pleasure as such (just as one does not experience pure
color as such), rather, what one does experience are particular instances or species of
pleasure (or instances of color –say, blue or green). The way particular instances of
pleasure are to be identified and distinguished from one another is presumably by
mentioning something about the causes, activities or qualities of experience with
which they are associated.
Whatever precisely Socrates may have in mind here, the general point seems obvious
enough. Instances of pleasure are not to be identified purely by some feeling-element
over and above the pursuits enjoyed, something usually characteristic of bodily
sensations, but rather, by certain non-affective properties such as perhaps their
causes, intentional objects (35b), etc.
Socrates is thus rejecting the possibility of
completely separating pleasure from the activities or pursuits in the way that his
interlocutor Protarchus seems to be doing (and which, it might be added, is more
typical of modern hedonists like Bentham and Mill).
Now, I am not proposing that Aristippus has in mind an account of pleasure like
Socrates does in the Philebus.
21
All I am suggesting is that the availability of this
dialogue
and Aristippus’ likely familiarity with it and
other works like the
Protagoras,
22
3
at least makes it plausible to think that Aristippus was indeed aware of,
and receptive to, the plasticity of the concept of pleasure, its multifarious nature –
circumstances which we might reasonably suppose would not speak much in favor
of the adoption of a narrow bodily view on his part.
There is not a whole lot in the historically proximate testimony which gives us much
indication of how it is Aristippus conceived of the nature of pleasure. It is true that in
the Memorabilia Socrates mainly attributes certain kinds of crude bodily pleasures to
Aristippus (esp. 2. 1. 1); as Gosling and Taylor point out, Xenophon, in that dialogue,
seems to make him “the champion of the sybaritic life” (1982, 40).
However, we should keep two important points in mind. One, as Diogenes reports,
Xenophon was no friend of Aristippus (II 65),
23
21
Of course Socrates in the Philebus is not extolling hedonism. Pleasure turns out to receive fifth position on the
candidate list for the highest good (67a).
22
We should notice that Plato, throughout his works, uses a variety of suggestive idioms in describing pleasure.
For instance, at
Gorgias 496e drinking is said to
be a filling of a deficiency and thereby a pleasure, and at 499e
we are told we must perform good pleasures. Again, this seems to betray the largely open-ended understanding
of pleasure at the time.
23
Grote, 1865, III, 538: “Xenophon was a man of action, resolute in mind and vigorous in body, performing with
credit the duties of the general as well as of the soldier. His heroes were men like Cyrus, Agesilaus, Ischomachus
–warriors, horsemen, hunters, always engaged in active competition for power, glory or profit, and never
shrinking from danger, fatigue, or privation. For a life of easy and unambitious indulgence…he had no respect. It
was on this side that the character of Aristippus certainly seemed to be…the most defective.”
providing us with some reason to
K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life
12
think he makes Socrates parody or exaggerate Aristippus’ outlook somewhat. And
two, we should notice that it is Socrates who attributes certain kinds of pleasures to
Aristippus while Aristippus himself never actually says anything about the sorts of
pleasures which concern him. The only pertinent thing he says in this regard is that
he wishes for a life of the greatest pleasure (2. 1. 9). There is admittedly little
information in this, but we should keep in mind that he does use hedone here, and he
does so without pointing to any pleasure-sources. And as we have seen, this term can
encompass a wide variety of psychological experiences or states. Such inclusiveness
is also hinted at in the fuller expression “a life of the greatest pleasure”, which, it
might be noticed, nearly mirrors the somewhat innocuous Protagoras passage
discussed earlier (351b). Thus it is largely left open what exactly Aristippus has in
mind here.
There is however one peculiar term indirectly attributed to Aristippus in the
Memorabilia perhaps worth mentioning. In Prodicus’ fable, Vice’s speech, whose
words are meant to represent the views of Aristippus, contains the use of
euphrainesthai of sexual love (2. 1. 24). The use of this term in conjunction with this
particular object is somewhat unconventional;
24
Outside of the historically proximate testimony, there are, I believe, three
illuminative characterizations of pleasure attributed to Aristippus. The first two are
to be found in the roman author Aelian and the Christian humanist Erasmus, and the
other, in the physician and philosopher Galen. Aelian reports that “Aristippus
seemed to speak with particular conviction when encouraging people neither to
bother themselves in retrospect over that which has passed, nor to toil in prospect of
things to come. For this kind of behavior is the mark of happiness and proof of a
gracious frame of mind (eu)qumi/a).” (
Var. Hist. 14. 6; 208 in Mannebach)
in this context we would have
expected hedesthai, which, though it, as we have seen, carries a wide range of
enjoyments, is more often paired with coarse physical pleasures. Euphrainesthai has
some etymological connection with mind or intelligence, phronesis. Indeed, as
previously noted, the same author (Prodicus) is made by Plato in the Protagoras to
make explicit this very distinction. At 337c, Prodicus takes euphrainesthai and
hedesthai to mark a dividing line between the enjoyment of mental activities and
physical or bodily activities respectively (and Socrates tells us that many of those
present agreed with this). Thus if we view Vice’s use of term in connection with what
Prodicus is made to say at Prot. 337c, we may have reason to suspect that for
Aristippus the enjoyment of a physical pleasure like sex is in part a mental one. This
is speculation which outruns the Memorabilia text however, thus I leave it as it is.
25
24
See Taylor, 1991, 138.
25
Some commentators take this fragment to be beyond doubt preserving Aristippus’ own words (see Guthrie,
1975, 494).
Erasmus