sovereignty. Schmitt’s metaphorical depiction of early modern warfare as
a gentlemanly ‘duel’ – a civilized affair – is a mystification. It is grounded
in an abstract-literal reading of the
ius publicum, ultimately rooted in
a wider strategic-rhetorical move to elevate the pre-revolutionary age to
the paragon of civilized warfare – an interpretative foil licensing the
fabrication of a degenerated and inflated ‘total war’ ascribed to Anglo-
American liberal universalism.
Schmitt’s account of the
ius publicum europaeum – from the Discoveries
to Versailles – is pervaded by contradictions, omissions, and empirical mis-
judgements, grounded in an oscillation between unlicensed abstraction and
empty concretion. At the centre stands a vacillation between a literal adher-
ence to the minimal positivism of an abstractly accepted
ius publicum – an
idealization of absolutist statehood, an un-examined account of early modern
geopolitics and a full embrace of the juristic notion of non-discriminatory
warfare – and a sociologically disembodied and inter-nationally evacuated
notion of concretion, formalized in spatial concrete-order-thinking. This
false notion of concretion – land appropriation, land division, sea parti-
tion – carefully dissociated from processes of contested social property
relations, authority relations, and geopolitical encounters, re-emerges
consequentially as another mega-abstraction: spatial order. In the end,
Schmitt maps the positivistic abstraction of the
ius publicum on to the
territorial abstraction of the spatial constitution – combining to form the
nomos. This play of abstractions was to undergo another round in
Schmitt’s interpretation of Versailles and after.
Versailles, the League of Nations and after: from concrete-order-thinking
to the IPE of American grand strategy
The dissolution of the classical
ius publicum, grounded in the Euro-centric
spatial order, and its transformation into a universal international law
occurred during a transitional period, marked by the Congo Conference
of 1885 and the Versailles Peace Treaties (Schmitt 2003, 2005a, 2005b).
This interim generated according to Schmitt a general disorientation in
jurisprudence, unable to conceptualize and navigate the tension between a
mere extension of the
ius publicum to rising extra-European powers, like
Japan or the Ottoman Empire, the potential pluralization of international
law by the recognition of a series of coexisting regional legal orders
(African, Asian or American inter-regional law), and the full onset of a
single universal international law. This period reached for Schmitt its
zenith in the ‘Versailles Diktat’ that proscribed an unsustainable half-way
house between a legal-normative universalism, master-minded by the
Fatal attraction: Schmitt’s international theory 207
Anglo-American powers and institutionalized in the League of Nations,
and a series of Anglo-American ‘opt-outs’ and provisos, most notably
through the externalization of the US-American ‘Western hemisphere’,
derived from the 1823 Monroe-Doctrine, from the League’s geographical
field of application. This lopsided construction not only undermined and
incapacitated the legal coherence of the new interwar legal order, it funda-
mentally failed to resolve the pivotal question of the nature of the new spatial
order, suspended between monopoly and polypoly – the global monopoly of
a single power and a pluralism of coexisting
Großra¨ume.
Schmitt turned his attention to the legal arguments for intervention by
‘space-alien’ Anglo-American powers within Europe, who simultaneously
ruled out the reverse. The Monroe-Doctrine, prohibiting European
intervention in the Western hemisphere, exemplified this ‘spatial chaos’
paradigmatically. Although the United States finally refused to ratify the
Versailles Treaty and failed to become a League Member, Article 21
explicitly recognized the validity of the Monroe-Doctrine within the
League system. This implied an external internality of United States
presence in Europe, as it implied the official acceptance of legal non-
reciprocity between the American and European hemispheres. For the
inclusion of the Monroe-Doctrine into the Covenant did not only exclude
the Western Hemisphere from the League’s jurisdiction, the League
also lacked authority to deal with relations between states within the
Western Hemisphere who were also League members (Cuba, Haiti, Santo
Domingo, Panama, Nicaragua) and with relations between them and
European states. These contradictions were radicalized by the absence
of the Americans and the Soviets, the presence of two European powers
with conflicting spatial–legal traditions (Britain’s elastic sea-based uni-
versalism vs. France’s static terrestrial continentalism), and the exclusion
of Germany and Austria-Hungary from the peace negotiations. For
Schmitt, the spatial disorder of the new
nomos had crippled the idea of
a universal international law, bisected into a European sphere of regional
application, supervised by the United States, and an Anglo-American
sphere outside its strictures. The new
nomos of the earth was split right
through the middle.
But the legalistic dissection and effective deconstruction of Versailles
and Geneva was ultimately shifted onto a much deeper sociological
terrain that gave Schmitt a privileged insight into the structural trans-
formations of international law and order at the start of the 20th century.
These revolved around the developing dualisms between international
public law and transnational private law, a territorial interstate order and
a sub-territorial world economy, a public pluriverse and a private uni-
versalism, grounded in the separation between the political and the economic
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