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1.1 INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
The need for greater international co-operation between countries to combat the ISIL threat is
without question. There is a need for practical action beyond multilateral statements and
declarations which rightly call for such action. Attention should be placed on ensuring countries
become more active and open to sharing information and intelligence both “spontaneously” and
“upon request”, in a timely manner, through a range of competent authorities. For example, law
enforcement agencies should continue to leverage their international working relationships to
proactively identify and develop investigative leads involving illicit money flows related to
terrorism and/or terrorist groups such as ISIL. In particular, the TF risks involving FTF travel could
be addressed by rapid information flow involving persons who have been identified as FTFs.
Discussions should include the sharing of best practices for detecting and investigating individuals
who are illicitly financing ISIL. In addition, FIUs should seek to find more effective mechanisms to
proactively share information regarding risks to the international financial sector and with non-
financial businesses and professions. This can include the use of “on-line” information sharing
mechanisms between competent authorities.
2. DEPRIVING ISIL OF ITS RESOURCES
2.1 TARGETED FINANCING SANCTIONS
The Monitoring Team Report on ISIL and ANF recommended that Member States, in particular those
most directly affected by the threat from ISIL, develop additional listings proposals for the
Committee under the Al-Qaida sanctions regime of key individuals and entities, including facilitators
and those most vulnerable to the impact of being sanctioned.
The MT provided examples of individuals and entities that might be relevant candidates for listing
requests, such as:
1.
facilitators of FTF recruitment networks based outside of territory where ISIL operates;
2.
key individuals involved in providing logistical support associated with ISIL and ANF who
may travel and be vulnerable to the travel ban;
3.
financiers whose involvement in terrorist funding to ISIL has been established by Member
States;
4.
companies and smuggling networks that trade in commodities that derive from ISIL, thereby
supporting ISIL financially;
5.
other parties, including terrorist groups that facilitate or give assistance to ISIL; and/or
6.
non-profit organisations involved in providing funding or other material support to ISIL.
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2015
Case Study 12: Use of Targeted Financial Sanctions
On 13 November 2014, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ms. Julie Bishop, listed the two Australian
individuals, Khaled Sharrouf and Mohamed Mahmoud Elomar, under Part 4 of the Charter of the
United Nations Act 1945. This legislation gives effect to Australia's international obligations under
UNSCR 1373 (2001) relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorist acts.
As a result of the listing all assets owned or controlled by Khaled Sharrouf and Mohamed Mahmoud
Elomar are subject to an immediate asset freeze. It is an offence to use or deal with such assets, to
allow such assets to be used or dealt with or to facilitate the use of or dealing with such assets,
without a permit. It is also an offence to make an asset (of any kind) available, directly or indirectly,
to the listed persons without a permit.
www.dfat.gov.au/sanctions
/
Source: Australia
2.2 OIL SMUGGLING AND SALES
There have been efforts to suppress the sale of ISIL oil and oil products on regional markets, such as
enhanced counter smuggling efforts of the Turkish authorities in the past two years, as well as
recent steps taken by the KRG and Iraqi Government authorities to seize suspected ISIL-related
shipments of oil and oil products.
Case Study 13: Efforts on Counter Smuggling
Turkey provided statistics on counter oil smuggling, demonstrating that the amount of seizures of
smuggled petroleum has shown a steady increase since 2012, when the government introduced
enhanced measures with an Action Plan upon finding an increase in attempted oil smuggling along
the Syrian border. Following capture of oil fields by ISIL by summer 2014, the seizures of smuggled
oil increased sharply, reaching 20 million liters at the seven Turkish provinces bordering Iraq and
Syria. The amount of seizures of smuggled petroleum products and oil by Turkish authorities was
raised to 79,238,759 liters in 2014 from over 73,000,000 liters in 2013 and the number of
intercepted smuggling incidents since 2012 has increased from around 4,000 to 10,000.
Source: Turkey
There is a need to better identify the origin, middlemen, buyers, carriers, traders and routes through
which oil produced in ISIL-held territory is trafficked. There is also a need to better understand
financial flows and the role of the international financial sector with respect to the oil trade. This is
important because the value chain does not only create revenue streams for ISIL, but also generates
local economic dependencies on illicit activity. In this respect an important example was provided
with effective steps taken by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq after ISIL’s