Karl Marx; his life and work
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- THE “ INTERNATIONAL ” (CONTINUED) Very
THE “INTERNATIONAL” 285 volume of Das Kapital, declaring that he was “ the first econo mist who had undertaken a scientific analysis of capital, and had resolved it into its primitive parts.” This was doubtless in tended rather as an advertisement for the book than as a decla ration of serious importance to the International. XII THE “ INTERNATIONAL ” (CONTINUED) Very shortly after the Brussels congress and his expulsion from the League of Peace and Liberty, Bakunin became a mem- j her of the International by joining the Branche Romande at ' Geneva. No sooner had he entered the International than he j began his campaign to secure control of the movement which i so speedily led to its disruption. He formed the Alliance de la j Democratic Socialiste, an organization within the organization, | through which he hoped to become master of the Interna- 1 tional. The Alliance, while nominally a branch of the Interna tional, had a programme of its own, including the “ equality of , classes.” Not only had the Alliance a programme conflicting 1 with that of the International, which aimed at the abolition of classes — but it was to be an international organization, with branches in every country of Europe and a separate Central Committee at Geneva, where Bakunin resided. These branches were to be affiliated with the International and represented at its next congress, at Basel. But they were also to have a sepa rate congress of their own, previous to that of the International, and also maintain their own official papers. Bakunin had man aged to get control of Egalite, one of the organs of the Inter national, and James Guillaume, one of Bakunin’s most fanatical supporters, conducted a small paper at Locle for the Alliance, named Le Progres. Bakunin had observed the greatest secrecy concerning his new organization, and it was not until plans had been perfected and various branches started that Marx learned anything posi tive and definite concerning it. Of course it was at once obvious / that if the General Council recognized the Alliance as a branch 286
THE “INTERNATIONAL” 287 of the International, and the right of the Alliance branches to representation at the International congresses, nothing could break Bakunin’s power. Very promptly, therefore, the Gen-1 eral Council issued a strongly worded, but scrupulously polite and impersonal, statement to the effect that it refused to recog nize the Alliance and repudiated its programme. The state ment condemned the Alliance as a scheme for the disorganiza tion of the International. Although it would seem to an ordinary person that the Gen eral Council could not have been expected to do anything else, Bakunin was apparently taken completely by surprise at the swift action of that body. It was some weeks before the Cen tral Committee of the Alliance replied to the General Com mittee of the International, stating that, “ for the good of the cause,” it would sacrifice its existence, but only on condition that the International would recognize the “ main principles ” of the Alliance. This the General Council refused to do, insisting that no section should have a programme which conflicted with that of the association. It was apparent that in the duel be tween the German and the Russian the former was the more cer tain of his ground. Bakunin and his followers bitterly denounced Marx as a f despot and a middle-class Intellectual, but bowed to the decision ; of the General Council. The Alliance was dissolved and all. its branches disbanded. Then they were immediately reor-j ganized as branches of the International. Of course, this was j a mere farce; the Alliance was as much a power for evil after the dissolution as before it. Marx knew this quite well, but i under the rules there was no ground upon which these reor-j ganized branches could be kept out of the International. Marx knew, too, that Bakunin, who was a great intriguer, would re sort to other, less direct, methods to gain his end. In a little while the local committee of the International at Geneva, of which Bakunin was a member, requested the Gen eral Council to include in the programme of the next congress at 288 KARL MARX Basel, the question of inheritance. In this apparently innocent request Marx saw masked the evil intentions of Bakunin. Abo lition of the right of inheritance was a prominent feature of the programme which Bakunin had formulated at the peace con gress at Berne. If it were adopted by the International con gress at Basel, on his motion, the event would be hailed as a great victory for Bakunin jtnd it would be easy for him to se cure the removal of the headquarters of the association to Geneva, where he could effectually control it. Marx check mated this move by drafting a resolution on the subject, which Bakunin could not refuse to support since it was in complete har mony with his position, and having it presented in the name of the General Council. By this astute move he placed his rival in the position of having to support him, for that is what was really involved. The Basel congress was held in September, 1869. For the first time Bakunin appeared as a delegate. The United States sent its first representative in the person of A. C. Cameron, a bombastic individual who gave the most ridiculously exagger ated account of the strength of the movement in America. An other who attended for the first time was Wilhelm Liebknecht, fresh from the successful launching of the Social Democratic Workingmen’s Party of Germany. Marx, as usual, was ab sent. Among the delegates were Cassar de Paepe, Robert Ap- plegarth, Moses Hess, Herman Greulich, John Philip Becker, George Eccarius, Frederick Lessner, and Herman Jung. Alto gether, there were seventy-eight delegates, representing Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Switzer land and the United States of America. The country with the largest delegation was France, with twenty-six delegates, Switz erland coming next with twenty-three. The large number of French and Swiss delegates was due, partly at least, to the activity of Bakunin, whose over-confidence as to the result of the struggle with Marx led him to play right into the hands of his rival. Eccarius, on behalf of the General
THE “INTERNATIONAL” 289 Council, proposed that the congress should give the General Council the power to expel immediately any section contraven ing the principles of the association, without waiting for the' consent of the annual congress. Marx wanted the additional j power in order to crush Bakunin. A strange thing occurred:; Bakunin, the Anarchist and anti-authoritarian, who had so often j denounced the “ despotism ” of Marx, and complained of the power vested in the General Council, supported the motion quite \ as vigorously as Liebknecht did. Not only that, but he went much farther; he contended that the General Council should also have power to prevent the formation of new sections if they deemed such action desirable, and to suspend existing sec tions at any time! Bakunin’s action caused the greatest wonderment and con sternation, alike among the Marxists and his own followers. What could such inconsistency mean ? Why, simply that Baku nin believed that his supporters certainly outnumbered the sup porters of the General Council, that is, of Marx. He believed that the overthrow of Marx was certain, and the centralization of power in the hands of the General Council would enable him to maintain control of the organization. Thus Marx would be “ hoist with his own petard ”— a fate which, as we know now, was Bakunin’s own. Soon after the Basel congress the International reached the zenith of its power. Persecuted in several countries, the more it was persecuted the more it grew. The Austrian government used every means in its power to break up the sections of the International in that country, but the only result was to make the association flourish. In Holland the movement spread like a prairie fire, and the government, thoroughly alarmed, tried to stop its progress by persecuting its leaders, with the usual re sult. In France and Switzerland the movement grew with great rapidity, despite the frantic efforts of the authorities to check it. The press of Europe manifested clearly enough the alarm of the master class. “ Europe will soon be controlled by 19
290 KARL MARX these revolutionists ” was the burden of many an editorial. But in a little while ominous clouds darkened the horizon. Within a few months the powerful International, which seemed so likely to conquer Europe, was to be greatly weakened and com pelled to strain all its energies merely to maintain its own exist ence, like a giant gasping for breath. I The first serious menace to the International from without occurred when the red shadow of war spread over Europe. The throne of Spain was empty, made vacant by revolution, and a Hohenzollern prince aspired to fill the vacancy. Then the Emperor of France, Napoleon III, whose head was turned by the enthusiasm with which his Liberal Empire had been re ceived, thought to strengthen his position by picking a quarrel with Prussia over the question of the Spanish throne. France will never permit a German sovereign to reign at Madrid, was Napoleon’s word to the King of Prussia, William I. And when the Prussian King replied that his cousin had withdrawn his candidature, Napoleon demanded from him a promise that he would never permit the candidature to be renewed. The war fever raged on both sides of the Rhine, and the unscrupu lous Bismarck, through his agents, cunningly stimulated it — in France as well as in Prussia. He saw, as many careful ob servers had done since Sadowa, that war with France would probably lead to the consolidation of a united Germany under the Hohenzollern dynasty. He saw, too, that France was wholly unprepared to wage war with Prussia. But France was war-mad, as the debates in the Corps Legislatif, in July 1870, very plainly showed. On the 19th of that month war was de clared against Prussia by Louis Napoleon and his prime min ister, M. Emile Ollivier, who boasted that he entered upon the war with a “ light heart.” The war proved a serious obstacle to the International, for several reasons. The war spirit which prevailed in both coun tries made it impossible to carry on the propaganda of the as sociation in those countries, and, to some extent, in other coun-
THE “INTERNATIONAL” tries where the war absorbed popular attention. As might be - expected, the members of the International were sharply divided upon the question of the policy to be adopted. The division ; was well illustrated by the attitude of the Socialists in the North j German Reichstag. Liebknecht and Bebel refused to vote for ' the war estimates, notwithstanding that the war had been forced j upon the country by France. On the other hand, Fritzsche,? Hasenclever and Schweitzer voted for the estimates. They:, held that the victory of Napoleon would mean the destruction of Germany and be a serious blow to the workers of both countries. The Brunswick Committee issued an appeal to the workers of Germany, calling upon them to fight as Germans for the defence of Germany, while, on the other hand, great mass meetings held in various cities protested against the “ jingoism ” of the Brunswick manifesto and declared that the workers could not support any war, under any circumstances. It was for Marx a very trying situation. The General Council could not avoid making some pronouncement upon the question of the war, outlining a policy for the workers, and no matter what its position might be it was bound to give offence in one or the other country, or to one or another group of mem bers. And of course any declaration issued by the General Council would be the declaration of Marx himself. Without being in any way a jingo, Marx was, as we know, a German of the Germans, and as ardent an advocate of German unity as Bismarck himself. He also detested Napoleon III and most of his ministers. He held, naturally, the German view that the war was, for Germany a defensive one. His position was sub stantially that of Fritzsche, Hasenclever and Schweitzer, rather than of Bebel and Liebknecht. Had Marx been in the Reich stag he would most certainly have voted with the former group in favour of the war estimates. On July the 23rd the General Council issued a manifesto, j written by Marx, declaring that the war was one of defence so j far as Germany was concerned. With rare prescience it warned
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KARL MARX the working class of Germany against the danger of the war eventually ceasing to be one of defence merely, and becoming | one of offence against the French people, to the great injury of I the working classes of both nations. How wise that admoni tion was will be perceived by all who are familiar with the history of the Franco-Prussian struggle. The beginning of September witnessed the crushing defeat of the French at Sedan and the capture of Louis Napoleon. Then, on the fourth of the month, the Republic was provisionally proclaimed and Gen eral Trochu became President where Louis Napoleon had been Emperor. It was recalled that the congress of the Interna tional in accordance with the Basel resolution, should have been in session in Paris that day. Here, then, was opportunity for an honourable and imme diate peace. Prussia had accomplished her defence; if the war continued it could not be urged that the Prussians were fighting a defensive battle, for the government of the Third Republic had begged for peace. It argued that the government which had precipitated the unholy war had been swept away by the wrath of the people; that the Republic could not be held re sponsible for the misdeeds of the Empire; that the Prussians had gloriously accomplished their defence and attained their ends. On the fifth of September Marx wrote to the Brunswick Committee a manifesto addressed to the working class of Ger many, urging the conclusion of an immediate and honourable peace, reminding them that the war was originally for defence and not for conquest. Four days later the authorities dissolved the Brunswick Committee and had the members of the com mittee taken in chains to the fortress of Boyen. < On that same day, the ninth, the General Council addressed an appeal, written by Marx, to all sections of the International, ! protesting against the proposed annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and the policy of conquest in general. For circulating this ad dress many German workmen were imprisoned, but it had a wholesome effect in that it provided the cue for the sections of THE “INTERNATIONAL” the International throughout the world. Great mass meetings were held throughout France and Germany, as well as in Aus tria, England, Italy and the United States, all protesting against the policy of conquest and the annexation of Alsace-Lor raine. And as the war continued and Paris was kept under i siege, the members of the International once more were united, ’ and the Socialist members in the Reichstag voted as a unit ',, against the war estimates. At last Paris capitulated and the preliminaries of peace were agreed to at Versailles, on the 29th of January, 1871, and the Prussian flag flew triumphantly on the forts of the city. In addition to a money indemnity of two hundred millions ster ling France was to cede the entire province of Alsace, excepting Belfort, and a large portion of Lorraine. A cry of indignation sounded through the land against terms of peace so humiliating. Nevertheless, in the elections which were held for the purpose of ratifying the terms of peace a National Assembly was elected which was strongly clerical and monarchical. The provinces rolled up an enormous reactionary vote, but Paris remained republican and progressive. Not content with fulfilling its mandate of settling the terms of peace, the reactionary National Assembly at once began to scheme for the overthrow of the Republic and the restoration of the monarchy. Republican Paris soon manifested its dis pleasure — and the reactionary government of the pacte de Bor deaux, with M. Thiers at its head, knew that Paris was armed, for, in arranging the surrender of Paris, Jules Favre had stipu lated that the Parisian National Guard should not be disarmed. Favre knew well that any attempt to disarm the National Guard of Paris would be resisted and that it was not impossible for such resistance to upset the peace plans completely. And now this armed force in Paris was the chief obstacle the reactionaries had to encounter. As soon as the business for which it was elected —• the ratifi cation of the peace treaty — was concluded, the reactionary 294 KARL MARX National Assembly determined to continue its functions as a legislative body in defiance of the limitations of its mandate. It insulted the Paris representatives, ordered the suppression of the radical republican papers, and passed a resolution to re move the capital from Paris to Versailles. In consequence of these things, quite naturally, local patriotism joined hands with revolutionary passion, and the chauvinistic and radical elements made common cause against the government of M. Thiers. From the beginning of February to the middle of March there was a growing sentiment in favour of an independent, autono mous Paris. The cry was for the Commune, for complete “ home rule.” And when, on the morning of the 18th, the dis armament of Paris was begun at Montmartre, the National Guard rallied to the defence of the city against the national gov ernment ; civil war had begun, j The Commune of Paris was therefore not, as many ignorant critics of Socialism suppose, an experiment in Socialism.1 It was the revolt of a city of republicans against a nation of mon archists ; an attempt to create a city-republic, bound to the rest of the nation by the loosest of federal ties, after the ancient manner. The movement drew together the following ele ments : (i) The fatuous chauvinists who opposed the treaty of peace with Prussia, indulging the vain hope of driving back the Prussians and rehabilitating the military honour and glory of France; (2) the bourgeois republicans, determined to pro tect the Republic from the monarchist reaction; (3) the Radi cals and Socialists, mainly represented in the International, who also wanted to preserve the Republic, equally with their bour geois allies, but for a larger purpose. It will be seen, therefore, how inevitable it was that the In ternational should be drawn into that terrible civil war which involved such frightful suffering and carnage. Just what the
1 Mr. Roosevelt, for example, speaks of Socialism as having been “tried” in France “under the Commune in 1871.” The Outlook, March 20, 1909. E. S. Beesly
share of the International in the Commune was has puzzled most historians, alike of the Commune and of the International. It has been contended that the Commune was the creation of ; the International, and, on the other hand, that the International had little or nothing to do with it. The truth of the matter ? lies midway between these. From the very first, the Interna tional section in Paris played a not unimportant part in the revo-' lutionary movement. From the first, too, the General Council gave the insurrection its hearty support, and, through Marx, - important advice, which, had it been followed, might very pos- ! sibly have averted the most terrible features of the great strug gle. From a letter of Marx to Professor Beesly, written soon after the fall of the Commune, we learn that, before the actual outbreak of war, Marx advised the Central Committee to for tify the northern hills of Montmartre, facing the Prussians. And later on, on the very next day after the secret meeting of Bismarck and the two envoys of M. Thiers — MM. Favre and Pouyer-Quertier, the latter a wealthy cotton-spinner of Rouen
Although at first the Radicals and Socialists of the Interna- . tional played a rather subordinate — though not unimportant i
296 KARL MARX i As a matter of fact, he was in constant communication with the leaders of the Commune, communications of more or less importance passing between them every few days. But these were never in writing; they were carried on through the medium of a trusted friend, a revolutionist of forty-eight, one Sigismund Borkheim, a successful wine merchant, whose business necessi tated constant travelling between Paris and London. The let ter to Professor Beesly, already referred to, is of great historical importance, as the Frankfort Zeitung editorially remarked after its publication in the Berlin Vorwarts, for several reasons, but for none more important than the fact that it solves the problem which has so long baffled the historians of the Commune, '■ namely, how the leaders of the commune managed so promptly to get accurate information concerning supposedly I secret affairs of the French and German governments, j They got this information from Marx, through Borkheim. And Marx received it from Bismarck’s “ right hand,” Lothar Bucher! Marx wrote of Bucher: “ This man realizes that i his fate depends upon my discretion, therefore the effort to I prove to me his well-meaning toward our cause.” Lothar Bu cher, with all his brilliance, was a thoroughgoing traitor. Just as he betrayed Bismarck by conveying secret information to Marx, pretending sincere interest in the cause which Marx represented, and to which he was formerly allied, so he is said later to have betrayed his old comrades by drafting the odious “ anti-Socialist Law” in 1878. The exact extent of Marx’s influence in the Commune will, on account of the method of communication employed, never be known.
It is doubtful whether the International could have survived 1 as anything more than a mere sectarian movement after the fall of the Paris Commune, so great was the opprobrium which that event brought upon it. But if that were not enough to insure its destruction, there were other forces at work to that end.! And chief of these was the treachery of that unscrupulous in-' triguer, Bakunin. Taking advantage of the situation in Europe which resulted } from the Franco-Prussian war and the Paris Commune, Baku- ’ nin went on building up his separate organization, the Alliance, I especially in Italy and Spain, resorting to all kinds of deceitful tricks in order to accomplish his purpose. His temper and pur pose may be judged from a letter which he wrote to one of his allies, a very questionable character named Morago, in which he said: “ The Alliance must appear to agree with the In ternational, though really apart from it, in order better to get round it, and to direct it. Therefore, efforts should always be made to place its members in a minority on any council, com mittee, or section of the Alliance.” 1 It seems quite certain from the evidence which was submitted to the General Council f of the International, that Bakunin and his allies represented to! their dupes that the Alliance was a sort of “ inner circle ” of the International, necessary for conspiratory purposes, and that! many of those who joined the Alliance had no idea that they ; were being used by Bakunin as a means of injuring the In ternational. In other cases branches of the International were 1 Quoted by Gustav Jaeckh, Die Internationale, pp. 169-170. Yüklə 1,7 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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