Great Britain, British Jews, and the international protection of Romanian Jews, 1900-1914: a study of Jewish diplomacy and minority rights

 
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this was not given, the outbreak of the war was without doubt the decisive 
factor. Later, in September, Greece voiced its assurance on the minority rights, 
after receiving a communication from the British government.
93
 There was, 
however, no common circular to the Balkan governments, which would 
certainly have been impossible after the outbreak of the war. 
 
The Conjoint Committee contacted the Foreign Office in July 1914 to 
inform Grey on the subject of the proposed modification of Romanian 
Constitution.  The revision plans did not appear to include any provisions for 
the Jewish rights. David Alexander and Claude Montefiore pointed out that the 
Romanian Jewish problem contributed to the inflammable situation in the 
Balkans: 
 
 
‘In once more commanding the case of our sorely tried co-religionists of Roumania to 
the sympathy and solicitude of His Majesty’s Government, we are not unmindful of 
the grave international difficulties by which the diplomacy of the Great Powers in 
the Balkans is at the present moment preoccupied. It seems to us, however, that by 
leaving the Roumano-Jewish question open, those difficulties can only be 
aggravated.’
94
 
 
This letter was the final Conjoint Committee effort on behalf of Romanian Jews 
before the outbreak of the First World War. The vigorous Conjoint Committee 
campaign of 1913-1914 had come to nothing. Hopes had been high, but the First 
World War got in the way. The Romanian Jewish question was pushed into the 
background, as was resignedly summarised by the Jewish Chronicle in August 
1914: 
 
 
‘Unfortunately, owing to the war, nothing further can be done in the matter for the 
moment.’
95
 
 
 
9.4   Towards a new era 
 
 
When the First World War broke out, Romania remained neutral despite its 
alliance with Germany and Austria. At this stage, the Conjoint Committee was 
still, in principle, able to campaign on behalf of the Romanian Jews. Romanian 
Jews were suffering from new regulations that were passed in the anti-alien 
atmosphere brought about by the war.  
 
The main organisation of the Romanian Jews, The Union of Native Jews, 
had set up a bureau in Switzerland, from where it co-operated with Jewish 
organisations in Western Europe and the United States. In 1915, David Labin, a 
Union representative, urged the Conjoint Committee and the Alliance Israélite 
Universelle to intervene on behalf of Romanian Jews in the same manner as 
they had repeatedly intervened before the war. At the time, however, the Allied 
                                                           
93
  
FO 371/2110/72/45490, Crowe to Minister in Athens, Francis Elliot, 3 Sept. 1914. 
94
  
FO 371/2089/32066, Alexander and Montefiore to Grey, 14 July 1914, 
95
 JC, 14 Aug. 1914. 

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powers and the Central Powers were competing for Romania’s support. 
Therefore, any action by Jews of the Allied countries, primarily in Britain and 
France, had to take the military situation into account. Any agitation on behalf 
of Romanian Jews might endanger the Allied cause in Romania and was 
therefore unlikely to be welcomed by the Allied governments. In this situation, 
Lucien Wolf and the Conjoint Committee decided not to act. In 1916, another 
request for help by the Union of Native Jews was suppressed in the same 
manner.
96
  
 
From the perspective of the Conjoint Committee, it was unfortunate that 
Romania eventually became an ally of Britain in 1916. Anglo-Jewish policies 
were likely to diverge from British government policy as a result. British policy 
was designed to promote war aims and therefore the government was not 
willing to argue with Romania over Jewish problems. Consequently, the 
Conjoint faced a major dilemma that concerned the basic principles of its 
existence. Leaders of the Conjoint believed that British and Anglo-Jewish 
interests were similar, but it was now impossible for the Conjoint activists to act 
on behalf of their East European co-religionists without being portrayed as 
disloyal British citizens.
97
 
   
In 1917, the Conjoint Committee underwent a transformation. The causes 
of this were the quarrel over Zionism and, more generally, the Board of 
Deputies’ undemocratic practices. During the war, the Conjoint policy was anti-
Zionist, just as it had been earlier.  However, Zionism was undoubtedly on the 
ascent among the Anglo-Jewry.  On 17 May 1917, the Conjoint published a 
manifesto rejecting Zionism in The Times. A number of influential members of 
the Anglo-Jewish community subsequently sided with the Zionists.
98
 
 
 A meeting of the Board of Deputies in June passed a motion against the 
Conjoint statement on Palestine. The Board then technically put an end to the 
Conjoint by terminating its treaty with the Anglo-Jewish Association over 
foreign policy co-operation. The series of events led to the resignation of the 
Board president David Alexander. However, although it may have appeared so, 
this did not mark a Zionist victory in Anglo-Jewish community affairs.
99
  
 
The Anglo-Jewish Association set up its own foreign committee with 
Lucien Wolf as the policy maker, while the Board ran its own foreign affairs 
division. In the autumn of 1917, it seemed that the AJA committee was 
managing to eclipse the feeble Board of Deputies committee almost completely. 
However, in December 1917, an agreement was reached between the Board and 
the AJA, and the Joint Foreign Committee was set up. This was really an 
updated and remodelled Conjoint, with Lucien Wolf now as the formally 
recognised foreign secretary.
 100
 
                                                           
 
96
  
FO 371/2443/165840, Wolf to Parliamentary Under Secretary Lord Robert Cecil, 4 
 
Nov. 1915 and Wolf to David Labin, 4 Nov. 1915. See also Mark Levene’s account, 
 
which is perhaps the best there is relating to these matters, Levene 1992, 45-47. 
 
97
  
Levene 1992, 37-38. 
 
98
  
Levene 1992, 150-155. 
 
99
  
Levene 1992, 154-155. 
 
100
   Levene 1992, 156-157. 

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