Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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Training and capacity building with opposition actors: Broadening 
the scope of engagement 
Moving from the first objective of understanding political Islam to the more 
ambitious second and third objectives of promoting the reform and peace 
potential of Islamist actors, what can be learned from the experiences of 
Spain, Georgia and Ukraine? 
Western engagement in our three case countries took the form of 
capacity building and training directed at different sectors.
14
 In Spain, 
engagement primarily took the form of political party building. The party 
building of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) was undertaken 
chiefly by the SI, which over the period 1946–61 channelled funds to train 
the party’s rank and file,
15
 established permanent offices of the PSOE in 
Spain and provided for the full-time employment of its senior officials. 
French socialists supported the PSOE by printing its newspaper El 
Socialista. The German SPD arranged training programmes, provided 
advice to party leaders on policy and campaign techniques and sponsored 
meetings of the Conferencia de Unidad Socialista. Likewise, in the cases of 
Ukraine and Georgia, Western foundations concentrated heavily on party 
building. In the run-up to the Orange revolution, Viktor Yushenko’s 
election campaign was supported almost entirely by Western 
foundations.
16
 In the case of Shevardnadze’s Georgia, the growth of the 
only two real opposition parties, the National Movement and the United 
Democrats, was supported by USAID (United States Agency for 
International Development), the NDI and IRI, through training 
programmes, seminars and assistance in efforts to build coalitions around 
reform agendas. In the Ukrainian case in particular, party training was 
carried out alongside institutional capacity-building programmes aimed at  
 
                                                      
14
 L. Whitehead, “Democracy by convergence and Southern Europe: A comparative 
politics perspective”, in G. Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy: The International 
Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, London: Leicester University Press, 
1991, p. 56. 
15
 Anaya Ortuno (2002), op. cit., p. 21.  
16
  M.  McFaul,  “Ukraine  Imports  Democracy:  External  Influences  on  the  Orange 
Revolution”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2007, pp. 67-68. 

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the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. Hence, there were 
initiatives such as the Indiana University Parliamentary Development 
project, which provided technical assistance to increase parliamentary 
effectiveness. 
Capacity building also branched out to wider sectors of civil society. 
In the Spanish case, special emphasis was put on building trade union 
capacity. The German IG Mettall [West German Metalworkers’ Union] 
supported the Union General de Trabajadores with the publication of its 
periodicals,  El Noticiero and Servicio de Prensa. The International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions assisted Spanish trade unions in their 
actions against the regime, supporting workers financially during strikes, 
enhancing organisational unity across industries and levels of government, 
and training activists on publicity techniques.  
In the Georgian and Ukrainian cases, greater emphasis was placed on 
youth organisations, NGOs and the independent media. Important actors 
behind the colour revolutions were the youth organisations PORA [‘It is 
time’] in Ukraine and KMARA [‘Enough’] in Georgia. These movements 
provided the necessary educational and training functions to mobilise 
thousands of young activists on issues such as freedom of expression, the 
establishment of transparent power structures, and the holding of free and 
fair elections. They conducted numerous regional pickets, mass rallies and 
distributed printed material in the most isolated regions of the country.
17
 
PORA notably created a website that became one of the most popular 
online information sources before and during the revolution, allowing 
activists to overcome the general information blockade at the time. Its 
activities were backed by the US administration, through its ties with key 
members of the Ukrainian diaspora.
18
 The US–Ukraine Foundation, 
                                                      
17
 V. Kaskiv, I. Chupryna and Y. Zolotariov, “It’s Time! PORA and the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine”, in J. Forbrig and P. Demeš  (eds),  Reclaiming Democracy: 
Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe, German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, Washington, D.C., 2008, p. 139 (retrieved from 
http://www.gmfus.org//doc/ReclaimingDemocracy_web5.pdf
). 
18
 F. Arias-King, “Orange People: A Brief History of Transnational Liberation 
Networks in East Central Europe”, Demokratizatsiya, Winter, 2007, p. 18 (retrieved 
from 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200701/ai_n19432273/ 
print
).  

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supported by USAID, helped organise the Znayu  campaign and trained 
young opposition representatives. In Georgia, KMARA’s origins can be 
traced back to a group of reformist students at Tbilisi State University, who 
benefited from links to major Georgian NGOs as well as the two principal 
opposition parties. These organisations provided KMARA with legal 
representation, services and training.
19
 Its activities were supported by the 
IRI, Freedom House, the German Marshall Fund and the Westminster 
Foundation, as well as several Western embassies. In addition, the 
International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) carried out several projects on 
youth education, aimed at encouraging modern and democratic thinking 
among younger generations. For this purpose, it financed several study 
tours of Georgian youth to visit European partner organisations. The 
opposition youth momentum in both Ukraine and Georgia was also 
supported by private philanthropists like George Soros, whose OSI and 
Central European University in Budapest aimed at reinforcing democratic 
values through Western-style, social science education. Indeed, many of the 
young revolutionary leaders from Ukraine and Georgia were Western-
educated. 
NGOs also proved pivotal in triggering the colour revolutions. In 
Ukraine, USAID financed the Citizen Action Network programme, which 
strengthened the legal framework to protect and encourage civil activism, 
and trained NGO representatives in political debate, organisational and 
financial capacity and in recruiting supporters. Freedom House and the 
German foundations worked with smaller NGOs at regional levels,
20
 by 
financing activities to foster citizen empowerment and human rights 
education. The US–Ukrainian foundation supported the largest NGO, 
Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU), which focused on voter education 
and mobilisation. The CVU later proved important in conducting 
monitoring activities and exit polls, along with spreading information 
about the violation of voters’ rights in the 2004 elections. Meanwhile, the 
IRF encouraged cooperation between NGOs and government structures, 
encouraged civil society monitoring of government regulations and 
established the Civil and Political Consultative Council of the Ukrainian 
                                                      
19
 Ibid., p. 106. 
20
  C.A.  Wallander,  “Ukraine’s  Election:  The  Role  of  One  International  NGO”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2005, pp. 2-3. 

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