Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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necessarily the case in other contexts. Yet, in so far as democracy promotion 
in the Middle East has been one of the self-styled goals of the West over the 
decades, the analysis below sets aside these considerations, simply taking 
Western aims of democracy promotion at face value. 
The objectives of Western engagement with political Islam  
Which objectives could be realistically pursued by the European and 
American actors toying with the idea of engagement with Islamist 
movements qua mass-opposition political actors in authoritarian contexts? 
Three principal objectives come to the fore.  
A lower-threshold objective is to understand Islamist movements and 
their evolution, and through them – in view of their societal and political 
relevance – understand trends in the Middle East. The recent history of 
Western policy in the region is rife with gross miscalculations of the 
fundamental trends at work. Examples include the overestimation of Ayad 
Allawi’s strength in Iraq in 2005, the surprise victory of Hamas in Palestine 
in 2006 or the unexpected alliance between Christian leader Michel Aoun 
and the Shiite Hizbullah in Lebanon following the latter’s walkout from 
government in the autumn of 2006. Much of the reason for these 
miscalculations is the over-reliance of Western actors on the messages 
delivered by liberal, secular ‘friends’ in the Middle East, which while being 
supported politically and financially by Europe and the US, have little 
standing in the region. The West may not necessarily like the picture 
painted by Islamists or their interpretation of trends in the region; but as 
political actors more embedded in society than their liberal, secular 
counterparts, they could provide information and analysis that would help 
the West formulate its foreign policies more accurately and effectively. This 
does not mean that the West should halt its consultations with liberal and 
secular groups. It is simply to say that it should diversify its sources of 
information and exchange to gain a more complete and nuanced picture of 
trends in the region.  
The second more ambitious objective is that of engaging political 
Islam in order to enhance its role as a force for political change in the 
region.
3
 The rationale for this objective does not stem from the inherent 
                                                      
3
 On this, see for example E. El-Din Shahin, Political Islam: Ready for Engagement, 
FRIDE Working Paper No. 3, FRIDE, Madrid; see also A. Hamzawy, The Key to 
 

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acceptance by Islamists of democracy and its virtues.
4
 It rather derives from 
the political reality of these movements as mass opposition actors. In so far 
as political change comes by shifting domestic (as well as regional and 
international) political balances, and given that Islamists in the Middle East 
represent to date the only mass opposition groups worthy of the name, a 
second possible objective would be to engage Islamists for the purpose of 
promoting democracy. Given that democracy cannot be imposed or 
generated by externally breeding secular liberals, if the West is serious 
about democracy promotion, it must be  prepared  to  engage  with  who  is 
out there by working with Islamists in their struggle for political 
participation. In some instances, Western actors have started treading this 
path. Examples include the efforts made by the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) in supporting 
an Islamist–socialist coalition in Yemen in 2003–04. It also and most notably 
includes the insertion of the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development, 
the Jordanian Wasat or the Yemeni Islah in the NDI’s programmes for 
party building, parliamentary strengthening, women’s participation, 
advocacy, strategic planning, recruitment, constituency outreach and 
media training.
5
 Yet these remain ad hoc and limited initiatives carried out 
by American non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and they are not 
extended to Islamist actors that are viewed as more radical or anti-systemic 
by their regimes or by the West.  
The third and most ambitious objective, relevant in conflict contexts, 
is to ensure the success of peace processes on the ground. In conflict 
situations such as Palestine, Lebanon or Syria, peace does not simply 
require a formal agreement signed by ‘moderate’ elites. If an agreement is 
to be accepted by the people and subsequently implemented on the 
ground, it must hedge against the ‘spoiler’ potential of domestic 
                                                                                                                                       
Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists, Policy Brief No. 40, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Washington, D.C., 2005. 
4
 M. Asseburg, Moderate Islamists as Reform Actors, SWP Research Paper No. 4, 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 2007. 
5
 M. Yacoubian, Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy: A Preliminary 
Assessment, USIP Special Report No. 190, United States Institute for Peace, 
Washington, D.C., August 2007. 

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opponents.
6
 To do this, popular radical actors such as Hamas and 
Hizbullah must be brought into the picture, as their engagement and 
involvement may well be the only recipe for acceptance. The underlying 
factor to bear in mind here is that those excluded from a peace process 
often tend to oppose it. Hence, it is important to engage with actors such as 
Hamas and Hizbullah, because of both their spoiling potential and the 
popularity of their political messages. Driven by this logic, the EU Observer 
Group coordinated by Alistair Crooke, involving diplomats from different 
European embassies, had established such a dialogue between 2000 and 
late 2003, although this was subsequently halted.
7
   
Lessons from Europe: The Cases of Spain, Ukraine and Georgia 
How can these complementary objectives be met? In seeking lessons and 
best practices, what can be learned from Western experiences of 
engagement with opposition actors in other authoritarian contexts in the 
past? As noted at the outset, Western interest in political Islam is growing. 
Yet engagement with Islamists remains at a stage of infancy. In the case of 
the US, American institutes have worked with Islamists in relatively 
‘unproblematic’ countries such as Morocco, Yemen and to a lesser extent 
Jordan. In these countries, Islamist parties are legally recognised and do not 
work against their pro-Western regimes. At the same time, they espouse a 
more open rhetoric on democracy, rights and the rule of law than their 
regimes do, making them evident targets for democracy promotion 
programmes. In the EU, while official engagement is harder to come by, 
there have been attempts such as the initiative on “Dialogue with the 
Islamic World” launched by the German ministry of foreign affairs in 2002, 
the informal dialogue opened by a group of member state embassies led by 
Sweden with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 2003–04 and the training 
seminars on political Islam held by the Commission since 2007.  
                                                      
6
 On the concept of spoilers in peace processes, see E. Newman and O. Richmond 
(eds),  Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution, 
Tokyo: UN University Press, 2006.  
7
 See A. Crooke, “Bottom-up Peace-building in the Occupied Territories”, Conflicts 
Forum, Beirut/London/Washington, D.C., 2007 (retrieved from 
www.conflicts.forum.org
). 

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