Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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faction among other parliamentary factions when organising larger 
meetings or conferences. More broadly speaking, it is deemed preferable to 
approach selected individuals in their personal or professional capacities 
(such as judges, lawyers, bloggers and human rights activists), rather than 
the party/movement as an institution.  
In some countries, meeting Islamists in their capacity as party 
representatives is not possible at all, while in others it is only feasible in the 
context of conferences or other public meetings that equally involve 
representatives of other parties. Conversely, diplomats meeting with 
members of controversial Islamist groups often claim to have done so in a 
private or non-diplomatic professional capacity. Where bilateral meetings 
are agreed, embassies ensure that these take place at the lowest level 
possible of the diplomatic hierarchy. Direct contacts on an ambassador 
level, even informal, are rare exceptions that are likely to lead to diplomatic 
difficulties following publication in the media.  
In some delicate cases, European governments sent (or did not object 
to) semi-official intermediaries/stooges to hold the talks. Most 
prominently, this happened in the Palestinian context when the EU found 
itself deprived of its political role in the Arab–Israeli conflict after having 
barred itself from having political contacts with Hamas in 2006. Eventually, 
several European governments looked for ways to bypass the engagement 
ban without risking a political upsurge. Among EU member states, Sweden 
and the UK were reported to have been the first to resume talks de facto 
through intermediaries. France found itself in the headlines in spring 2008 
when a retired French ambassador was reported to have had direct contact 
with leading Hamas officials, sparking the Le Figaro headline, “The French 
are talking to Hamas”. Bernard Kouchner said in a somewhat ambiguous 
reaction that these had not been official political contacts, as the retired 
ambassador did not represent the French government. At the same time, he 
defended the step, saying the encounters were “not relations; they are 
contacts”, and that France “must be able to talk if we want to play a role”.
19
 
In many instances, European ministries (directly or indirectly 
through non-governmental intermediaries) invite Islamists to conferences, 
study tours or meetings in their European capitals. Several ministries 
                                                      
19
 S. Erlanger, “France Admits Contacts with Hamas”, New York Times, 20 May 
2008. 

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organise seminars on or linked to the topic of moderate Islamism in their 
capitals, also inviting representatives of moderate Islamist parties as 
participants.
20
 European governments frequently fund NGOs and political 
party foundations that engage directly with Islamists. On numerous 
occasions, European NGOs and think tanks have organised seminars and 
other fora involving European MPs, government representatives and 
moderate Islamists, both in the MENA countries and in Europe. Indeed, 
some analysts recommend that the German party foundations, which tend 
to complement the German authorities by engaging in more politically 
delicate fields, should play a key role in engaging Islamists in the MENA 
without risking major diplomatic trouble.
21
   
Conclusions 
Taking into account the limited value of discussing ‘engagement with 
Islamists’ on an abstract regional level, along with the limited willingness 
of European governments to provide information on this issue, a number of 
conclusions can still be drawn. 
Consensus on principle, clash on terms and conditions.  In spite of 
widespread reservations regarding the democratic bona fides of certain 
groups and the impact that is to be expected from engagement, there is a 
sense among EU member states that some form of greater strategic 
engagement with moderate Islamists in the MENA will be unavoidable. 
However, the issues of how, when, with whom and why remain of great 
                                                      
20
 The Dutch ministry of foreign affairs reportedly organised (through a US-based 
NGO) a series of closed meetings involving dialogue with a specific group of 
participants, including representatives of different Islamist groups, at The Hague. 
The meetings took place on a regular basis and aimed at exchanging information 
and increasing mutual understanding. According to participants, eventually the 
dialogue meetings “bled to death” when “everything had been said”, not least 
because some of the European funders pulled out and US funds could not be used 
owing to the moral objections of some group members. 
21
 But even the party foundations are not immune to political frictions. For 
example, a conference held by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Beirut, which was 
organised in cooperation with a local think tank associated with Hizbullah and 
which included the participation of Hizbullah members, caused a major diplomatic 
uproar. 

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controversy and are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. This 
controversy  has led to a lowest-common-denominator policy at the EU 
level that touches on the region’s hotspots and which is likely to remain 
reactive rather than preventive. Such policies will lead to anything but de-
radicalisation. 
Inclusion remains theory. Despite frequent abstract declarations of 
intentions, a development of strategic ties with moderate Islamist groups in 
the MENA through systematic contacts has not yet taken place. Member 
states, keen to maintain full sovereignty on this issue, have largely been 
engaging in bilateral, informal, low-key contacts on an ad hoc basis. 
Systematic and formal engagement is the exception rather than the rule and 
there is hardly any evidence of open institutionalised partnerships, let 
alone funding. The timid trend towards an inclusion of all relevant societal 
actors at the discourse level has not yet found its way into policies and 
political practice.  
Emotions over expertise.  While the substantial intellectual work and 
debate on political Islam has helped to ease some of the prejudices and 
simplistic views on Islamist activism, the level of both expertise and 
rational debate about this issue is still frighteningly low even among 
European government institutions. The lack of direct contacts and reliance 
on second-hand information go hand in hand with persistent monolithic 
views on Islamism. Many European high-level decision-makers have never 
personally met and exchanged views with a representative of an Islamist 
party. Decisive in this respect are the strong repercussions that such actions 
would have among European electorates, themselves afflicted with the fear 
factor of the post-9/11 era that too often equates Islamism with terrorism.  
Stigma of response to Hamas paralyses debate. The EU’s clumsy response 
to the rise of Hamas in the Palestinian Territories has become a stigma 
representing the inability of European governments to respond adequately 
and coherently to the rise of Islamist political actors in the region.  
Religious and culturalist perceptions of Islamism. Surprisingly, the EU – 
itself among the strongest advocates of secular politics – and member states 
respond to the rise of faith-based politics in the MENA with an ill-defined 
blur of religion, culture and politics in institutions, policies and discourse. 
Difficulties in formulating coherent policies are greatest where Islamism is 
understood as a religious rather than a political phenomenon. While in 
some instances, the blur of religious, cultural and political notions may be 
designed purposefully to provide diplomatic cover, in many other cases it 

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