Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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stance on Hamas after the Palestinian elections, which “strongly reinforced 
sensitivities” and “paralysed the discussion on this issue”. 
Among the opponents of the common approach, a Portuguese 
diplomat voiced the concern that regardless of the Islamist issue, there 
could be “no general policy regulating opposition contacts that fits all”. A 
French representative stressed that it was not a question of creating special 
conditions for Islamists, but of including them “just like all other 
representative societal groups”, and therefore a particular “Islamist 
strategy” was not only unnecessary, but would also lead to an unhealthy 
exposure of a particular group defined by a religious reference. Moreover, 
the whole initiative had been inspired  partly  by  pressure  from  the  US 
government, which had “always wanted us to engage with the Muslim 
Brotherhood”. According to a Swedish diplomat, Swedish scepticism is 
rooted in the conviction that “all that is not forbidden should be allowed” 
and thus a set of common principles at the EU level would create 
unnecessary additional regulations to the detriment of diplomatic 
flexibility. Furthermore, the scope and depth of engagement also depends 
on the priorities and financial resources of each member state. A German 
diplomat explained that the idea of adopting common principles on how to 
approach Islamists was, from the German point of view, “completely 
beside the point”, as dealing with these issues on a bilateral level was both 
diplomatically safer and more efficient. Any common EU initiative was 
likely to appear as an “attempt to bring the [forces of] good to the Islamic 
world” and would be “a sure way of immediately turning all the 
governments of the region against us”. 
As far as EU technical and financial cooperation with Islamist 
organisations is concerned, Commission staff assure that there is no explicit 
EU provision that prohibits channelling aid to Islamist groups. Islamist 
civil society funding is said to be determined according to what drives the 
group’s interest in each case. In practice, however, while working-level 
contacts are reported to be frequent, parties and civil society organisations 
with an Islamist leaning are de facto mostly  excluded from formalised 
involvement in EU aid and cooperation programmes.
15
 Overall, neither the 
                                                      
15
 A. Boubekeur and S. Amghar, Islamist Parties in the Maghreb and their Links with 
the EU: Mutual Influences and the Dynamics of Democratisation, EuroMeSCo Paper 
No. 55, EuroMeSCo, Lisbon, October 2006, p. 21. 

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Barcelona process nor the European Neighbourhood Policy has been 
advancing engagement with moderate Islamists. This is not expected to 
change under the forthcoming Union for the Mediterranean.  
The European Parliament has always had a rather different approach. 
As it is subject to less scrutiny and constraint by both the European and 
MENA governments’ sensitivities, the European Parliament has a long 
history of direct engagement with Islamist political actors. Parliamentary 
delegations meet Islamist parliamentarians in inter-parliamentary exchange 
and visiting programmes across the region, and European Parliament 
resolutions explicitly advocate a proactive, open engagement with MENA 
opposition groups, including moderate Islamists. Similar ties also exist 
with a number of national parliaments in Europe (such as the German–
Egyptian parliamentary group). Unfortunately, the European Parliament’s 
more proactive approach towards Islamist political actors goes relatively 
unnoticed; so far, it has failed to have a meaningful influence on the 
policies of European governments.  
Member states: Political constraints 
The fundamental policy dilemma of European governments with respect to 
the MENA is the widespread perception of a permanent contradiction 
between the long-term development agenda, on the one hand, and the 
short-term security and trade agendas, on the other. Including all relevant 
societal actors for the sake of broad participation and de-radicalisation, and 
maintaining smooth relations with MENA governments, are two lines of 
action European governments are having trouble reconciling. The wider 
European public and even governmental institutions are also severely split 
over the issue. Several civil servants point to the “unpopularity” of 
advocating engagement with Islamists in their ministries. A Dutch 
diplomat remarked that by engaging with Islamists “you don’t get 
popular” and that where engagement was not officially forbidden, it was 
“definitely not encouraged”. Diplomats from several member states noted 
substantial internal obstacles in this respect and even feared disadvantages 
to their careers. Internal sensitivities in European ministries are largely 
ascribed to undifferentiated views on Islamism and the fear of harsh 
reactions on the part of domestic constituencies. As one diplomat noted, 
“rationality has nothing to do with it”, concluding that the entire political 
environment in Europe was “not conducive to such a dialogue”. 

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It is therefore not surprising that during interviews, most European 
government interlocutors ask not to be quoted on a personally attributable 
basis, and often display reluctance and insecurity regarding the 
information they are allowed to reveal. In addition to the fear of career 
setbacks, the lack of capacity and the inability to communicate fluently in 
Arabic are also mentioned as common obstacles that inhibit diplomats from 
proactively seeking dialogue with Islamists. On several occasions, 
diplomats (including French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner)
16
 have 
sought to relativise engagement with controversial groups through 
apologetic remarks (e.g. “we are not the only ones”). Insecurity and 
controversy within ministries, and even within the very units dealing with 
engagement, is at times considerable. One European diplomat working on 
dialogue with the Islamic world stated that he saw “no need for a position 
like mine” as dialogue was “dangerous” and “leading nowhere”, and that 
he was therefore “trying to destroy [his own] function”.  
In a few instances, diplomats deliberately leaked information about 
confidential policy shifts towards certain Islamist groups in an attempt to 
prevent their government from taking actions of which they personally 
disapproved. In 2005–06, a British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) official leaked to the press a number of secret internal memos 
advocating a more active UK engagement with the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood – a policy shift reportedly approved by then foreign secretary 
Jack Straw. The leaks led to several very critical articles in the New 
Statesman and the Observer, and a polemic debate about “the British state’s 
flirtation with radical Islamism”.
17
 The FCO whistleblower later claimed he 
had leaked the documents to “expose dangerous government policy” and 
that his own unease was shared by many others in the FCO.  
European officials also emphasise the role of Muslim immigrant 
communities in Europe as a major factor linking engagement with Islamists 
abroad to the domestic context. A French representative even identified the 
different immigrant communities in EU member states as the one key factor 
                                                      
16
 See “France Admits Contacts with Hamas”, New York Times, 20 May  
2008 (retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/world/europe/ 
20france.html
). 
17
 M. Bright, “When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries: The British state’s 
flirtation with radical Islamism”, Policy Exchange, July 2006. 

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