Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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good relations with the domestic regime (such as regional conflict, 
cooperation on anti-terrorism, trade, migration, energy) and the possible 
repercussions engagement may have in the European domestic context (for 
example, in large, Muslim immigrant communities).  
EU government relations with Islamist opposition parties and 
movements in the MENA vary greatly according to different national 
settings: 
•
 
In Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain, Islamist movements (such 
as the Justice and Development Party, PJD; Islamic Action Front, IAF; 
Islamic Constitutional Movement, ICM; al-Wefaq) are legal, 
recognised political actors with parliamentary representation. 
Contacts with European government representatives take place 
regularly. Thanks to the comparatively liberal environment in these 
countries, European embassies are also able to make occasional 
contact with illegal but non-violent Islamist movements (for example, 
the Justice and Charity movement in Morocco) on a low-key basis, 
even though this is considerably more sensitive. While the regimes 
leave no doubt that they do not appreciate such contacts, meetings 
with illegal moderate groups are not usually prevented, nor do they 
lead to major diplomatic rows.  
•
 
In  Algeria  and  Egypt, moderate Islamists also enjoy parliamentary 
representation, either as members of a legal party (Movement for the 
Society of Peace, MSP; Movement for National Reform, MRN; Islamic 
Renaissance Movement) or as independents (Muslim Brotherhood, 
MB). In Algeria, the MSP forms part of the governing coalition, but it 
sees itself rather as the opposition. In both countries, contact is being 
made with Islamist parliamentarians, even though the regimes do not 
appreciate this and often give diplomats a hard time. In Algeria, 
incentives to meet Islamist parliamentarians were often considered 
too low to risk good relations with government counterparts for the 
sake of engagement with a co-opted, unpromising Islamist 
opposition. In Egypt, interest in the Muslim Brotherhood is 
substantial and most European embassies occasionally engage with 
MB parliamentarians and to a lesser degree with non-
parliamentarians.  
•
 
In  Tunisia  and  Syria, Islamist parties are illegal. Contacts with 
Islamists at the domestic level are practically impossible because of 
heavy constraints, surveillance and the political repression of Islamist 

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movements. The regime’s confrontational relationship with the 
outlawed an-Nahdah and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and the 
resulting constant surveillance by the secret services, impede any 
direct domestic contacts. In contrast, encounters between European 
diplomats and exiled members of outlawed Islamist movements do 
take place on European soil, beyond the direct radar of national 
security services.  
•
 
The most complex, controversial and sensitive cases are, of course, 
Palestine  and  Lebanon. While both Hamas and Hizbullah do not 
clearly fulfil the criterion of non-violence used here to describe 
‘moderates’, they cannot be left aside as any assessment of European 
engagement with moderate Islamist movements must be seen in the 
light of the politicised regional context shaped by these two cases. 
Open engagement with Hizbullah was largely uncontested when the 
party was in government, and now most EU member states still 
consider engagement justified and necessary, as Hizbullah is a legal 
party and an integral part of the Lebanese political landscape. It is 
acknowledged that “there will be no solution without them”. EU 
formal political contacts with Hamas have officially been banned 
since Hamas was listed as a terrorist group by the EU in 2006. As a 
non-EU member, Norway is free to engage with Hamas, and is the 
only European country to have done so openly. Several EU member 
states have nonetheless maintained contacts with Hamas in spite of 
the ban, using diplomatic grey areas to bypass the common EU line. 
Within this variety of national settings, a number of different motives 
guide the EU’s interest in engaging with particular groups. The motive 
most frequently mentioned by EU diplomats is obtaining reliable 
information about the goals, policies, internal debates and trends of the 
group in question, and its analysis of domestic and regional developments. 
Aware of notable past Western misreading of trends in the region, it is 
understood that European analysis of domestic and regional developments 
must be based on first-hand information from representative stakeholder 
sources on the ground. Embassy staff in particular stress the need for direct 
contact to enable them to provide a realistic report of the political situation 
in the country to their capitals. They claim that the image portrayed of 
Islamist and other opposition groups in a region where the mass media are 
controlled by the regimes has constituted an insufficient basis for informed 
European policy decisions.  

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Engaging with Islamists in a bid to influence domestic developments 
positively in anticipation of an upcoming political shift or surge in 
democratisation, albeit often stressed by analysts, is rarely mentioned as 
one of the major driving forces behind European engagement. Exerting 
influence is mostly understood in the sense of improving Europe’s image, 
rather than boosting democratisation. At the same time, the notion of 
positively influencing the development of Islamist movements through 
engagement – socialisation – has gained substantial weight in the context of 
European security and anti-terrorism policies with a view to preventing 
radicalisation.  
Improving their image is also an argument frequently mentioned by 
Islamist leaders in favour of engaging with European actors. By engaging 
with the West, they hope to upgrade their image from an undifferentiated 
and blurred extremist/terrorist notion towards the picture of a moderate, 
potentially reformist force. By deconstructing what they perceive as 
prejudices in European public opinion, many moderate Islamist 
movements ultimately hope to shift European policy-making towards the 
region away from stability-oriented cooperation with authoritarian 
governments.
9
 
At the same time, engagement with Western governments and 
sometimes even with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can bear a 
series of risks for Islamist actors domestically. Depending on the varying 
degrees of harassment that different movements and individuals may 
expect from their home regime when accused of plotting with foreigners, 
Islamist politicians are often reluctant directly to engage with foreign 
officials without the regime’s knowledge. Frequently, the latter’s reaching 
out to the West provides the occasion that regimes need to target and 
clamp down on a particular group or individual. There are countless 
examples of instances in which MENA regimes have tried to prevent 
European officials from meeting with Islamists, and of Islamists having 
been punished as a direct consequence of such engagement. Often Islamists 
reject invitations to Europe or other engagement offers out of fear of 
                                                      
9
 For an account of Islamist leaders’ views on European foreign policy, see M. 
Emerson and R. Youngs (eds), Political Islam and European Foreign Policy: 
Perspectives from Muslim Democrats of the Mediterranean, CEPS and FRIDE, Brussels 
and Madrid, 2007
.
  

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