Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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conditioning the way each EU member state deals with Islamist 
movements abroad. Certainly, France, the UK and Germany, the EU states 
with the largest MENA immigrant communities, are also among the 
countries that most proactively approach the issue of engagement.  
The aftermath of 9/11, and the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London 
bombings have seen several European governments set up specific 
units/posts with proper human and financial resources in their foreign or 
development ministries and embassies. These new units have aimed at 
enhancing dialogue and cooperation between the West and the Islamic or 
Arab world, with varying scope, approaches and priorities. Institutions 
have included a division for “Dialogue with the Predominantly Islamic 
World” in the German foreign office (since 2002), an adviser for relations 
with the Islamic world at the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs (2002), an 
ambassador-at-large for relations with the Islamic world at the Spanish 
ministry for foreign affairs and cooperation (2006) and a unit for “Engaging 
with the Muslim World” in the UK (which in 2007 was tellingly merged 
into the anti-terrorism department). Moreover, specific “Islam observers” 
have been placed at 25 German embassies around the world (2002) and 
regional public diplomacy officers for the Arab world/MENA have been 
located at the Dutch (2008) and British embassies in Cairo, respectively. In 
addition to specific institutions, a number of special policy initiatives 
seeking to enhance dialogue and understanding along with political 
cooperation and cultural/social exchange between Europe and the Muslim 
world have been established (including the Alliance of Civilisations 
initiated by Spain and the Swiss-led Montreux Initiative).  
The French ministry of foreign affairs does not have a specific unit for 
engaging with Islamists, but the staff of the semi-independent policy-
planning unit of the Quai d’Orsay is reported to have a greater margin of 
manoeuvre with regard to contacts. Notably, unlike similar posts in other 
member states, the mandate of the French conseiller pour les affaires 
religieuses is strictly limited to religious affairs and clearly separated from 
political dialogue activities with Islamists. The UK, eager to prevent 
radicalisation against the background of its military engagement in Iraq, is 
the European country that most systematically links external and internal 
dimensions of engaging with Islamists through an integrated inter-
ministerial approach with a clear security/anti-terrorism focus. The UK 
model is widely seen by other member states as a good example 
institutionally, as its integrated inter-ministerial approach is believed to 

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maximise synergies between the internal and external dimensions of 
political Islam. At the same time, the UK’s unequivocal security/anti-terror 
focus also raises some criticism as reinforcing simplistic perceptions 
equating Islamism with terrorism. While the security dimension is decisive 
in all national policies, some European countries approach the issue from a 
more pronounced security focus that directly links Islam or Islamism with 
anti-terrorism measures (the UK and Switzerland). Others set a stronger 
focus on inter-civilisational dialogue in a broader sense, including from a 
long-term, democratic development angle, and draw clearer institutional 
lines between security and inter-civilisational dialogue units (Germany and 
Spain). Meanwhile, some do not appear to engage much at all (smaller and 
Eastern European member states). Sweden and Norway consider 
themselves particularly suited to engage in dialogue activities owing to 
their lack of negative historical baggage in the region.  
An overarching theme affecting Europe’s relations with Islamists is 
the former’s prevailing religious or culturalist perceptions of Islamism. 
European political activities, institutions and policy documents aimed at 
engaging with Islamist political actors are often undertaken under the 
heading of interfaith, inter-civilisational or intercultural dialogue. France, 
with its distinctive laic heritage, is a notable exception in this regard. 
Germany, by contrast, has a unit for Dialogue with the Islamic World in the 
German foreign office that is financed from the ministry’s culture budget 
line, although – as German diplomats admit – the unit’s activities and 
objectives are of a political rather than cultural nature. Several European 
diplomats in charge of dialogue cautioned against mistaking the decidedly 
political engagement issue for a religious matter (“we are not here to bring 
rabbis, monks and imams together”). This concern is often shared by 
moderate Islamist politicians who complain about being invited to talk 
about Islam instead of pressing societal problems in the MENA. 
There are some concerns among EU diplomats that the current 
engagement debate is directed towards “engagement for its own sake”. 
Many emphasise that dialogue with Islamists is not a goal in itself, but 
must be a means to achieve clear strategic objectives. Another common 
notion across European ministries and EU institutions is that the challenge 
is not engagement with Islamists as a specific target group, but rather their 
inclusion in dialogue activities and civil society initiatives as currently 
undertaken with secular societal groups. They stress the need to “de-
essentialise Islamism”, that is, to avoid replacing negative discrimination 

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