Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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with positive discrimination or exposure, and instead to include all 
representative groups in regular activities regardless of their religious or 
secular references. Even those who are critical of enhanced direct 
engagement stress the need for the EU to “actively demonstrate that there 
is no rejection of any political actors”. 
Trial and error in a diplomatic grey zone 
Among European governments, clear criteria for the choice of permissible 
interlocutors are rare. Beyond the limits of the EU’s terror list as the only 
set criteria, there is agreement that engagement with groups or individuals 
that have not renounced violence as a means of action is taboo. There are 
differences, however, as to whether that includes implicit endorsement of 
violence or armed resistance against foreign occupation. In a similar vein, 
groups linked to terrorist groups/activities are considered off-limits, 
although here again individual member states are coming to very different 
assessments as to what that means in practice. There is broad consensus 
that engagement with individuals in public office, especially elected MPs, is 
permissible and desirable, even though not all EU member states take 
advantage of it.  
There is no general consensus on engagement with moderate Islamist 
actors who do not hold a public office, in particular with representatives of 
outlawed parties and organisations. All interlocutors emphasise the 
difficulties of engaging with outlawed groups. While the criterion of 
legality is mentioned by some member states as a precondition for 
engagement, for others this does not constitute an obstacle per se, but 
rather reduces the number of channels through which engagement can take 
place. 
Formal political contacts with opposition Islamist movements and 
individuals at the ministry or ambassador level are rare exceptions. The 
level at which contacts are deemed appropriate largely depends on the 
respective group’s legal situation and its degree of integration in political 
institutions. The great majority of direct contacts between European 
government representatives and moderate Islamists take place in the large 
diplomatic grey area of active and passive informal contacts. Indirect 
contacts through intermediaries are unproblematic and frequent in most 
settings, but lack the advantages of first-hand engagement. Striking the 
balance between first-hand insights and diplomatic provocation is a 
challenging tightrope walk for diplomats, at times entailing substantial 

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diplomatic and personal risk. Maintaining engagement with a low profile is 
widely considered not only a matter of precaution but also of efficiency, as 
the success of engagement with many groups depends heavily on 
discretion.  
Engagement with Islamist parties in power largely follows the pre-
defined channels and terms of international diplomacy (and is therefore not 
the focus of this chapter). When engaging with Islamists in opposition, the 
democratic legitimacy of an elected deputy provides foreign governments 
with a conveniently given channel for engagement, making it easier to 
justify contacts before the country’s authorities. Moreover, the legitimacy 
and official policy-making role of elected MPs further raise the level of EU 
interest in engaging with them. But even in the case of elected 
parliamentarians, contacts are usually not appreciated by the regime, so 
engagement must often take place above all informally and in the context 
of larger meetings involving other parties and factions as well. Several 
embassy personnel expressed doubts that contacts limited to 
parliamentarians were enough to provide a realistic picture of the internal 
developments of certain Islamist movements, as depending on the electoral 
framework, parliamentarians elected by their local constituencies are not 
necessarily key figures in the higher leadership of their party/movement. 
The most politically delicate – and least assessed – cases are those 
where Islamists have no parliamentary representation, so there is no pre-
defined formal channel for foreign diplomats to approach them. The legal 
status and more importantly the de facto quality of the group’s relations 
with the regime are decisive in determining the diplomatic risk entailed in 
engagement. In this context, European diplomats typically stress the 
primacy of intergovernmental relations. Many officials claim that 
engagement with the Islamist opposition is underscored by the same 
conditions and rules as engagement with other opposition groups. 
Evidence from the MENA region, however, shows that such claims are an 
expression of wishful thinking rather than a reflection of political realities. 
With a few exceptions, most European capitals do not give any 
explicit written directives to their embassies as to which groups they are 
allowed to meet or under what conditions. In most cases, this decision is 
left to the ambassador or the personal discretion of the political embassy 
staff. Likewise, most of the dialogue personnel at the foreign ministries in 
Europe do not have clearly outlined mandates or directives, leaving most 
activities to the ‘common sense’ and priorities of the diplomats in charge. 

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The absence of over-rigid, technocratic policy directives is widely seen as 
crucial to guaranteeing the necessary flexibility of action on the ground. 
Yet, the relative absence of clear directives from above on a matter as 
politically sensitive as engagement with Islamist organisations is a striking 
feature across many EU member states and institutions, often to the 
detriment of institutionalisation, policy coherence and the formation of 
strategic relationships. 
In a few cases, European capitals have instructed embassies not to 
engage with a specific group or with Islamists in general. After creating a 
special division for dialogue with the Islamic world in Berlin in 2002, the 
German foreign office gave directions to the embassies not to enter into 
direct contact with Islamists under any circumstances. In the following 
years, German diplomats say, reports from the embassies made clear to 
those in charge in Berlin that differentiated, reliable reporting about the 
political situation in the region was impossible without the option of 
entering into direct contact with all the important social and political 
actors. Consequently, the directive was loosened, allowing direct contact in 
principle but “without shouting it from the rooftops”. 
Embassy receptions and similar social occasions are often considered 
a convenient opportunity by both sides to meet under relatively low 
diplomatic risk. Embassy staff report how they are at times visiting 
“otherwise uninteresting conferences” at which they know Islamists will be 
present, “taking advantage of the coffee breaks” to meet members of 
outlawed groups in particular. But not even these meetings are free of 
diplomatic risk, as demonstrated by various incidents.
18
  
To evaluate the diplomatic risk involved in meeting a particular 
individual, diplomats stress the importance of labels. For example, 
parliamentarians can be met in their capacity as elected officials, but not 
necessarily as party representatives. While there is little objection to 
meeting elected Islamist parliamentarians even if their party is banned, it is 
considered essential to meet individuals solely in their capacity as 
parliamentarians. It is also considered important to avoid singling out their 
                                                      
18
 On one occasion, the UK deputy head of mission in Cairo invited Muslim 
Brotherhood parliamentarians among many other guests to a reception at his home 
and the Brotherhood’s MPs themselves leaked this to the press, leading to frictions 
with the Egyptian authorities.  

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