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become common wisdom that substantial political reform will only happen 
through effective pressure from within. Non-violent, non-revolutionary 
Islamist parties that aspire to take power by means of a democratic process 
have therefore often been portrayed as potential reform actors that carry 
the hopes of a volatile region towards genuine democratic development 
and long-term stability.
3
 The moderation of many formerly violent Islamist 
movements, their integration into national political processes and their 
increasing ability to turn broad societal backing into electoral successes 
have turned moderate Islamists into interesting political interlocutors.  
Analysis and debates on political Islam have mushroomed in recent 
years, helping to differentiate Western views on Islamists’ goals and means 
to some degree. Scepticism of the intentions of Islamist movements and the 
potential benefits of engagement with them is widespread. Many observers 
question the true democratic commitment of moderate Islamists and 
ascribe a hidden totalitarian agenda to them.
4
 Some critics argue that open 
engagement with Islamists by foreign governments would provide 
Islamists with undeserved attention and legitimacy. Some doubt that 
Europeans can have any substantial impact on Islamists’ internal direction. 
Others argue that the very assumption that Islam serves as the foundation 
for political identity in the region is mistaken.
5
 In addition, there are some 
who even deem the categorisation of Islamist movements on a moderate–
radical continuum as misleading. Reservations about the substantial “grey 
zones”
6
 in the political platforms of mainstream Islamist movements are 
                                                      
3
 See for example, A. Hamzawy, The Key to Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists, 
Carnegie Policy Brief No. 40, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington, D.C., August 2005; and M. Asseburg (ed.), Moderate Islamists as Reform 
Actors: Conditions and Programmatic Change, SWP Research Paper No. 4, Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, April 2007. 
4
 See for example, T. Bassam, “Why they can’t be democratic”, Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 19, No. 3, July 2008.  
5
 D. Brumberg, “Islam is not the Solution (or the Problem)”, Washington Quarterly, 
Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 97–116. 
6
 For a detailed assessment of such democratic ambiguities, see N.J. Brown, A. 
Hamzawy and M. Ottaway, Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the 
Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones, Carnegie Paper No. 67, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Washington, D.C., March 2006. 

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broadly shared by both critics and advocates. In spite of all fair scepticism, 
however, the lack of viable alternatives appears to lead to a growing 
consensus among analysts that some form of engagement will be necessary.  
The  time  to  engage  is  now.  Many argue that advantage should be 
taken of the relative openness currently shown by moderate Islamists 
towards the idea of engaging with the West, and especially Europe, in 
order to reach out to them and establish strategic links. Moreover, 
removing the stigma that has been attached to political actors with an 
Islamic reference over the last decades is becoming particularly important 
in the context of the increasing frustration of Islamist parties over the 
inability to have a meaningful influence on political realities in their 
countries through the political process. Overall, it has thus been dawning 
across EU capitals that Islamist actors can and should no longer be ignored. 
But how far has this timid inclination to engage found its way into policies 
and diplomatic practice? Has there actually been a shift of approach 
towards a systematic engagement with those who used to be the 
“untouchables”
7
 of EU relations with the MENA? 
Much talk about Western engagement with moderate Islamists stands 
in contrast to thin evidence. While headlines about bilateral contacts by EU 
member states with Hamas and Hizbullah dominate, little is known about 
the systematic engagement with moderate Islamist opposition parties and 
movements in the rest of the region. The present attempt to help address 
this lacuna assesses neither mainstream Islamists’ democratic credentials, 
nor the potential usefulness of engagement with specific groups. Clearly, 
the very political delicacy that has inhibited an open public debate on this 
issue also makes it difficult to conduct primary research on the topic. 
Hence, this chapter aspires to provide no more than a broad and 
fragmentary overview of the tendencies in the engagement of European 
governments with moderate Islamist groups across the MENA region; the 
motives and fears behind this engagement; and the channels, levels, policy 
frameworks and limits in which it typically takes place. Based on this 
                                                      
7
 R. Youngs, Europe’s Uncertain Pursuit of Middle East Reform, Carnegie Paper No. 
45, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., June 2004, p. 
12. 

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assessment, the conclusion drawn states a number of implications for EU 
democracy and de-radicalisation in the MENA.
8
  
A cost-benefit analysis of engagement 
Not surprisingly, the emerging consensus among analysts in favour of 
engaging with moderate Islamists is not yet matched by an equally strong 
consensus among European government representatives. Providing long-
term stabilising support for autocratic regimes in the region does not sit 
easily with actively seeking engagement with the first serious opposition 
the region has seen in decades. Moreover, a persistent, often ill-defined 
uneasiness towards Islamist interlocutors in general appears to be stalling 
the EU’s search for a common direction. 
Against the background of competing policy priorities in the MENA, 
individual diplomats keen on engaging with Islamist political actors are 
finding it difficult to assemble the necessary political support. EU policy 
circles, aware that some sort of shift of policy will be necessary, currently 
“fear the political implications of raising the issue”, as many are concerned 
that it “would look like a change of position”. The questions of when and 
how to engage with Islamists in the diverse national settings across the 
MENA are largely being debated on a flexible case-by-case basis. Fearing 
potential negative implications for bilateral relations with the host 
government, most member states have been keen to maintain full decision-
making power on this issue at the national level.  
The main determining factors of engagement include the degree of 
European interest in establishing dialogue with a specific group (for 
example, a rising political force likely to win elections); the diplomatic risk 
entailed (the group’s legal status and overall relations with the regime); the 
interest in engaging as opposed to other strategic interests that require 
                                                      
8 
The main findings of this chapter are based on personal interviews carried out 
specifically for the purpose of this study with approximately 45 European 
diplomats and Islamist politicians representing ministries, embassies and 
institutions. The interviews were conducted in European capitals (Brussels, 
London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid and The Hague) as well as those in the MENA 
(Cairo, Tunis and Rabat) between June and December 2008. With regard to the 
information used in this chapter, the interviewees agreed to be quoted on a 
personally non-attributable basis.
 

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