Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

124 |
 
A
NA 
E
CHAGÜE
 
 
internal Brotherhood/IAF factions after nine months of crippling internal 
divisions that had threatened to break up the movement.
45
  
Although the disappointing results of the 2007 parliamentary 
elections in Morocco led observers to predict an abandonment of political 
participation or even an engagement in clandestine activities, the PJD has 
made clear its commitment to participate in the system and rejected a 
withdrawal from politics as a signal of its disappointment over the political 
and electoral process. Instead, it has begun an internal dialogue to revise its 
position on key issues, leading to renewed focus on demanding real 
constitutional reforms and questioning the government’s laxity in 
combating electoral corruption.
46
 
The instrumental and ideological merits of participation continue to 
hold sway despite the unfairness of the system. Participation allows for the 
use of institutional instruments and methods as protection from the 
regime’s repression and enables the party to maintain a public presence. In 
addition, participation serves the party’s objective of struggling for gradual 
and meaningful reform.
47
 So it would appear that for now the incentives of 
remaining within the system outweigh the merits of defecting. 
When asked whether the Muslim Brotherhood would not be able to 
engineer the downfall of the regime quicker by becoming a more 
confrontational opposition, a member of the guidance bureau stated:  
This regime lost its legitimacy a long time ago. But the institutions 
of the state are owned by the people and if we withdraw from 
these institutions, we would be achieving nothing. It is very wrong 
to think that just because we participate in elections and have a 
presence in some of the institutions of the state we are lending the 
regime legitimacy.
48
 
                                                      
45
 “Shadi Hamid, Jordan: Fair Winds for the Brotherhood”, Arab Reform Bulletin, 
October 2008.  
46
 M. al-Khalfi, “The PJD between Inclusion and Cooptation”, Arab Reform Bulletin, 
March 2008. 
47
 Hamzawy (2008b), op. cit. 
48
 “Interview with Abdul Monei Abu El-Foutouh, Member of the Guidance Bureau 
of the Muslim Brotherhood”, Islamism Digest, August 2006. 

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R
ADICALISATION OF MODERATE 
I
SLAMIST PARTIES
:
 
R
EALITY OR CHIMERA
?
 
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125 
 
Confrontational strategies are the exception. In 2006, the ICM joined a 
coalition adopting a more confrontational approach in its push for electoral 
reform, which ended up favourably for them. Despite such instances of 
taking a more confrontational approach, any violent radicalisation is 
unlikely. 
Conclusions 
While the EU might feel comfortable with the model of partial liberalisation 
prevalent in Arab states, which disempowers groups that it finds 
ideologically distasteful, it is losing credibility by providing cover for 
authoritarian regimes. It is not in the EU’s interests to turn a blind eye to 
tactics that authoritarian regimes could just as well use against secular 
parties if these ever achieved enough  support  to  be  deemed  a  threat.  In 
addition, the EU is playing a dangerous game with its neglect of moderate 
Islamist parties. In sidelining the parties that have historically had the most 
support, the EU is seen to be disregarding the will of a majority of the 
population. Although parties that have agreed to play by the rules of the 
game are unlikely to go back on their commitment, they do stand to lose 
the support of their voters, who could in turn support actors who are more 
radical or simply choose to disengage from politics. In this way, the EU 
gives strength to those who argue for fighting the regime from outside the 
system. The EU should not determine engagement with parties based on 
ideology but rather on practices and stated commitment to some minimum 
standards. The standard for engagement should be a willingness to 
participate in the legal political process and acknowledgement of the 
legitimacy of the constitutional framework. In this way, the EU will 
encourage pluralism and maybe even moderation.  

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P
ART 
III. 
E
UROPEAN ENGAGEMENT
? 

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129 
 
 
7.
 
E
UROPE
’
S ENGAGEMENT WITH 
MODERATE 
I
SLAMISTS
*
 
K
RISTINA 
K
AUSCH
 
irect engagement
1
 with Islamist political movements has typically 
been a no-go area for European governments. In recent years, 
however, the limits of the European Union’s stability-oriented 
approach towards cooperation with authoritarian rulers in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) to defend the EU’s strategic interests in the 
region have become ever more obvious. The attempts of incumbent MENA 
rulers to portray the European choice of interlocutors in the region as either 
stabilising governments or de-stabilising Islamists are increasingly 
perceived as short-sighted and contradictory. Recent debates suggest that 
the search for viable alternative policy approaches is leading to a shift in 
the attitudes of European policy-makers towards moderate
2
 Islamist actors.  
There is no shortage of incentives to divert the course of EU policies 
in the region. Preventing the radicalisation of Islamist movements in the 
region  is  an  integral  part  of  the  EU’s counter-terrorism strategy. It has 
                                                      
*
 This chapter was also published as a FRIDE Working Paper in January 2009. 
1
 ‘Engagement’ is here understood as any form of formal or informal direct contact. 
The degree of intensity and institutionalisation of engagement may vary greatly, 
ranging from personal conversations over occasional informal encounters to long-
term institutionalised partnerships. 
2
 This chapter refers to ‘moderate’ Islamists as those parties or movements among 
the Islamist spectrum that have eschewed  or  formally  renounced  violence  in  the 
domestic context and aim at achieving their goals within the margins of the 
political process. 
D 

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