Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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programmes to expose the violation of journalists’ rights and helped 
establish the website “Maidan”, which provided information to help 
Ukrainian voters make informed political choices.  
The experiences of Spain, Georgia and Ukraine offer a wealth of 
lessons for external policies of engagement through training and capacity 
building. These lessons should by no means be applied to Islamist 
movements alone – but should rather concern all opposition actors with an 
interest in and commitment to reform and with genuine roots in society. By 
contrast, externally breeding reform actors with little domestic standing is a 
waste of resources at best or a cause for popular resentment and frustration 
at worst. 
Three principal lessons from Western capacity-building and training 
initiatives in our three case countries can be extrapolated and applied to the 
question of external engagement with political Islam. First is the need to 
deepen the degree of training and capacity-building support to opposition 
political parties. We have already noted how the NDI and the IRI have 
been active in this field. Yet the Spanish precedent especially suggests the 
necessity of a critical mass of support, whereby the PSOE received 
campaigning, strategy and party development training and funds from the 
SI, the German and French socialists, the British Labour Party and the 
German foundations. Likewise, opposition parties in Georgia and Ukraine 
were supported by a wide range of European and American foundations, 
universities and private philanthropists. It is high time that European 
actors build on the efforts made by American organisations, not least given 
their somewhat better reputation in the region compared with the US.
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Yet party training is feasible only in those countries – such as 
Morocco, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon – in which Islamist actors are 
legally recognised and allowed to operate. In other countries, this is not the 
case, making it difficult if not outright impossible for Western actors, 
including non-state ones, to engage in training and capacity building of 
‘illegal’ parties. In cases such as Palestine and Lebanon, Western actors 
might be reluctant to engage in capacity-building activities with parties 
viewed as radical or ‘terrorist’. Nonetheless, the second critical lesson 
drawn is the need for capacity-building efforts to concentrate on wider 
                                                      
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 Emerson and Youngs (2008), op. cit.  

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sectors of society. This would allow Western actors to engage with Islamist 
actors even in those contexts that are viewed as most politically radical. 
Georgian and Ukrainian liberals, like Islamists in the Middle East, are not 
confined to the elites and the rank and file of parties, but are spread across 
different spheres, including NGOs, professional associations, charities, 
media, youth organisations and student groups. Hence, there is a need to 
tailor capacity-building and training activities to these actors as well. When 
applied to the Middle East this entails a shift of focus away from urban, 
Westernised and elite-based NGOs, which receive the bulk of Western 
funds and attention, and concentrating on Islamic and non-Islamic youth 
groups, student associations, charities and other welfare organisations. In 
so far as over three-quarters of civil society in the Middle East is service-
based, any well-meaning policy of external engagement aimed at change 
and reform cannot ignore this sector. The Spanish precedent highlights the 
importance of including within the scope of civil society development, 
support for trade unions and professional associations, as key actors in any 
country’s associational life.  
Third, the experiences of Spain, Georgia and Ukraine (and to this one 
could also add countries such as Greece or Portugal as well as the Eastern 
European countries), while certainly distinct from the Middle East, could 
certainly be of substantial value to reform-minded opposition actors in the 
region, including Islamist movements. Thus, a lesson and suggestion in this 
respect would be that of organising meetings for representatives of Islamist 
political parties and civil society organisations in Europe to discuss, explore 
and learn from the experiences of former opposition groups in 
authoritarian states. Not only could this have a positive impact in terms of 
socialisation and learning, but it could also help build trust and 
understanding between Islamists and the West. 
Political pressure: A sine qua non for effective engagement 
Beyond the external engagement with opposition parties and civil society, 
Western policies played a role in the democratisation processes in Spain, 
Ukraine and Georgia by exerting credible pressure and conditionality on 
authoritarian regimes. Without pressure at the top, engagement with 
opposition actors alone is futile. In other words, engagement with 
opposition actors in authoritarian contexts must necessarily go hand in 
hand with conditional engagement and pressure on their regimes. 

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Opposition actors in Spain used their European links effectively to 
apply pressure on the regime. In 1962, a Congress of the European 
Movement in Munich drew up a declaration outlining the political 
conditions the European Community (EC) should demand before signing 
any agreement with Spain, a declaration that strengthened the anti-Franco 
lobby in Europe.
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 Earlier, in 1961, the SI had adopted these 
recommendations in order to exert pressure on foreign governments to 
stop cooperating with Franco. In 1966, the SI adopted a resolution that 
condemned the referendum on the Organic Law, which gave full powers to 
Franco and guaranteed the loyalty of state institutions to the regime. The SI 
also opposed Spain’s membership in NATO, the Council of Europe and the 
European Economic Community (EEC). It vocally protested against the 
arrests of members of the socialist opposition and the death sentences 
passed during the dictatorship, attracting international attention to Spanish 
affairs. After Franco’s death in 1975, the SI called for restoring full 
democracy in Spain, freeing all political prisoners, providing freedom of 
speech and association and freedom for all political parties and trade 
unions.
30
 
Earlier, in Germany the SPD had opposed the entry of Spain into the 
EEC. In 1972, Chancellor Willy Brandt declared that there was no 
possibility of Spain entering the EEC, because only democratic countries 
could become members of the Community. In France, the General 
Confederation of Labour Workers’ Force brought pressure on the French 
government to halt relations with Franco’s regime.
31
 The trade union 
movement was also active in mobilising pressure on the Spanish regime. In 
1961, a delegation of the ICFTU met with members of the US 
administration in order to persuade them to change their policy towards 
Franco’s regime and exercise pressure on the government. The ICFTU 
additionally put pressure on the regime by inducing local governments, 
national governments and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to 
protest against Franco’s rule and its violation of labour rights. In the UK, 
the TUC adopted a resolution that opposed the establishment of NATO 
military bases in Spain and rejected Spain’s entry into the alliance. The TUC 
                                                      
29
 Pridham (1991), op. cit., p. 218. 
30
 Ibid., p. 85 
31
 Anaya Ortuno (2002), op. cit., pp. 22-40.  

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