Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

 
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C
ONCLUSIONS
:
 
D
YNAMICS IN 
POLITICAL 
I
SLAM AND CHALLENGES 
FOR 
E
UROPEAN POLICIES
 
M
URIEL 
A
SSEBURG
 
Current dynamics and trends in political Islam 
As the contributions to this volume illustrate, there is no single trend or 
tendency among Islamist actors in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) today. Rather, four major trends can be identified. 
First, countries whose politics are dominated by the Arab–Israeli 
conflict have been facing challenges that stem from mainstream Islamists 
engaging in electoral politics while maintaining armed wings that engage 
in ‘resistance’ against Israel. Islamists in Lebanon (Hizbullah) and the 
Palestinian territories (Hamas) have participated in elections, in parliament, 
and in government, and have, in principle, renounced violence in the 
domestic power play.
1
 They have both, however, used weapons not only in 
the confrontation with Israel, but also in the fight against their domestic 
political opponents when they have seen their position threatened. In 
Lebanon, Hizbullah and its allies staged a show of force in May 2008 to 
institutionalise a power of veto on government decisions and safeguard the 
weapons of the ‘resistance’. In the Palestinian territories, after having won 
elections in 2006, Hamas saw its efforts at governing undermined. It pre-
empted being ousted from power by violently assuming control of the 
Gaza Strip in June 2007. The results of the use of force differed substantially 
                                                      
1
 For the religious underpinnings of Hamas’s stances as well as the entrenchment 
of radical views owing to Israeli military campaigns, see the chapter by Khaled al-
Hashimi, “Understanding Hamas’s radicalisation” in the present volume. 

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for the two entities: Hizbullah’s 2008 show of force unlocked the political 
blockade that had paralysed the country since late 2006. It led to the Doha 
compromise, which re-established a government of national unity with 
veto powers for the opposition and paved the way for elections in mid-
2009. Hamas’s 2007 violent takeover of the Gaza Strip led to a geopolitical 
split of the Palestinian Authority – where today we witness two competing, 
authoritarian political systems being consolidated in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip.  
What has widely been viewed by Arab publics as successful 
steadfastness in confronting Israel has won the Islamist national liberation 
movements extensive popularity in the region. Their domestic experience 
has also suggested to many that armed struggle rather than electoral 
politics pays greater political dividends. Still, and in spite of the admiration 
that Hizbullah and Hamas arouse, they have not generated imitators. 
Second, a new trend among Salafist actors has been noticed as some 
of them have abandoned their reluctance to engage in participatory politics. 
This is particularly remarkable as these Islamists traditionally have been 
preoccupied with emulating the ‘righteous’ or ‘pious predecessors’ (al-salaf 
al-salih) and have concentrated on fundamentals of faith as well as doctrinal 
purity. Yet in recent years, some Salafist groups (for example in Lebanon, 
Kuwait and Yemen) have overcome principled stances on restricting their 
activities to issues of faith and seeing their role mostly as one of ‘guardians 
of  pure  Islam’.  They  have  thus  come  not  only  to  engage  in  the  public 
sphere but also in elections and parliaments. As Omayma Abdel-Latif 
points out in her contribution, in Lebanon, some of these ‘new Salafists’ 
have also criticised confessionalism and taken a notable stance on dialogue 
with other political groups such as Hizbullah, hence breaking out of the 
pattern of sectarian politics.
2
 Engagement in politics has also led to quite 
substantial revisions with regard to issues pertaining to political and 
religious thought – as Lebanese Salafists have, at least de facto, accepted 
the Lebanese state, the legitimacy of a non-Muslim president and 
confessional pluralism. A similar trend can be discerned among Kuwaiti 
Salafists, who have recognised the constitution and concepts such as 
sovereignty held by the people, as well as political pluralism. While these 
new Salafists represent a marginal trend in Lebanon at present, in the May 
                                                      
2
 See the chapter in this volume by Omayma Abdel-Latif, “Trends in Salafism”. 

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2008 parliamentary elections in Kuwait, Salafists captured record shares of 
the vote, thereby sidelining the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic 
Constitutional Movement (ICM or Hadas).  
Third, the performance of the Turkish Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) stands as a major example of the successful ‘de-radicalisation’ of an 
Islamist party. As Senem Aydın Düzgit and Ruşen Çakır highlight, the 
AKP has evolved from a Welfare Party that had been committed to 
“reformist fundamentalism” to a party that pursues “strategic modernism”, 
and embraces pluralist democracy and a capitalist market economy.
3
 
Indeed, rather than pursuing an Islamic state through the democratic 
process, the AKP has undertaken fundamental reform in the field of 
democratisation and the stabilisation of the economy. It has entered into 
accession talks with the EU and used the Copenhagen criteria for EU 
accession to bolster its course of political reform. The pace of reform, 
however, has slowed considerably during the AKP’s second term in office. 
At the same time, significant sectors of Turkish society have been 
concerned about the AKP’s social politics, which have been perceived as 
encouraging the Islamisation of Turkish society (e.g. through its public 
sector recruitment policies) and undermining the secular order. The 
promotion of conservative social values by the AKP, backed by pious and 
conservative middle classes, holds strong potential for increased 
Islamisation. Meanwhile, forces in the administration and the military have 
been afraid of having their influence reduced further by way of reform – 
framing their interests as concerns about the AKP’s commitment to 
secularism and democracy.  
Fourth and possibly most relevant in the MENA region, the so-called 
‘moderate Islamists’ – i.e. those Islamists who have renounced violence as 
an instrument to achieve their domestic policy goals and who are ready to 
work from within the respective political system
4
 – scored some impressive 
                                                      
3 
See the chapter by Senem Aydın Düzgit and Ruşen Çakır, “Turkey: A sustainable 
case of de-radicalisation?” in the present volume. 
4
 On this definition of moderate Islamists, see Muriel Asseburg, Moderate Islamists 
as Reform Actors: Conditions and Programmatic Change, SWP Research Paper No. 4, 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, April 2007, p. 9. Thus, ’moderate’ should 
not be understood as a value judgment about the Islamists’ political and social 
goals. It does not mean that these groups necessarily espouse values that would 
 

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