Lexstat 18 usc section 1001 united states code service

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied because government presented sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for making false statement in violation of 18 USCS § 1001; government sufficiently proved that false statements that defendant gave to federal investigator were "material" because defendant was local conservation enforcement officer, investigator had initially relied upon defendant's good faith as fellow enforcement official, investigator was misled by defendant, and investigator switched focus of interview once he realized that defendant had not been entirely truthful with him. United States v Guishard (2006, CA3 VI) 2006 US App LEXIS 643.

123. Trick, scheme or device

Indictment was not insufficient because it failed to allege trick, scheme, or device by which the material fact was to be concealed, since it was knowing falsity of statement which is material part of statutory crime, not vehicle of its preparation. United States v Uram (1945, CA2 NY) 148 F2d 187.

Indictment which uses statutory language charging concealment by "trick, scheme, or device" is sufficient to inform defendants of charges against them and states offense under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v London (1977, CA5 Ga) 550 F2d 206.

Real estate developer's use of false loan closing statement to document and justify $ 2,225,000 loan amount, his causing true closing statement to carry camouflaged disbursement hiding his conversion of $ 612,000 overage to his own use and his admission that he had willfully concealed true purchase price in order to get loan larger than purchase price were sufficient to allow jury to conclude that he had concealed and covered up true purchase price by trick, scheme and device. United States v Swaim (1985, CA5 Miss) 757 F2d 1530, cert den (1985) 474 US 825, 88 L Ed 2d 66, 106 S Ct 81 and (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).

Indictment adequately alleged that bank customers violated 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 2 by aiding and abetting structuring of financial transactions of purchases of money orders totaling over $ 10,000 so as to avoid bank's duty to file CTR's, where they conspired with bank officers, who were aware of transactions to degree sufficient to impose duty upon bank, although defendants themselves had no duty to disclose, even though indictment failed to define particularly "scheme and device." United States v Farm & Home Sav. Ass'n (1991, CA8 Mo) 932 F2d 1256, cert den (1991) 502 US 860, 116 L Ed 2d 141, 112 S Ct 179.

Indictment charging that ". . . defendant did conceal and cover up by trick, scheme and device. . . a material fact in the following manner, to-wit;. . . the defendant furnished and delivered rolls of paper of a stated specification. . . under a contract,. . . that called for furnishing and delivering rolls of paper of a different specification. . . , and the defendant well knew that the said paper furnished and delivered did not comply with the required specification and the defendant willfully and knowingly committed the said fraud. . . ." was insufficient in that it failed to set forth essential facts showing concealment or covering up or any trick, scheme, or device. United States v Harris (1962, MD Ga) 217 F Supp 86.

Indictment charging that the object of conspiracy was to knowingly and willfully cause the falsification and concealment by any trick, scheme and device a material fact and cause the making of a false writing and document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious and fraudulent statement and entry in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, was impermissibly vague and insufficient to state an offense where the overt acts alleged in the conspiracy count of the indictment totally failed to indicate in any way the nature of the false information, or the agency to which the false information was to be submitted. United States v Borland (1970, DC Del) 309 F Supp 280, 73 BNA LRRM 2399, 62 CCH LC P 10688.

Indictment charging defendants with concealing material facts in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 sufficiently describes concealment scheme where count specifies dates, times, and locations of events while relying on statutory language unsupported by additional facts. United States v Bank of New England, N.A. (1986, DC Mass) 640 F Supp 36.

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Defendant's fraud convictions were proper because even though spendthrift trust appeared properly created under Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 112.035, it was rendered self-settled sham for purpose of concealing assets from FDIC and his activities in relation to trust constituted mail fraud, false statements, and concealment of assets under 18 USCS §§ 1341, 1001(a), and 1032. United States v McBirney (2008, CA5 Tex) 2008 US App LEXIS 752.

124. Use, presentation or filing of statement or document

It was not necessary to allege that defendants wrote and presented receipt, or that such receipt was to be used as predicate for false bill or claim against United States. Chevillard v United States (1946, CA9 Cal) 155 F2d 929.

Evidence at trial demonstrated that defendant signed certain union forms for both 2003 and 2004, defendant told Department of Labor investigators that she did, in fact, review forms, and defendant also admitted that consequences of false statements on forms would meant that payments to her would go undetected; thus, there was more than sufficient evidence for reasonable jury to find defendant guilty of false statement offenses with which she was charged. United States v Love (2008, CA8 Mo) 516 F3d 683.

Indictment was sufficient if it alleged presentation of affidavit with signature known to be false and forged. United States v Adler (1892, DC Iowa) 49 F 733.

It was not necessary to allege in indictment for making false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and representations in affidavit of non-Communist union officer that affidavit was filed. United States v Lohman (1953, DC Ohio) 127 F Supp 432, 27 CCH LC P 69129.

Indictment for making false deposition did not need to allege use or attempted use of deposition or that claim had been filed or was pending when deposition was made. United States v Rhodes (1887, CCD Mo) 30 F 431.

125. Miscellaneous

Allegation of loss or damage to government was not necessary in indictment under predecessor of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Goldsmith (1940, CA2 NY) 108 F2d 917, cert den (1940) 309 US 678, 84 L Ed 1022, 60 S Ct 715, reh den (1940) 310 US 657, 84 L Ed 1420, 60 S Ct 1073 and reh den (1941) 313 US 599, 85 L Ed 1551, 61 S Ct 956.

Indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 which alleged that in-office services listed on claim forms submitted for payment under Medicare and Medicaid programs by defendant physician were not actually rendered was sufficient. United States v Adler (1980, CA8 Mo) 623 F2d 1287.

Defendant's indictment sufficiently stated falsity and materiality elements under 18 USCS § 1001 to provide defendant with adequate notice of offense charged to overcome plain error review. United States v Hoover (2006, CA5 La) 467 F3d 496.

Indictment charging that defendants for purpose of inducing veterans administrator to insure dwelling made false statement warranting that dwelling had been constructed "in substantial conformity with plans and specifications therefor' was not invalid on ground of vagueness as to warranty. United States v Wender (1958, DC NY) 158 F Supp 496.

In denying federal employee's motion to dismiss counts of indictment for making false statements, court rejected employee's argument that indictment failed to allege affirmative act to conceal material fact, that is lobbyist's business dealings with GSA, because government, both in indictment and in its opposition, identified additional acts of concealment, other than one statement relied on by employee, such as employee's use of his home rather than work email. Taking indictment on its face - and not holding it up against evidence that had not yet been admitted (and much of which consisted of hearsay and required interpretation) - court concluded that indictment sufficiently alleged affirmative acts. United States v Safavian (2006, DC Dist Col) 429 F Supp 2d 156.

There was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of making false statements or acts of concealment under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1) because jury was adequately instructed and had sufficient evidence to find that defendant had requisite intent to commit each of false statement offenses and to find element of materiality; further, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs had jurisdiction to investigate whether defendant's participation in trip with lobbyists violated standards of ethical conduct because Committee was investigating lobbyists' dealings with Indian tribes. United States v Safavian (2006, DC Dist Col) 451 F Supp 2d 232.

False statement counts under 18 USCS § 1001(a) were not dismissed under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) because "truth paragraphs" satisfied stark contrast rule, defendant failed to show that statements were "fundamentally ambiguous," and any issues related to interpreting precisely what defendant meant when uttering statements were properly left to jury to decide at trial. United States v Hassoun (2007, SD Fla) 477 F Supp 2d 1210, 20 FLW Fed D 647, motions ruled upon (2007, SD Fla) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 25086.

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Evidence adduced at trial showed that former sheriffs department officer cooperated with investigators and agreed to wear wire to record conversations with other members of department and Government recorded conversation between officer and defendant, during which officer told defendant he was looking for known drug dealer in order to sell him half-kilogram of cocaine; FBI agents interviewed defendant as part of their investigation and during that recorded interview, defendant twice told agents he had no idea why officer was looking for drug dealer; in light of recordings, which were played for jury, sufficient evidence existed to support guilty verdict as to violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2). United States v Adams (2009, CA4 Va) 2009 US App LEXIS 14035.

C.Defenses 126. Authority

Appellant's assertion, that he was authorized, or reasonably believed that he was authorized, to sign his wife's name on documents he submitted, constitutes affirmative defense which tends to negate government's charge that he "knowingly" submitted false documents. United States v West (1981, CA2 Vt) 666 F2d 16, 7 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1506.

127.--Federal entity

Once it appeared that department had colorable authority to do what it was doing, accused could not justify his falsehood by collateral attack upon authority. United States v Barra (1945, CA2 NY) 149 F2d 489.

State department employee who was charged with making false and fraudulent statements and representations as to membership and activities in Communist Party could not justify his falsehood by a collateral attack upon authority of federal bureau of investigation, civil service commission and state department to investigate his activities in such subversive organization. United States v Marzani (1947, DC Dist Col) 71 F Supp 615, affd (1948, App DC) 83 US App DC 78, 168 F2d 133, affd (1948) 335 US 895, 93 L Ed 431, 69 S Ct 299.

Indictment charging owner of plywood mill with violation of 18 USCS § 1001, arising out of submission of production and consumption reports which falsely understated its use of resin, is stricken, where resin reporting requirements were not in emissions permit or state implementation plan and where there is no federal authority to regulate resin, because resin consumption reports are not within jurisdiction of EPA and cannot form basis for criminal liability under § 1001. United States v Louisiana Pac. Corp. (1996, DC Colo) 925 F Supp 1484, 43 Envt Rep Cas 1025, 27 ELR 20405, app dismd (1997, CA10 Colo) 106 F3d 345, 27 ELR 20715 (criticized in United States v Oakar (1997, App DC) 324 US App DC 104, 111 F3d 146) and (criticized in United States v Serafini (1999, CA3 Pa) 167 F3d 812).

128. Double jeopardy

Union president may not be convicted under Landrum-Griffin Act for willfully making false entry in union records and of violating 18 USCS § 1001 based on his activities in connection with only one record book. United States v Sullivan (1980, CA8 Mo) 618 F2d 1290, 89 CCH LC P 12105, 5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1230.

District Court did not err in refusing to dismiss portion of indictment charging violation of 18 USCS §§ 1001, 1623 on grounds of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel, where defendants had previously been acquitted of willfully and knowingly misapplying moneys entrusted to bank with intent to injure and defraud bank in violation of 18 USCS § 656, and willfully and knowingly making false material statement to bank for purposes of influencing actions of that bank in violation of 18 USCS § 1014, and conspiracy to commit those offenses under 18 USCS § 371, even though conspiracy charge in present indictment was dismissed on double jeopardy grounds, since substantive offenses charged under each indictment involved completely different statutory violations requiring proof of different facts, and involved completely different transactions. United States v Levy (1986, CA5 La) 803 F2d 1390.

Punishment under both 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 1014 for same acts of making false statements to federally insured financial institution did not violate double jeopardy, since Congress intended to allow cumulative sentences under 2 offenses, where 2 statutes are directed at different ends, and where, although § 1014 requires additional element of intent to influence financial institution, not merely any government agency, § 1001 does not appear to be lesser included offense of § 1014. United States v York (1989, CA5 Tex) 888 F2d 1050, 29 Fed Rules Evid Serv 142, reh den (1989, CA5) 1989 US App LEXIS 19532.

Double jeopardy did not bar retrial on all 6 statements made to FBI agents in furtherance of grand jury investigation, and alleged to be false on Count 1 under 18 USCS § 1001, where jury found defendant guilty of first statement by special verdict and made no finding as to others, since there was no implicit acquittal; Count 2 of indictment, alleging that justice was obstructed by means of one or more false statement enumerated in Count 1, was sufficient, even without itemizing particular statements, since it adequately protected defendant's right to be tried on charges presented to Grand Jury; double jeopardy would not be violated by his retrial on Count 2, since each count stated separate offense, and defendant had moved to dismiss on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or innocence. United States v Wood (1992, CA10 NM) 958 F2d 963, reh den, amd (1992, CA10) 1992 US App LEXIS 4656.

Double Jeopardy Clause prevented multiple convictions for violations of l8 USCS §§ 542, l00l for making false statements and misrepresentations to Customs officials, since every element needed to prove violation of § l00l is element of § 542, and there is no clear indication of congressional intent to provide for cumulative punishments under both statutes. United States v Avelino (1992, CA2 NY) 967 F2d 815.

Defendant may properly be punished both under 18 USCS § 287 for making false claim against United States and under 18 USCS § 1001 for making false statement in matter within jurisdiction of United States Probation Office, even though he committed only one act of lying about his ownership of Porsche during interview to determine whether he qualified for court-appointed counsel, since each statute requires proof of fact which other does not. United States v Allen (1993, CA4 NC) 13 F3d 105, 6 Fourth Cir & Dist Col Bankr Ct Rep 110.

Double jeopardy did not bar prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 for materially false representations made to Customs, where same statements had been determined in pretrial hearing to be immaterial under 18 USCS § 1623, since jeopardy never attached to first indictment, and question of materiality varies in context of each charge. United States v Bailey (1994, CA8 Mo) 34 F3d 683.

Double jeopardy clause did not bar government from prosecuting defendant for stealing money from federal agency under 18 USCS § 641 and making materially false statement to federal agency under 18 USCS § 1001(a) based on same acts of submitting false time cards for same pay period, since 18 § 1001(a), which required proof of materially false statement which 18 USCS § 641 did not, could not be lesser included offense of § 641, which required proof of theft of more than $ 100, which § 1001(a) did not. United States v Turner (1997, CA8 Mo) 130 F3d 815, cert den (1998) 524 US 909, 141 L Ed 2d 147, 118 S Ct 2071, subsequent app (1999, CA8 Mo) 189 F3d 712, 52 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1048, reh, en banc, den (1999, CA8) 1999 US App LEXIS 23014.

Assessment of civil penalties of $ 400,000 against tobacco marketer for exceeding federal marketing quotas subsequent to his acquittal on criminal charges did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause, since criminal prosecution required proof of intent which civil statute, 7 USCS § 1314(a) did not, while civil statute required proof of failure to remit penalty which 18 USCS §§ 1341, 1001, and 371 did not, and Congress intended penalty to be civil in nature. Cole v United States Dep't of Agric. (1998, CA11 Ga) 133 F3d 803, 11 FLW Fed C 987.

After defendant was acquitted on charges of supplying services to Taliban, subsequent prosecution under 18 USCS §§ 1001(a), 1503, and 1623 based on defendant's conduct in falsely denying that he had participated in jihadist camp and that he knew about people he had communicated with about training for jihad was not barred by collateral estoppel component of Double Jeopardy Clause of Fifth Amendment because issues of ultimate fact in two prosecutions were distinct. United States v Benkahla (2008, CA4 Va) 530 F3d 300.

Defendant's motion to dismiss charge of larceny of four postal money orders on ground that information filed in Federal District Court against accused involved same money orders, was rejected, where federal information set forth that accused representing to post office certain money order and falsely representing that he was lawful payee, violated 18 USCS § 1001, and where Federal Court convicted accused, but suspended imposition of any sentence, upon being advised of court-martial sentence; even if, instead of Federal Court, court-martial had tried § 1001 charge, there would not have been unreasonable multiplicity of charges, since criminal conduct involved was so basically different, and since accused was sentenced by only one court, he could not complain of multiple punishment. United States v Schwender (1958) 25 CMR 753.

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Conviction under 18 USCS § 101 did not violate double jeopardy protections where, although counts charged defendant with making same false statement to same recipient, false statements were made on two separate dates. United States v Lacefield (2005, CA6 Tenn) 146 Fed Appx 15.

Unpublished: Indictment charging defendant with conspiracy to commit document fraud under 18 USCS §§ 371, 1001 and 1546(a) and 42 USCS § 408(a)(6) and (7)(A) was not subject to dismissal under Double Jeopardy Clause of Fifth Amendment based on post-conviction dismissal in another court of charges of conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and to engage in document fraud; defendant was not acquitted in prior case and did not show that jury made factual findings that would have been fatal to instant case; also, prior charges and instant charges were not "same" for double jeopardy purposes because alleged conspiracies were separate and distinct. United States v Elmardoudi (2007, ND Iowa) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 48487.

129. Entrapment

Defendant's conviction for making false statements to United States agencies in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was affirmed notwithstanding defendant's argument that he was entrapped. United States v Cooper (1974, CA9 Cal) 501 F2d 1089.

Defendant in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 presented insufficient evidence of entrapment where there was no evidence on record that defendant's participation in conspiracy was induced by government agents, but rather he was induced to conspire with law breaker unassociated with government. United States v Freedson (1979, CA9 Cal) 608 F2d 739, 5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 627.

130. "Exculpatory no" defense

"Exculpatory denial" defense was not available in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 since employee of Small Business Administration had been advised of his constitutional rights several times and was also told of penalties for perjury, and circumstances surrounding employee's statement implicating coworker indicated that statement was deliberate falsehood which succeeded for short time in shifting focus of Secret Service investigation to innocent coworker. United States v Shanks (1979, CA2 NY) 608 F2d 73, cert den (1980) 444 US 1048, 62 L Ed 2d 736, 100 S Ct 740.

Predicate of "exculpatory no" defense is simply that negative response cannot serve as proof of knowledge and willfulness required to convict defendant under 18 USCS § 1001; such defense cannot prevail where inquiries which defendant responded to were purely administrative in nature, such as customs declaration forms. United States v Fitzgibbon (1980, CA10 Colo) 619 F2d 874 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v Solis (1997, CAAF) 46 MJ 31, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 5).

"Exculpatory" doctrine was not applicable as defense to falsification of affidavit to obtain court-appointed counsel in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, since defendant's holding of safe deposit box containing unreported cash suggested active concealment of his ownership. United States v Blackmon (1988, CA2 NY) 839 F2d 900, 24 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1123.

Individual who made false denial of his drug use in order to secure employment with government would not be entitled to "exculpatory no" defense, were it adopted, since he himself precipitated investigation by seeking employment with government, and policy underlying "exculpatory no" doctrine of limiting government's ability to coerce individuals suspected of self-incrimination during course of governmental investigations would not be advanced through protecting persons from prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 who make false statements in connection with their quest for government employment. United States v Barr (1992, CA3 Pa) 963 F2d 641, reh den (1992, CA3) 1992 US App LEXIS 14558 and cert den (1992) 506 US 1033, 121 L Ed 2d 684, 113 S Ct 811.

"Exculpatory no" doctrine is no defense to charge of making false statement in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, since there is no support for it in either statutory language or legislative history. United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35, affd sub nom Brogan v United States (1998) 522 US 398, 139 L Ed 2d 830, 118 S Ct 805, 98 CDOS 643, 1998 Colo J C A R 495, 11 FLW Fed S 322 and cert den (1998) 522 US 1107, 140 L Ed 2d 101, 118 S Ct 1033 and (criticized in United States v Whab (2004, CA2 NY) 355 F3d 155).

When federal agents asked defendant about his involvement in gun sale, he lied by saying that he didn't know what they were talking about and that there was no gun; defendant was charged under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) with making false statement to federal agents; while defendant claimed that he was simply asserting his Fifth Amendment right to end conversation, Seventh Circuit held that "exculpatory no" doctrine provided no valid defense to liability under 18 USCS § 1001; therefore, district court properly refused to provide instruction on defense. United States v Brandt (2008, CA7 Ind) 546 F3d 912.

Dismissal of indictment is denied in prosecution for making false statements to federal agents, where accused raised "exculpatory no" defense and where government stipulated to determination of defense on factual merits, because affirmative defense to false statement indictment under 18 USCS § 1001 must be raised at trial and not by motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b), because Rule 12(b) motions cannot be turned into criminal counterparts of motions for summary judgment and stipulation by parties cannot amend rules to create new motion. United States v Antonucci (1987, ND Ill) 663 F Supp 245.

"Exculpatory no" defense serves as exception to § 1001 and prevents government from punishing individual for giving false negative answer in response to government inquiry if truthful affirmative answer would have incriminated individual or if individual reasonably believed that truthful affirmative answer would have been incriminating. United States v Harrison (1985, ACMR) 20 MJ 710.