Lexstat 18 usc section 1001 united states code service

97.--Affidavits

Defendant falsified material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 when he signed affidavit stating that former IRS agent did not indicate his willingness to disclose government's case for income tax evasion against particular taxpayer where such false statement was calculated to induce action or reliance by IRS in its investigation. Brandow v United States (1959, CA9 Cal) 268 F2d 559, 59-2 USTC P 9699, 4 AFTR 2d 5489.

Defendant makes material false statement in affidavit issued in course of IRS investigation of third party where he denies association with person under investigation. Sica v United States (1963, CA9 Cal) 325 F2d 831, cert den (1964) 376 US 952, 11 L Ed 2d 972, 84 S Ct 970.

False affidavit submitted by defendant in court concerning IRS investigation of discrepancies between his income reported and received, in which third party incorrectly stated that he had made cash gifts of unspecified amounts to defendant during period in question, was material for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001, requirement of materiality having been construed to exist in second clause of this section; affidavit had natural and probable tendency to influence decision to be made by tribunal, such tendency being judged by content of document itself, and not by any special knowledge possessed or required by Service; while 18 USCS § 1001 does not apply to mere answers, including untruthful ones, to investigator's questions, submission of affidavit did not fall within "exculpatory no" exception to this section as defendant offered affidavit on his initiative, knew of criminal investigation, and nonetheless affirmatively and voluntarily misrepresented material fact in order to convince Service not to prosecute. United States v Johnson (1976, CA5 Ga) 530 F2d 52, 76-1 USTC P 9398, 37 AFTR 2d 1242, cert den (1976) 429 US 833, 50 L Ed 2d 97, 97 S Ct 96.

98. Miscellaneous

Pharmacist and drug store owner violated 18 USCS § 1001 when he falsely recorded in prescription file that 450 missing morphine sulphate tablets had been dispensed to particular customer. Coil v United States (1965, CA8 Neb) 343 F2d 573, cert den (1965) 382 US 821, 15 L Ed 2d 67, 86 S Ct 48.

Escrow agent's closing statement regarding disposition of approximately $ 33,000 is material within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Bailey (1984, CA7 Ill) 734 F2d 296, cert den (1984) 469 US 931, 83 L Ed 2d 263, 105 S Ct 327.

Airplane pilot's lies to Secret Service agents as to why he flew into prohibited airspace over President Reagan's ranch were material within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, since they were admittedly made in effort to prevent revocation of his pilot's license and to avoid possibility of criminal prosecution, and clearly had propensity to influence agency decisions. United States v Myers (1989, CA9 Cal) 878 F2d 1142 (criticized in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35).

Allegedly false statements made by police officers as to location of firearm they retrieved, whether from defendant's person or from black bag, were material, since they tended to influence, impede or dissuade government's investigation and prosecution of defendant, even though they may not have influenced ultimate charge against defendant of being felon in possession. United States v Gribben (1993, CA2 NY) 984 F2d 47.

Fact that FBI already knew that state senator had received $ 6,000 in cash from lobbyist for horse racing industry did not affect materiality of his statements to contrary, since FBI could not have concluded its investigation without interviewing him, and his responses foreclosed this critical line of questioning. United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P, reh, en banc, den (1995, CA6 Mich) 1995 US App LEXIS 19703 and cert den (1996) 516 US 1043, 133 L Ed 2d 657, 116 S Ct 701 and (criticized in United States v Robertson (2003, CA8 ND) 324 F3d 1028).

Although government failed to sustain its burden of proving that interest and royalty payments were nonreimbursable under Medicare, concealment of their true nature, as well as concealment of advertising costs under term "outreach," constituted material falsity for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Calhoon (1996, CA11 Ga) 97 F3d 518, 51 Soc Sec Rep Serv 740, 45 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1081, 10 FLW Fed C 493, cert den, motion gr (1997) 522 US 806, 139 L Ed 2d 11, 118 S Ct 44, reh den, motion gr (1997) 522 US 1037, 139 L Ed 2d 626, 118 S Ct 648.

Although district court plainly erred when it decided element of materiality as matter of law, error did not seriously affect fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, where United States presented unrebutted evidence that false 10-K report which overstated profit by $ 7,000,000 not only had tendency to influence SEC but did in fact influence that agency to take remedial action against defendant. United States v Schleibaum (1997, CA10) 130 F3d 947.

Defendant does not falsify material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where his misstatement concerning Communist-front organization is merely part of lengthy affidavit and without weight or influence in any decision to be made by Subversive Activities Control Board. Weinstock v United States (1956, App DC) 97 US App DC 365, 231 F2d 699.

Falsifications on financial disclosure statements filed by congressman under Ethics in Government Act (Public Law No. 95-521, 92 Stat 1824) meet materiality requirement for conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 where falsifications relate to financial transactions which are within charge of committee to which forms are submitted and tend to conceal information that would prompt investigation or action. United States v Hansen (1985, App DC) 249 US App DC 22, 772 F2d 940, cert den (1986) 475 US 1045, 89 L Ed 2d 571, 106 S Ct 1262, post-conviction relief gr, remanded (1995, CA9 Idaho) 1995 US App LEXIS 27043, habeas corpus den, request den, request gr (1995, DC Dist Col) 906 F Supp 688 and (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163) and (criticized in United States v Oakar (1997, App DC) 324 US App DC 104, 111 F3d 146).

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: To be material statement need only have natural tendency to influence decision of decision-making body to which it is addressed, it need not actually exert such influence. United States v Bossinger (2009, CA2 NY) 2009 US App LEXIS 3815.

Unpublished: Defendant's statements to investigators (that she gave elected official three checks made out to election campaign, when in fact she gave official five checks made out to "cash" and to his son) were material because difference between making checks out to legitimate campaign and to "cash" and family member was highly relevant to question of whether payments were bribes or campaign contributions. United States v Foxworth (2009, CA2 Conn) 2009 US App LEXIS 12192.

Unpublished: Defendant's statements to investigators (that she did not have conversation with elected official about official loaning defendant's ex-husband $ 500 from official's campaign funds, when in fact she had such conversation, and defendant's statement that same $ 500 was to pay her and her ex-husband back for loan they made to official, when in fact $ 500 was loan from official to defendant's ex-husband) were material, since they could reasonably be understood as designed to convince investigators that $ 3000 defendant gave to official was loan rather than bribe, issue that was central to bribery investigation. United States v Foxworth (2009, CA2 Conn) 2009 US App LEXIS 12192.

IV.PERSONS LIABLE 99. Generally

Predecessor of 18 USCS § 1001 made it offense for persons other than claimants to cause pecuniary or property loss to government by willfully concealing material fact. Capone v United States (1931, CA7 Ill) 51 F2d 609, 2 USTC P 786, 10 AFTR 286, 76 ALR 1534, cert den (1931) 284 US 669, 76 L Ed 566, 52 S Ct 44.

18 USCS § 1001 should not be construed to extend to cases where false statements are made by person not under oath and not under duty to speak, but should be limited in its application to persons under legal obligation to speak or give information to representatives of agency or department of United States who have authority to finally dispose of matter being investigated, and to cases where keeping of records or filing of documents are required or permitted by law. United States v Levin (1953, DC Colo) 133 F Supp 88.

100. Aiders and abettors

Defendant was properly convicted where evidence showed that he had aided and abetted veteran entitled to purchase surplus property for his own use, in presenting purchase applications on their face representing that property was to be used for veteran in permissible enterprise, such representations, however, being false and fraudulent, and that defendant had general plan to use veterans as means of acquiring war surplus property for his own business. McCoy v United States (1948, CA9 Mont) 169 F2d 776, cert den (1948) 335 US 898, 93 L Ed 433, 69 S Ct 298.

Person who permitted another to make out and file false income tax return in order to obtain refund of fictitious overpayment of income taxes could be convicted as aider and abettor under 18 USCS § 1001. Driver v United States (1952, CA5 Fla) 199 F2d 860, 52-2 USTC P 9548, 42 AFTR 866.

United States could properly prosecute defendant under 18 USCS § 1001 for having aided and abetted in preparation of false payroll records to United States navy, although government might have prosecuted him under another section. United States v Greenberg (1959, CA2 NY) 268 F2d 120, 37 CCH LC P 65575.

Attorney-client relationship is not radically altered, and attorney may be convicted of aiding and abetting the making of false statements if he prepared visa petition for permanent residence in the United States for alien who has entered a sham wedding with an American citizen in reckless disregard of whether the statement made was true or with a conscious effort to avoid learning the truth (requirements that satisfy the preferred charge of acting "knowingly" and "willfully"). United States v Sarantos (1972, CA2 NY) 455 F2d 877.

Defendants, who hired 2 undercover government agents to convert counterfeit currency into 5 cashiers' checks at bank, were aiders and abettors under 18 USCS § 1001 where bank did not file CTR's after agents identified themselves as such, since had defendants personally conducted transactions on their own behalf, bank would certainly have had duty to report transactions, and fact that agents did so on behalf of defendants and with defendants' money did not convert transactions into transactions by government as part of its day-to-day operations. United States v Hernando Ospina (1986, CA11 Fla) 798 F2d 1570, 21 Fed Rules Evid Serv 878.

Person with no duty to file Currency Transaction Reports can be prosecuted under both 31 USCS § 5322 and 18 USCS § 1001 on account of aiding and abetting financial institution's failure to file CTR's. United States v Cure (1986, CA11 Fla) 804 F2d 625.

Even if none of facts, taken alone, would have been sufficient proof to uphold defendant's convictions for willingly making false statements to federal agency under 18 USCS § 1001 and of immigration fraud under 18 USCS § 1546(a) (although § 1546 convictions were reversed on other grounds), combination of his position as sole lawyer in law firm in which criminal activities took place, spouse of wrongdoer, active participant in at least forgery of one asylum application, and contact with government officials regarding questions about fraudulent ETA-750 forms, provided evidentiary basis sufficient to support jury's verdict that defendant was liable as aider and abettor under 18 USCS § 2. United States v Phillips (2008, CA10 Kan) 543 F3d 1197.

101. Corporations

In prosecution of corporation for conspiracy to defraud by furnishing jet airplane canopies which were fraudulently stamped as approved by government inspectors, it is not necessary that government prove that president or other officers of corporation took active part in the conspiracy but it is sufficient to show that corporate agents acting in area entrusted to them had joined in the conspiracy; jury may find corporation guilty but not president as individual since corporate guilt may be premised upon acts of its agents other than the president, even of close-owned corporation. United States v Steiner Plastics Mfg. Co. (1956, CA2 NY) 231 F2d 149.

Defendant's contention that, since he signed monthly report which contained false statement in matter within jurisdiction of federal agency only in his capacity as corporate officer, violation of 18 USCS § 1001 should have been charged against corporation rather than defendant personally, was without merit, where record shows that defendant took active part in operating business and knew about and participated in fraud on government; defendant, as knowing corporate officer, could have been personally responsible for acts of corporation as aider and abettor. United States v Lanier (1978, CA8 Mo) 578 F2d 1246, 4 Fed Rules Evid Serv 317, cert den (1978) 439 US 856, 58 L Ed 2d 163, 99 S Ct 169.

Corporation may be convicted of making and using false documents in matter within jurisdiction of federal agency on basis of action taken by agent of corporation acting within scope of employment which action is taken at least in part to benefit corporation; there is no requirement that any officer or director knowingly and willfully participate in or authorize unauthorized practice. United States v Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. (1985, CA4 Va) 770 F2d 399.

102. Miscellaneous

Predecessor to 18 USCS § 1001 made it offense for persons other than claimants to cause pecuniary or property loss to government by willfully concealing material fact, and thus extended to taxpayers. Capone v United States (1931, CA7 Ill) 51 F2d 609, 2 USTC P 786, 10 AFTR 286, 76 ALR 1534, cert den (1931) 284 US 669, 76 L Ed 566, 52 S Ct 44.

18 USCS § 1001 includes reports of Internal Revenue agents who "knowingly and willfully" falsify them and is consistent with 26 USCS § 7214(a)(7), concerning agents who make "fraudulent" entry, as opposed to making innocent false statement. United States v Eisenmann (1968, CA2 NY) 396 F2d 565.

Defendant has violated 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 18 USCS § 2, where he purposefully structured banking transactions of over $ 10,000 so as to avoid bank's filing of Currency Transaction Reports (CTR's), despite fact that he had no duty to disclose and therefore could not ordinarily be guilty of concealment of material fact, since by operation of 18 USCS § 2, defendant is liable as principle for willfully causing innocent bank to fail to file CTR. United States v Richeson (1987, CA4 Md) 825 F2d 17.

Defendant could not be guilty of violating 18 USCS § 1001 by concealing material facts on CTR, where he revealed only holder of account, since he had no duty to reveal real source of funds for whom transaction was completed. United States v Bucey (1989, CA7 Ill) 876 F2d 1297, reh den (1989, CA7) 1989 US App LEXIS 11009 and cert den (1989) 493 US 1004, 107 L Ed 2d 560, 110 S Ct 565 and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v Gollott (1991, CA5 Tex) 939 F2d 255).

Convictions of mine operator and its managers for making false statements to government inspectors about safety conditions under Mine Safety and Health Act were affirmed, except convictions for making false statements where managers had no duty to disclose violations which might become, but were not yet, hazardous conditions. United States v Gibson (2005, CA6 Ky) 409 F3d 325, 2005 FED App 230P.

Notary public was punishable under predecessor of 18 USCS § 1001 for falsely certifying, in claim for soldier's additional homestead that witness appeared before him. United States v Lair (1902, DC Ark) 118 F 98.

Presence of seller at meeting where purchaser signed false certificate, stating that price paid for property was not in excess of appraised value of property, did not make him guilty of filing false claim, if evidence failed to show he knew about requirement. United States v Mignon (1952, DC Pa) 103 F Supp 20.

Failure of county sheriff to furnish United States Army with information in his files concerning army enlistee's arrest and adjudication as youthful offender did not violate 18 USCS § 1001. Doe v County of Westchester (1974, 2d Dept) 45 App Div 2d 308, 358 NYS2d 471.

V.PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT

A.In General 103. Jurisdiction and venue

Mere fact that criminal conviction might rest on false statement made while engaging in business regulated by agency, did not of itself place action within jurisdiction of former Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals; case or controversy itself must have arisen under statute or regulations and resolution of issue must have turned on proper interpretation of agency. United States v Uni Oil, Inc. (1981, CA5 Tex) 646 F2d 946, cert den (1982) 455 US 908, 71 L Ed 2d 446, 102 S Ct 1254.

Venue for prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 is proper in district in which false documents are prepared rather than in district in which documents are filed. United States v Mendel (1984, CA2 NY) 746 F2d 155, 16 Fed Rules Evid Serv 771, cert den (1985) 469 US 1213, 84 L Ed 2d 331, 105 S Ct 1184.

Language of 18 USCS § 1001 applies to false statements made on customs forms without regard to place where offense occurred, so district court in Washington had jurisdiction over United States citizen who made false statement on customs form while at international airport in Vancouver, Canada. United States v Walczak (1986, CA9 Wash) 783 F2d 852.

In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, venue for HUD applicant for mortgage insurance was proper in state through which false statements were made, where applicant made statements in Washington, D. C., knowing they would go to bank in Virginia and then on to HUD in Washington, since applicant could not have sent documents directly to HUD. United States v Barsanti (1991, CA4 Va) 943 F2d 428, 34 Fed Rules Evid Serv 256, cert den (1992) 503 US 936, 117 L Ed 2d 618, 112 S Ct 1474.

In prosecution for making false statements to federal officers, even though defendant made false statements in Kentucky and never left Kentucky, fact that statements affected proceedings in Indiana made venue for his prosecution proper in Indiana. United States v Ringer (2002, CA7 Ind) 300 F3d 788, reh den, reh, en banc, den (2002, CA7) 2002 US App LEXIS 22206 and cert den (2003) 538 US 981, 155 L Ed 2d 672, 123 S Ct 1785.

Where defendant's making false statements to government convictions under 18 USCS § 1001 concerned documents filed in New Jersey and forwarded by agency to New York (NY) for processing, force that was propelled immediately contemplated NY and venue had been proper in Southern District of NY. United States v Ramirez (2005, CA2 NY) 420 F3d 134.

Where possible venue defect as to charge under 18 USCS § 1001 of making materially false statement to federal agent was apparent on face of indictment, defendant waived challenge to venue on appeal by failing to object before close of government's case; possible venue defect as to second § 1001 charge was not apparent on face of indictment, and issue was again waived because defendant's Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for acquittal did not specifically raise issue of venue. United States v Knox (2008, CA7 Ill) 540 F3d 708.

Under 18 USCS § 3237, alleged violations of § 1001 may be prosecuted in either district in which false statement was prepared and mailed, or in district in which offense was completed, that is, where federal agency receives and acts upon statement. United States v Culoso (1978, SD NY) 461 F Supp 128, affd without op (1979, CA2 NY) 607 F2d 999.

General venue statute, 18 USCS § 3237(a) is applicable to prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001; therefore when offenses may be said to have commenced with mailing of documents venue is proper in district in which such mailing occurred. United States v La Bar (1981, MD Pa) 506 F Supp 1267, affd without op (1982, CA3 Pa) 688 F2d 826, cert den (1982) 459 US 945, 74 L Ed 2d 202, 103 S Ct 260, reh den (1982) 459 US 1093, 74 L Ed 2d 941, 103 S Ct 583.

Venue for prosecution for violating 18 USCS § 1001 by preparing and filing false visa application is proper in New York, even though application was filed in Vermont, where application was completed in New York, because violations of § 1001 are continuing offenses for which venue is proper in any district in which offense began, continued, or was completed, and INS clearly had interest in visa applicant before application was actually filed on her behalf. United States v Kouzmine (1996, SD NY) 921 F Supp 1131.

Fact that defendant allegedly made false statement to FBI agents in Northern District of Texas that may have had effect on investigation in Southern District of New York did not create venue for prosecution in Southern District of New York, since 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) did not require that there be proof of false statement's effect. United States v Bin Laden (2001, SD NY) 146 F Supp 2d 373.

Indictment alleging that defendant made false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements under 18 USCS §§ 1001, 2(b) was not subject to dismissal for improper venue pursuant to 18 USCS § 3237(a) because defendant's alleged conduct in causing false statements to be made occurred, at least in large part, in Los Angeles, and, thus, it did not matter that report was ultimately filed in D.C., as required by Federal Elections Campaign Act; criminal conduct charged occurred in Central District of California; therefore, venue was appropriate there as matter of law. United States v Rosen (2005, CD Cal) 365 F Supp 2d 1126.

104. Single or separate offenses and multiple violations

18 USCS § 1001 aims at the making or using of each false writing or document and intends wrong connected with each to be separate offense. United States v Bettenhausen (1974, CA10 Kan) 499 F2d 1223, 74-2 USTC P 9544, 34 AFTR 2d 5415.

Only one violation of 18 USCS § 1001 occurred where statements were submitted, all of which were necessary to influence bank's action in loan application proceeding. United States v Canas (1979, CA1 Puerto Rico) 595 F2d 73 (criticized in United States v Schlei (1997, CA11 Fla) 122 F3d 944, 48 Fed Rules Evid Serv 143, 11 FLW Fed C 541).

Although false statement made by defendant in each annual claim was identical, submission of each statement was separate violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Huber (1979, CA2 NY) 603 F2d 387, cert den (1980) 445 US 927, 63 L Ed 2d 759, 100 S Ct 1312 and (criticized in Lockheed Martin Corp. v Boeing Co. (2005, MD Fla) 2005 US Dist LEXIS 3948).

Multiple violations of 18 USCS § 1001 occurred where defendant food stamp vendor submitted monthly reports supposedly reflecting amount of deposits made each month in Federal Reserve Bank, each report involved different amount of money, covered different time, was submitted in separate documents and contained separate signatures by defendant. United States v Lanier (1979, CA8 Mo) 604 F2d 1157.

Where false statements are made in distinct and separate documents requiring different proof as to each statement, filing of each false document constitutes crime under 18 USCS § 1001 and each filing may be alleged in separate count of indictment; where defendant falsely represented her name on 2 different documents, each misrepresentation constituted separate offense, because proof of each count was contained in separate document, making evidence required on one count unnecessary to prove other count, even though 2 documents were presented in same transaction and contained same falsity. United States v Guzman (1986, CA5 Tex) 781 F2d 428, cert den (1986) 475 US 1143, 90 L Ed 2d 343, 106 S Ct 1798.

Where identical false statements, in either oral or written form, are made in response to identical questions, declarant may be convicted only once. United States v Olsowy (1987, CA9 Cal) 819 F2d 930, 23 Fed Rules Evid Serv 272, reported at, amd (1987, CA9 Cal) 836 F2d 439, cert den (1988) 485 US 991, 99 L Ed 2d 509, 108 S Ct 1299.

Two convictions were proper under 18 USCS § 1001, where importer made, identical false statements to 2 separate officials denying that he had anything to declare, since each official had distinct duties and functions which were impaired at border. United States v Salas-Camacho (1988, CA9 Cal) 859 F2d 788, 111 ALR Fed 779.