Lexstat 18 usc section 1001 united states code service

82. Tendency to influence, or capacity to affect or influence, governmental function as test to determine materiality

Concerning meaning of word "material" as used in 18 USCS § 1001, test is not whether instrument actually influenced or caused department or agency of United States to act, but rather whether false statement had natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, decision of tribunal making determination required to be made. Robles v United States (1960, CA9 Ariz) 279 F2d 401, cert den (1961) 365 US 836, 5 L Ed 2d 745, 81 S Ct 750, reh den (1961) 365 US 890, 6 L Ed 2d 201, 81 S Ct 1032.

In determining whether a false statement is material, test is whether it has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a determination required to be made. United States v Krause (1975, CA5 Fla) 507 F2d 113, 88 BNA LRRM 2856.

In context of 18 USCS § 1001, materiality means that false statement must have natural tendency to influence, or be capable of affecting or influencing, government function, but such statement need not have actually influenced action of government agency. United States v McGough (1975, CA5 Fla) 510 F2d 598.

Test to determine materiality of false statement for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001 is whether statement has natural tendency to influence decision of tribunal which makes decision. United States v Di Fonzo (1979, CA7 Ill) 603 F2d 1260, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 96957, cert den (1980) 444 US 1018, 62 L Ed 2d 648, 100 S Ct 672.

Materially false statement for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001 is one capable of influencing exercise of government function; fact that government is not actually influenced by statement is of no significance. United States v Lichenstein (1980, CA5 Ga) 610 F2d 1272, cert den (1980) 447 US 907, 64 L Ed 2d 856, 100 S Ct 2991.

Although false statements chargeable under 18 USCS § 1001 are often calculated to procure benefit or monetary payment, test of materiality is not capability of false statement to induce payment or benefits; statement may be material where no payments are at issue but where false statement is made in hope of influencing pending investigation. United States v Cowden (1982, CA8 Minn) 677 F2d 417.

Materiality under 18 USCS § 1001 is tested by whether false statements could have affected or influenced exercise of governmental function; test is intrinsic capabilities of false statement itself, rather than possibility of actual attainment of its end as measured by collateral circumstances. United States v Salinas-Ceron (1984, CA9 Cal) 731 F2d 1375, vacated on other grounds, remanded (1985, CA9 Cal) 755 F2d 726.

There is no requirement under 18 USCS § 1001 that false statement influence decision making process of department of United States government. United States v Norris (1984, CA4 Va) 749 F2d 1116, cert den (1985) 471 US 1065, 85 L Ed 2d 496, 105 S Ct 2139 and (criticized in United States ex rel. Berge v Bd. of Trustees (1997, CA4 Md) 104 F3d 1453, 41 USPQ2d 1481).

Test for materiality under 18 USCS § 1001 is not whether false statement actually influenced government function, but whether it had capacity to influence government function. United States v Alemany Rivera (1985, CA1 Puerto Rico) 781 F2d 229, cert den (1986) 475 US 1086, 89 L Ed 2d 725, 106 S Ct 1469.

Test for materiality under 18 USCS § 1001 is whether false statement has tendency to influence or is capable of influencing federal agency. United States v Brantley (1986, CA7 Ill) 786 F2d 1322, 20 Fed Rules Evid Serv 302, cert den (1986) 477 US 908, 91 L Ed 2d 572, 106 S Ct 3284 and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in United States v Pearson (1995, CD Ill) 897 F Supp 1147) and (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).

Statement is material for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001 if it has natural tendency to influence or be capable of affecting or influencing, governmental function; to be material, statements need not have exerted actual influence, so long as it had capacity to do so. United States v Van Horn (1986, CA11 Fla) 789 F2d 1492, 20 Fed Rules Evid Serv 431, cert den (1986) 479 US 854, 93 L Ed 2d 123, 107 S Ct 190 and cert den (1986) 479 US 855, 93 L Ed 2d 124, 107 S Ct 192 and cert den (1986) 479 US 886, 93 L Ed 2d 255, 107 S Ct 279.

A false document was material if it has natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, official decision; materiality is question of law. United States v Gregg (1987, CA8 Mo) 829 F2d 1430, 23 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1170, cert den (1988) 486 US 1022, 100 L Ed 2d 226, 108 S Ct 1994.

For false statement to be "material" for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001 it does not have to actually influence investigator or decisionmaking body, but rather it is sufficient if statement at issue is of type that is capable of influencing reasonable investigator or decisionmaker; standard is not whether there had been actual influence on investigator or decisionmaker, as result of false statement having been made, but whether statement or omission would have tendency to influence reasonable investigator or decisionmaker. United States v McBane (2005, CA3 Pa) 433 F3d 344.

Evidence supporting defendant's conviction on false statements charges was sufficient to establish materiality and intent elements of charged offense where defendant's statement that he and co-defendant were only parties involved in charged fraud was capable of distracting federal investigators' attention away from third person involved in fraud and thus could be considered material; further, defendant's intent could be not be refuted by fact he later recanted to investigators. United States v Stewart (2006, CA2 NY) 433 F3d 273.

Assuming arguendo witness was qualified to testify as expert, his proposed testimony presented erroneous understanding of 18 USCS § 1001's materiality element; to prove materiality, government needed to show only false statements were capable of influencing Office of Comptroller of Currency's (OCC) decision; government was not required to prove false statements actually succeeded in influencing OCC, or influenced that decision within any specific period of time. United States v Wintermute (2006, CA8 Mo) 443 F3d 993.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of making false statements to FBI in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 because while defendant's statements probably had very little actual influence on agents in light of information they already had from incriminating recorded conversations, defendant's statements were aimed at misdirecting agents, and this was enough to satisfy materiality requirement of § 1001. United States v Turner (2008, CA7 Ill) 551 F3d 657.

Test for materiality of an allegedly false statement under 18 USCS § 1001 is whether statement has natural tendency to influence or be capable of influencing federal agency, not whether it, in fact, did so influence it. United States v Clearfield (1973, ED Pa) 358 F Supp 564.

Materiality of statement is established as statements are proven to be capable of influencing or affecting governmental function. United States v Olin Corp. (1979, WD NY) 465 F Supp 1120.

In case in which defendant moved for judgment of acquittal as to his conviction under Count Two of superseding indictment, which alleged violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1) and (a)(2), he argued unsuccessfully that false statement made in request for ethics opinion could not be material as matter of law; his argument that General Services Administration's ethics officer's opinion was immaterial because it was purely advisory and hence not decision was flawed; in any event, jury was instructed that statement, representation or fact was material not only if it had effect of influencing particular decision of ethics officer, but also if it had effect of influencing actions or activities of agency or was capable of, or had potential to do so. United States v Safavian (2009, DC Dist Col) 644 F Supp 2d 1.

In case in which defendant moved for judgment of acquittal as to his conviction under Count Five of superseding indictment, which alleged violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), he argued unsuccessfully that false statement he made to FBI agent could not have influenced agent because agent already knew, from reading certain e-mails and other background material, that statement was inaccurate at time defendant uttered it; that argument incorrectly narrowed scope of materiality inquiry, and even assuming that only agent's decisions about whether defendant was able to help lobbyist and whether defendant was speaking truthfully to agent about his ability to help lobbyist in that context, and further assuming that agent's views on those matters were not influenced by defendant's statement, reasonable jury still could find defendant's statement to be material. United States v Safavian (2009, DC Dist Col) 644 F Supp 2d 1.

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Record demonstrated that defendant made one or more false statements to FBI during its investigation; although his false statements apparently did not impede FBI's investigation, they could have affected FBI's decision to continue investigation or prosecution of matter, so false statements were material for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Richey (2008, CA11 Ala) 2008 US App LEXIS 11503.

Unpublished: Defendant was entitled to reversal of her conviction for making false statement under 18 USCS § 1001 because government did not establish that allegedly false statement, which was that car defendant was driving belonged to her boyfriend, was material; evidence demonstrated only materiality of question of car ownership, and defendant admitted that she did not own car; there was no evidence to show that defendant's statement had or could have had any bearing once agents in question knew car did not belong to her. United States v Cuevas (2008, CA9 Cal) 2008 US App LEXIS 15337.

Unpublished: Jury could have found that defendant's false statements were material for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), as they were of type capable of influencing reasonable decision maker investigating scope of conspiracy and degree of responsibility of persons who may have been involved. United States v Silman (2008, CA3 Pa) 2008 US App LEXIS 16029.

83. Damage, injury or loss to government

It was unnecessary to show either that government lost money or that it was deceived. United States v Presser (1938, CA2 NY) 99 F2d 819.

Loss or damage to government is not essential ingredient of those crimes proscribed by 18 USCS § 1001. Morgan v United States (1962, CA9 Ariz) 301 F2d 272.

Whether or not the government was deceived, or suffered monetary loss because of the acts charged in the indictment, is immaterial. United States v Jones (1972, CA8 Ark) 464 F2d 1118, cert den (1973) 409 US 1111, 34 L Ed 2d 692, 93 S Ct 920.

Perversion of governmental body's function is hallmark of 18 USCS § 1001 offense. United States v Lambert (1974, CA5 Fla) 501 F2d 943 (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v Rodriguez-Rios (1994, CA5 Tex) 14 F3d 1040).

18 USCS § 1001 applies to positive statements which substantially impair basic functions entrusted by law to government agency. United States v Krause (1975, CA5 Fla) 507 F2d 113, 88 BNA LRRM 2856.

Letter and fabricating estimate sent to government agency in connection with application for rent increase in government financed housing were material in deception in that they had capacity to influence determination which was to be made. United States v Guthartz (1978, CA5 Fla) 573 F2d 225, reh den (1978, CA5 Fla) 576 F2d 931 and cert den (1978) 439 US 864, 58 L Ed 2d 173, 99 S Ct 187.

Government need not prove pecuniary loss in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 since false statement is merely required to have capacity to impair or pervert functioning of governmental agency. United States v Lichenstein (1980, CA5 Ga) 610 F2d 1272, cert den (1980) 447 US 907, 64 L Ed 2d 856, 100 S Ct 2991.

In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, government need not prove that false statements or misrepresentations were actually relied upon or that government suffered financial loss. United States v Hicks (1980, CA8 SD) 619 F2d 752 (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).

84. Reliance

It was unnecessary to show either that government lost money or that it was deceived. United States v Presser (1938, CA2 NY) 99 F2d 819.

Submission to Veterans Administration of fraudulent application for home loan guaranty of insurance calculated to induce agency reliance constitutes falsification of material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 even though favorable agency action was for other reasons impossible. United States v Quirk (1959, CA3 Pa) 266 F2d 26.

Fact that government did not rely upon false statement of defendant, but instead obtained evidence as to defendant's criminal record from the police department, does not exclude defendant's violation from operation of 18 USCS § 1001. Blake v United States (1963, CA8 Mo) 323 F2d 245.

Whether or not the government was deceived, or suffered monetary loss because of the acts charged in the indictment, is immaterial. United States v Jones (1972, CA8 Ark) 464 F2d 1118, cert den (1973) 409 US 1111, 34 L Ed 2d 692, 93 S Ct 920.

Defendant, who gave false answer during course of investigation by Drug Enforcement Agency, was properly convicted of violating 18 USCS § 1001 even though investigators knew answer was not true when given since answer was calculated to induce agency reliance; court will look to intrinsic capabilities of false statement itself, rather than possibility of actual attainment of its end as measured by collateral circumstances. United States v Goldfine (1976, CA9 Wash) 538 F2d 815.

Materiality is essential element of violation of 18 USCS § 1001, although proof of actual reliance is not required; however, government bears burden of proving that statement is capable of influencing agency action. United States v Talkington (1978, CA9 Cal) 589 F2d 415.

Test for determining materiality of false statement within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001 is whether falsehood is calculated to induce reliance by United States agency; government has burden of proving that false statement had intrinsic capacity to influence agency decisions. United States v Valdez (1979, CA9 Cal) 594 F2d 725.

In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, government need not prove that false statements or misrepresentations were actually relied upon or that government suffered financial loss. United States v Hicks (1980, CA8 SD) 619 F2d 752 (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).

Statement may be material even though Government does not actually rely on it. United States v McIntosh (1981, CA5 Miss) 655 F2d 80, reh den (1981, CA5 Miss) 660 F2d 497 and cert den (1982) 455 US 948, 71 L Ed 2d 662, 102 S Ct 1450.

Proof of agency's actual reliance on statement is not necessary to sustain conviction under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Cowden (1982, CA8 Minn) 677 F2d 417.

It is not certain under 18 USCS § 1001 that statement must be a material one and it is accepted § 1001 lore that reliance upon statement by Government need not be shown, but while statute is thus formidable in its scope and severity it must in each instance of its application derive substance of its prohibition from circumstances in which statement is used. United States v Gomez-Londono (1976, ED NY) 422 F Supp 519, revd on other grounds (1977, CA2 NY) 553 F2d 805 and affd without op (1978, CA2 NY) 580 F2d 1046.

Even if materiality were required element of violation of 18 USCS § 1001, defendant's statement was material in that his response carried potential of inducing agency reliance and of perverting legitimate function of agency. United States v Pereira (1978, ED NY) 463 F Supp 481.

2.Particular Cases 85. Assistance and grant programs

Defendant conceals material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where he induces certain veterans to lend him use of their name so he can buy property at price available only to veterans. Ehrlich v United States (1956, CA5 Ga) 238 F2d 481.

Manager of cattle-feeding operation committed material falsehood in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by altering existing lease between cattle-feeding operation and trucking firm so it appeared that lessee cattle-feeding operation was taking all risks involved in order to obtain preferred payment rate under Hay Transportation Assistance Program. United States v Voorhees (1979, CA8 SD) 593 F2d 346, 49 ALR Fed 614, cert den (1979) 441 US 936, 60 L Ed 2d 665, 99 S Ct 2061.

Submission of false timesheets to Housing Authority of Dallas is material despite fact that Authority received grant from United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to fund project which employed defendants before submission of false sheets; performance of program is hindered when funds are spent for work that is not done and quarterly reports required by Department of Housing and Urban Development show that federal agency has ultimate authority to see that funds are properly spent. United States v Baker (1980, CA5 Tex) 626 F2d 512 (criticized in United States v Blankenship (2004, CA11 Fla) 382 F3d 1110, 17 FLW Fed C 953).

False statements by employees regarding their employment status, made at order of employer so that he could obtain Comprehensive Employment and Training Act funds from non-profit organization for on-the-job training were material under 18 USCS § 1001 since they were capable of influencing federal agency responsible for proper disbursement of federal funds. United States v Brantley (1986, CA7 Ill) 786 F2d 1322, 20 Fed Rules Evid Serv 302, cert den (1986) 477 US 908, 91 L Ed 2d 572, 106 S Ct 3284 and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in United States v Pearson (1995, CD Ill) 897 F Supp 1147) and (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).

Falsified signatures of purported beneficiaries of HUD community grant monies were material misstatements under 18 USCS § 1001, even though their production was not required by HUD, since § 1001 prohibits false statements generally; signatures were material even though they had no actual effect on HUD, since they were "capable" of affecting or influencing HUD's actions, and since statements were made in hope of influencing pending investigation. United States v Corsino (1987, CA1 Puerto Rico) 812 F2d 26 (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).

Selling of rice from commercial mills by rice growers association to Commodity Credit Corporation under rice price support program does not constitute concealment of material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where fact that rice was commercially milled does not affect its eligibility for purchase. United States v Rice Growers Asso. (1953, DC Cal) 110 F Supp 667.

86. Criminal record concealment

Corporation physicist concealed material fact in filling out personal questionnaire required for security clearance for work corporation was engaged in with Atomic Energy Commission where he stated that he had never been arrested when in fact he had been convicted of at least two felonies. Pitts v United States (1959, CA9 Cal) 263 F2d 353, cert den (1959) 360 US 935, 3 L Ed 2d 1547, 79 S Ct 1457, reh den (1959) 361 US 857, 4 L Ed 2d 97, 80 S Ct 47.

Defendant who plead guilty to charge of aggravated robbery falsified material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by answering "no" to question on Post Office Department application for temporary employment as to whether he had ever been arrested, charged, or held for a violation of any federal, state, county, or municipal law. Juan Alire v United States (1962, CA10 Colo) 313 F2d 31, cert den (1963) 373 US 943, 10 L Ed 2d 699, 83 S Ct 1554.

Evidence was sufficient that contractor's false statement on HUD form, that he was not convicted felon, was material, even though convicted felon may still be awarded contracts, since his misrepresentation deprived HUD of opportunity to determine, based upon all relevant information, which bidder was best qualified to complete job. United States v Puente (1993, CA5 Tex) 982 F2d 156, 38 CCF P 76533, cert den (1993) 508 US 962, 124 L Ed 2d 684, 113 S Ct 2934.

District court erred in dismissing two indictments under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) for making materially false statements on applications for secure identification display area (SIDA) badges, as defendants' failure to disclose convictions for misdemeanor firearms offenses was material. United States v Baer (2003, CA4 Va) 324 F3d 282, dismd (2003, ED Va) 274 F Supp 2d 778, affd (2004, CA4 Va) 92 Fed Appx 942.

87. Customs matters

Defendants' use of fictitious names in response to questions posed by Customs Officials on airline tickets, notarized affidavits of residency, and other documents is falsification of material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where defendants were found to have concealed marijuana in their luggage. United States v Parten (1972, CA5 Tex) 462 F2d 430, cert den (1972) 409 US 983, 34 L Ed 2d 248, 93 S Ct 325.

False statement made by defendant to border agent at border crossing that he had only two cameras when in fact there were other dutiable items carried by him in suitcase, was material within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, even though his statement was oral, unsworn and unrelated to any monetary claim against United States, since declarant was claiming privilege of entry, and his statement potentially impaired function of customs service. United States v Rose (1978, CA9 Wash) 570 F2d 1358 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35) and (criticized in United States v Solis (1997, CAAF) 46 MJ 31, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 5) and (criticized in United States v Huber (2002, DC ND) 2002 US Dist LEXIS 306).

Response of "no" to customs inquiry of whether person was bringing over $ 5,000 into United States is material within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Duncan (1982, CA9 Cal) 693 F2d 971, 12 Fed Rules Evid Serv 82, cert den (1983) 461 US 961, 77 L Ed 2d 1321, 103 S Ct 2436.

Defendant's 2 false denials to customs officials that he had anything to declare were material, despite fact that second, identical, denial, was immediately corrected by true oral statement, since true statement was only made once he was confronted with imminent inspection of his vehicle. United States v Salas-Camacho (1988, CA9 Cal) 859 F2d 788, 111 ALR Fed 779.

Car importer concealed material fact from customs, where he imported cars which required conversion work, but obtained one-time personal use exemptions from EPA for them by listing others, who had no legal or financial interest in vehicles as importers. United States v Gardner (1990, CA5 La) 894 F2d 708, 31 Envt Rep Cas 1036, reh den (1990, CA5) 1990 US App LEXIS 3673.