Lexstat 18 usc section 1001 united states code service

73. Investigations

Statements made by defendant to federal officers, which statements were allegedly false, while defendant was restricted of his liberty and pressed with questions, answers to which, if true, would have been confessions of guilt, where purpose of agents was not to obtain information, but to obtain admissions, agents having already reached their decision to make arrest, did not constitute violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Stoffey (1960, CA7 Ill) 279 F2d 924, 60-2 USTC P 15303, 5 AFTR 2d 2094.

While a US agent was conducting a tax fraud investigation, defendant violated 18 USCS § 1001 by intentionally and knowingly making false statements that he did not have bank accounts in either of two cities. United States v Ratner (1972, CA9 Cal) 464 F2d 101, 72-2 USTC P 9526, 30 AFTR 2d 5058.

Statement made by private citizen to FBI falsely pointing to possible criminal conduct that is within power of FBI to investigate falls within prohibition of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Lambert (1974, CA5 Fla) 501 F2d 943 (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v Rodriguez-Rios (1994, CA5 Tex) 14 F3d 1040).

A generally negative and exculpatory response made by a subject of a criminal investigation in reply to questions propounded to him by investigating officers is not a crime under 18 USCS § 1001; however, statute applies to positive statements which substantially impair the basic functions entrusted by law to a government agency. United States v Krause (1975, CA5 Fla) 507 F2d 113, 88 BNA LRRM 2856.

Where hedge fund broker pleaded to charge of making false statement under 18 USCS § 1001 for misleading Securities and Exchange Commission during its investigation of insider trading, Commission properly sanctioned him in administrative proceedings by permanently barring him from association with any broker, dealer, or investment adviser under investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 USCS § 80b-3(f), even though he had no prior infractions; sanction was reasonable in order to protect public. Kornman v SEC (2010, App DC) 592 F3d 173, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 95574.

Claimants seeking recovery of funds lost as part of pyramid scheme had their claims rejected because they made false statements to investigating agents that made it more difficult to conduct investigation, delayed completion of investigation, enabled defendants to defraud other people, and potentially constituted violations of federal false statement statute, 18 USCS § 1001; thus, claimants were not permitted to change their story merely because it was in their financial interest to do so. United States v Cabe (2003, DC SC) 311 F Supp 2d 501.

Defendant was found guilty of making false statements under 18 USCS § 1001 to FBI because statements were obviously material to activities or decisions of FBI and defendant knew that statements were not true. United States v Dongfan Chung (2009, CD Cal) 633 F Supp 2d 1134.

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Defendant's Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for acquittal was properly denied and defendant was properly convicted of knowingly and willfully making false statements to special agent, violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), because defendant made false statements to agent from Office of Inspector General (OIG) during administrative interview of defendant on allegations that he had violated Bureau of Prisons' code of conduct by having contact with former inmate, defendant was aware of code of conduct and that he could be terminated for violating same, and statements were material as they concerned investigation and had potential to lead it off track; mere fact that OIG might not have relied on false statements and curtailed, intensified, or changed direction of its investigation was irrelevant to finding of materiality because to be material, statement only had to have propensity or capacity to influence OIG's actions or decisions. United States v Silva (2004, CA9 Ariz) 119 Fed Appx 892.

Unpublished: Court rejected defendant's challenge to sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction for making false statements to federal officer; defendant told Secret Service agent investigating case that he did not know about currency in his car, but evidence showing defendant's fingerprints and palm prints on currency provided sufficient basis for jury to conclude that defendant's denial was false, and jury could have found statement to be material, because defendant's knowledge of currency had capacity to affect government's decision to prosecute. United States v Ocampo (2007, CA4 NC) 2007 US App LEXIS 6155.

74. Negative answers

Where city councilman, who received free plumbing services from union in exchange for voting to place union manager on city plumber's examining board, was convicted of making false statement to FBI agent during investigation of matter, and where basis for conviction was answer councilman gave in interview that he had not received any improvements to real property from anyone other than his family members, and where question was complicated, and not straightforward, councilman's one-word answer was sufficient to sustain false statement conviction under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) because, although it was complicated question, it was not so confusing and ambiguous that answer could be found literally true. United States v Martin (2004, CA8 Minn) 369 F3d 1046, 174 BNA LRRM 3261, reh den, reh, en banc, den (2004, CA8) 2004 US App LEXIS 16638.

Negative answers, even if given under oath, by contractors, to questions asked by FBI agents who were investigating reports of alleged bribery attempt, as to whether contractors knew of money given to officials of Federal Housing Administration, were not "statements" within 18 USCS § 1001, since these answers were not volunteered to make claim upon nor induce improper action by government against others nor were they made under legal compulsion, and matter was not one "within the jurisdiction" of agency. United States v Stark (1955, DC Md) 131 F Supp 190.

Defendant, who while being interviewed informally by agents of FBI as to whether he knew or was named person, gave untruthful negative answers, did not violate 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Davey (1957, DC NY) 155 F Supp 175.

False oral denial by defendant of suspected source of income made to special agent of IRS investigating and interrogating defendant for possible criminal income tax evasion did not constitute false statement within purview of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Philippe (1959, SD NY) 173 F Supp 582, 59-2 USTC P 9654, 4 AFTR 2d 5365.

Defendant's negative response to Custom agents' inquiry as to whether he had anything to declare was "statement" within scope of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Pereira (1978, ED NY) 463 F Supp 481.

Where defendant was convicted of crime of brandishing firearm, which was not specifically enumerated as listed offense on Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) form, defendant's negative response to question 20 of SIDA form was literally true, and indictment charging violation of 18 USCS § 1001 had to be dismissed. United States v Baer (2003, ED Va) 274 F Supp 2d 778, affd (2004, CA4 Va) 92 Fed Appx 942.

75. Omissions or leaving blanks

Prosecution for false representation cannot be grounded upon omission of explanation, which omission only carries with it implication of state of facts which are not true. United States v Diogo (1963, CA2 NY) 320 F2d 898.

If there are facts that should be reported, leaving blank belies certification on front page of application that information therein is true and correct. United States v Irwin (1981, CA10) 654 F2d 671, cert den (1982) 455 US 1016, 72 L Ed 2d 133, 102 S Ct 1709 and (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v Daily (1990, CA10 Kan) 921 F2d 994) and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in United States v Allemand (1994, CA10 Wyo) 34 F3d 923).

76. Oral and/or unsworn statements

18 USCS § 1001 was not intended to embrace oral, unsworn statements, unrelated to any claim of the declarant to a privilege from the United States or to a claim against the United States, given in response to inquiries initiated by federal agency or department, except perhaps, where such a statement will substantially impair the basic functions entrusted by law to that agency. United States v Bedore (1972, CA9 Wash) 455 F2d 1109.

Unsworn responses of defendant, a union's international vice-president, to questions propounded by a NLRB hearing officer at fact-finding hearing constituted a "statement" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Krause (1975, CA5 Fla) 507 F2d 113, 88 BNA LRRM 2856.

18 USCS § 1001 applies to oral as well as written statements. United States v Massey (1977, CA5 Fla) 550 F2d 300.

18 USCS § 1001 applies to protesters who participate in jurisdictional agency's proceedings, even though statements are unsworn. Ecee, Inc. v Federal Energy Regulatory Com. (1981, CA5) 645 F2d 339, 69 OGR 343.

18 USCS § 1001 is not overly broad because it punishes unsworn oral statements. United States v Des Jardins (1985, CA9 Cal) 772 F2d 578.

Evidence presented by U.S. was insufficient to allow finder of fact to determine critical underlying historical facts, and that evidence was insufficient to allow jury reasonably to find that false statements at issue were "material;" thus, defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 was vacated. United States v Finn (2004, CA10 Colo) 375 F3d 1033.

18 USCS § 1001 is applicable to false but unsworn and untranscribed oral statement made by official of Executive Branch to Members of Congress acting in their legislative capacity, since there is no "legislative function" exception. United States v Poindexter (1991, App DC) 292 US App DC 389, 951 F2d 369, 34 Fed Rules Evid Serv 33, cert den (1992) 506 US 1021, 121 L Ed 2d 583, 113 S Ct 656 and (criticized in Hubbard v United States (1995) 514 US 695, 131 L Ed 2d 779, 115 S Ct 1754, 95 CDOS 3581, 95 Daily Journal DAR 6212, 9 FLW Fed S 3).

It was not necessary that false statements be under oath. United States v Dumas (1923, DC NY) 288 F 247.

18 USCS § 1001 may be applied to oral unsworn statements, and defendant need not have initiated investigation. United States v Clifford (1976, ED NY) 409 F Supp 1070.

77.--Tax matters

False statement made orally and under oath to agents of internal revenue department constituted offenses under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v McCue (1962, CA2 Conn) 301 F2d 452, 9 AFTR 2d 1041, cert den (1962) 370 US 939, 8 L Ed 2d 808, 82 S Ct 1586, reh den (1963) 374 US 858, 10 L Ed 2d 1083, 83 S Ct 1860.

Taxpayer is guilty of making false statement where he orally denies that he maintained bank accounts at certain locations when asked by special agent, although he in fact does maintain such accounts under false names. United States v Ratner (1972, CA9 Cal) 464 F2d 101, 72-2 USTC P 9526, 30 AFTR 2d 5058.

Oral-conversational responses given in an interview with IRS agents, while not under oath are sufficient to support a charge of making false statements to IRS agents in violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Isaacs (1974, CA7 Ill) 493 F2d 1124, cert den (1974) 417 US 976, 41 L Ed 2d 1146, 94 S Ct 3183, 94 S Ct 3184, reh den (1974) 418 US 955, 41 L Ed 2d 1178, 94 S Ct 3234.

78. Self-incrimination

Dismissal of indictment of gambler who made false statements on returns and registration application filed under § 4412 of Title 26 was not required by privilege against self-incrimination, as validity of government's demand for information is not element of 18 USCS § 1001 which prohibits making of false statements to any federal agency, and gambler was not indicted for crime about which he had been forced to make incriminating statements. United States v Knox (1969) 396 US 77, 24 L Ed 2d 275, 90 S Ct 363, 70-1 USTC P 15925, 27 AFTR 2d 1902.

Oral answer of "no" to customs inspector in response to question of whether person was carrying over allowable amount of money upon reentry into United States constitutes violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where such answer is false and person was claiming privilege of entry into United States and inspector's question was routine and did not involve possibility of self-incrimination. United States v Carrier (1981, CA9 Idaho) 654 F2d 559.

Defendant's motion for acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 was denied because he waived any due process claims since he never moved to suppress statements made to agency and ethics officers before trial; even if not waived, no prior warning was required under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1) and defendant had clear legal duty to disclose concealed information. United States v Safavian (2006, DC Dist Col) 451 F Supp 2d 232.

79. Voluntary statements

Statements for which there can be convictions under 18 USCS § 1001 are not limited to those required to be made by law or regulation. Neely v United States (1962, CA9 Ariz) 300 F2d 67, 9 AFTR 2d 1046, 93 ALR2d 718, cert den (1962) 369 US 864, 8 L Ed 2d 84, 82 S Ct 1030.

18 USCS § 1001 should not be construed to extend to cases where false statements are made by person not under oath and not under duty to speak, but should be limited in its application to persons under legal obligation to speak or give information to representatives of agency or department of United States who have authority to finally dispose of matter being investigated, and to cases where keeping of records or filing of documents are required or permitted by law. United States v Levin (1953, DC Colo) 133 F Supp 88.

There is no necessity under 18 USCS § 1001 that "statements or representations" be made while under legal obligation to speak, where indictment charged that defendant violated § 1001 when he stated to assistant United States attorney that certain person had stolen two checks from him and that by means of forgery had cashed same, knowing at time he made this statement that it was untrue. United States v Van Valkenburg (1958, DC Alaska) 17 Alaska 450, 157 F Supp 599.

18 USCS § 1001 does not apply to statements given to FBI voluntarily and without oath or to verbatim transcription during interview initiated by FBI in course of criminal investigation. United States v Ehrlichman (1974, DC Dist Col) 379 F Supp 291.

18 USCS § 1001 is not applicable only to false statements initiated by persons affirmatively seeking to obtain some benefit from government, and is applicable to false statements made to FBI agents. United States v Mitchell (1974, DC Dist Col) 397 F Supp 166, affd, en banc (1976, App DC) 181 US App DC 254, 559 F2d 31, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1203, cert den (1977) 431 US 933, 53 L Ed 2d 250, 97 S Ct 2641, reh den (1977) 433 US 916, 53 L Ed 2d 1103, 97 S Ct 2992.

Circumstances under which allegedly false statements were made may govern invocation of 18 USCS § 1001, so that it was questionable whether reports of certain interviews not conducted under oath, which were voluntarily agreed to and of which no verbatim transcript was made by interviewer, could form basis of conviction under § 1001. United States v International Business Machines Corp. (1976, SD NY) 415 F Supp 668, 1976-2 CCH Trade Cases P 61170.

18 USCS § 1001 is not limited to statements required by law or regulation. United States v Olin Corp. (1979, WD NY) 465 F Supp 1120.

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for making false statement to government official, based on defendant's letter to Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), because (1) statement in that letter that defendant had lost letter from OFAC to which defendant was responding did not show Government did not prove defendant acted knowingly and wilfully in making false statement as Government introduced letter to which defendant was responding, which had been discovered in file cabinets in defendant's storage space, and, (2) even if jury believed letter was lost, record contained evidence from which reasonable factfinder could find defendant knew of relevant regulations, that defendant went to great lengths to disguise defendant's violations of regulations, and that this was another example of that behavior. United States v Amirnazmi (2009, ED Pa) 2009 US Dist LEXIS 74833.

80. Miscellaneous

18 USCS § 1001 does not apply to defendant's giving a false name to FBI agent because defendant's response was not within the class of false statements that this section was designed to proscribe. United States v Bedore (1972, CA9 Wash) 455 F2d 1109.

An affidavit may be a "statement" within the meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Protch (1973, CA3 Pa) 481 F2d 647, 73-2 USTC P 9580, 32 AFTR 2d 5388.

Defendant did not commit concealment of material fact of ownership of car for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001, where he had transferred legal ownership to his girlfriend prior to completion of financial statement pertaining to his sentencing on drug offenses, despite argument that transfer was sham. United States v Gahagan (1989, CA6 Mich) 881 F2d 1380.

Sufficient evidence supported conviction of healthcare manager for use of false document under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(3); Medicare cost report prepared under manager's direction contained false statement than healthcare facility under his control had no "related party" costs. United States v White (2007, CA6 Ohio) 492 F3d 380, 73 Fed Rules Evid Serv 919, 2007 FED App 215P, reh den (2007, CA6) 2007 US App LEXIS 16858.

When defendant in criminal proceeding made false statement to probation officer during defendant's presentence interview rather than to judge directly, exemption from criminal liability in 18 USCS ' 1001(b)for false statements submitted to judge by party to judicial proceeding applied to defendant because probation officer was required by law to include such statement in presentence report and to submit presentence report to judge. United States v Horvath (2007, CA9 Mont) 492 F3d 1075.

Defendant's statement to probation officer that omitted mention of his $ 40,000 401(k) retirement account was prosecutable offense under 18 USCS § 1001(a) and was not excepted under judicial function exception of 18 USCS § 1001(b) because probation officer "picked and chose" what to include and exclude in presentence report, based on his understanding of what was expected of him and what he believed was important for court and parties to know, and thus, process involved probation officer's exercise of his discretion, and not mere transmission of information; to hold defendant's false statement to probation officer within ambit of 18 USCS § 1001(a) also supported Congressional intent because Congress did not intend to allow defendants to avoid restitution obligations through lies or misrepresentations made to probation officer; moreover, procedure for issuance of restitution order indicated that Congress intended to include all of defendant's assets in restitution calculation under 18 USCS § 3664(d)(3). United States v Manning (2008, CA10 Okla) 526 F3d 611.

18 USCS § 1001 is aimed at supplying inaccurate copy of originally filed tax return or supplying of false statements about sources of income or extent of deductible expenses but does not apply where taxpayer supplied IRS agent with true copy of tax return, which tax return understated his income. United States v Gripentrog (1977, WD Wis) 77-2 USTC P 9629, 40 AFTR 2d 5537.

Where defendant attorney agreed to abide by special administrative measures (SAMs) governing her client's confinement and signed May Affirmation few days before she visited client in prison, and violated SAMs when she allowed client to dictate letters to interpreter about client's decision to withdraw his support for Middle East cease-fire, attorney's knowingly false promise, which was knowingly false statement of present intent, was false statement within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Sattar (2003, SD NY) 272 F Supp 2d 348, motions ruled upon (2003, SD NY) 2003 US Dist LEXIS 16164, motion den, request den (2003, SD NY) 2003 US Dist LEXIS 19770.

Former employee's wrongful discharge claim, which was premised on public policy exception to at-will employment doctrine that existed for employees who refused to perform illegal act, failed because even if employer asked employee to "smooth over" order, there was no evidence that this act, which was calculated to spread employee's commission over period of months, violated any law, including 18 USCS § 1001. Hess v Sanofi-Synthelabo Inc. (2007, ED Mo) 503 F Supp 2d 1178.

Charges on invoice or other form of billing document constitutes "statement" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. Holmes v General Dynamics Corp. (1993, 4th Dist) 17 Cal App 4th 1418, 22 Cal Rptr 2d 172, 93 CDOS 6236, 93 Daily Journal DAR 10701, 8 BNA IER Cas 1249.

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Evidence was sufficient to affirm defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 because there was evidence that defendant failed to accurately describe trust assets as his own and that defendant knew he was making false statements. United States v Trupin (2005, CA2 NY) 119 Fed Appx 323.

Unpublished: Because false statement charge against defendant, predicated on lease, was legally sufficient because lease was "statement" under 18 USCS § 1001(a), factual misrepresentations contained therein (notably, that deposit was given when it was not, and back-dated execution date) qualified it as "false," and Government submitted ample proof as to other elements of charged offense, district court properly denied defendant's Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion. United States v Serag (2006, CA4 Va) 2006 US App LEXIS 13357.

E.Materiality

1.In General 81. Generally

Materiality is essential element of crime of making false statement. Paritem Singh Poonian v United States (1961, CA9 Cal) 294 F2d 74, 61-2 USTC P 9647, 8 AFTR 2d 5400.

Materiality must be demonstrated for conviction pursuant to 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Deep (1974, CA9 Cal) 497 F2d 1316.

An essential element of offense of making a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement proscribed by 18 USCS § 1001 is that such statement relate to a material fact. United States v Krause (1975, CA5 Fla) 507 F2d 113, 88 BNA LRRM 2856.

Materiality is essential element of every 18 USCS § 1001 violation. United States v McGough (1975, CA5 Fla) 510 F2d 598.

"Trick, scheme, or device" language of first clause of 18 USCS § 1001 implies requirement of affirmative act by which means material fact is concealed. United States v London (1977, CA5 Ga) 550 F2d 206.

For statement to be "material" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, statement or act need not violate another statute. United States v Masters (1979, CA9 Cal) 612 F2d 1117, cert den (1980) 449 US 847, 66 L Ed 2d 57, 101 S Ct 134.

Issue of materiality may be intermixed with whether matter was within jurisdiction of agency. United States v Wolf (1981, CA10 Okla) 645 F2d 23.

False statements made to conceal fraud are no less material for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001 than false statements designed to induce fraud. United States v Brack (1984, CA7 Ill) 747 F2d 1142, cert den (1985) 469 US 1216, 84 L Ed 2d 339, 105 S Ct 1193.

Materiality is element of 18 USCS § 1001 and applies to all clauses within statute. United States v Gaudin (1994, CA9 Mont) 28 F3d 943, 94 CDOS 4632, 94 Daily Journal DAR 8593, affd (1995) 515 US 506, 132 L Ed 2d 444, 115 S Ct 2310, 95 CDOS 4634, 95 Daily Journal DAR 7952, 9 FLW Fed S 187 (criticized in United States v Copus (1997, CA10 Okla) 110 F3d 1529) and (criticized in United States v Pappert (1997, CA10 Kan) 112 F3d 1073).

In order to establish violation of 18 USCS § 1001, which proscribes making of any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement, or making or use of any false writing or document in matter within jurisdiction of any department or agency of United States, materiality of representation must be established. United States v Dozier (1958) 9 USCMA 443, 26 CMR 223.