Curr Psychol
The Experiment
In 1972 David Rosenhan (
1973a
) and seven other “pseudopatients” feigned mental
illness and succeeded in gaining admission to 12 different psychiatric hospitals. All eight
pseudopatients were admitted on the basis of a single simulated symptom: auditory
hallucinations. The hallucinations consisted (they claimed) of a voice saying “empty,”
“dull,” and “thud.” The pseudopatients told each admitting doctor that the voices had
initially troubled them, but less so now, and they had come to the hospital on the advice
of friends. Once admitted, the pseudopatients dropped all pretense of psychic distur-
bance and began to act entirely normally. Nevertheless, all eight individuals were judged
“insane” by psychiatrists and experienced considerable trouble in eventually obtaining
permission to go home. The lengths of hospitalization ranged from seven to 52 days,
with an average stay of 19 days. None of the pseudopatients was ever detected. On the
contrary; on 11 occasions the pseudopatients were diagnosed with paranoid schizophre-
nia, and on the 12th the diagnosis was of manic-depressive psychosis. What is more,
when the pseudopatients eventually were discharged, each was presented not with a
clean bill of health, but with the remarkable diagnosis of “schizophrenia in remission.”
Some pseudopatients were nervous about lying to the admitting doctor, but
apart from any signs of that the alleged hallucinations were the sole reason for
admitting them. Each pseudopatient gave a false name and job, but they other-
wise gave true details about their lives—its ups and downs, their relationships,
and their life histories.
Published in the venerable journal Science, the experiment provoked a swift and
incendiary reaction—and for several obvious reasons. Rosenhan was a psychiatric
reformer, not a psychiatric atheist, and so he predictably exposed himself to attack on
two fronts. An overwhelming first wave of criticism came from professional psychi-
atrists and mental health practitioners (Rosenhan
1973b
). They attacked his study as
misguided or frivolous. An extended critique issued from Dr. Robert L. Spitzer
(
1975
) (born 1932), a psychiatrist at Columbia University College of Physicians
and Surgeons who several years later became the editor of DSM 3 (published in
1980). These criticisms need not be repeated in detail here because to readers
unfamiliar with psychiatric controversies, the various points they raise in opposition
will suggest themselves instinctively.
The second and less obvious charge to which Rosenhan’s study lay open was that
he had not gone far enough. This left him vulnerable to those critics who were
skeptical of the pathological explanation of socially deviant behavior—that is, to
critics who questioned the validity of the medical model of madness. This latter view
is closely associated with Dr. Thomas Szasz (1920–2012), who from 1956 until his
retirement in 1990 was professor of psychiatry at the SUNY Upstate Medical
University at Syracuse. The thesis argued in Szasz’s bestselling 1961 book The
Myth of Mental Illness (Szasz
2010
) implies that if psychiatric diagnoses lack validity,
as Rosenhan maintained, then that is simply because they are based on the false
premise that mental illness is a medical (bodily) illness at all. According to Szasz,
mental illness is merely a socially convenient metaphor—largely forgotten, to be
sure—for excusing or avoiding responsibility for others’ unwanted behaviors.
Widespread acceptance of this view would, of course, imperil the psychiatric enter-
prise entirely.
Curr Psychol
In the event, Szasz published an extended critique of Rosenhan’s efforts only in
2008. I will come to it later (§6 below). For now, since these issues tend to be fraught
with emotional involvement, I prefer to add the caveat that I have no professional
competence in psychiatry to endorse or reject any of these approaches. My aim is
merely to describe them, largely by means of rhetorical analysis.
Rosenhan forestalled the second line of criticism by ignoring its existence.
Instead, he offered a declaration of personal belief in the medical model as a sign
of good faith. In the Science article he states: “Let me be perfectly clear about
this: To say that psychological suffering is a myth is to engage in massive
denial” (Rosenhan
1973a
, pp. 250–1; repeated verbatim in Rosenhan
1973b
, p.
369). Actually, this is not at all what Szasz said, but the word
myth is clearly an
allusion to the title of his book (which Rosenhan does not mention anywhere in
the article).
Rosenhan did respond to the former line of criticism, first piecemeal, in various
letters in
Science (Rosenhan
1973b
), and then more extensively in a retrospective
published two years later. In it he articulated what he believed to be the salient points
of his study (
1975
):
The issue is not that the pseudopatients lied or that the psychiatrists believed
them. […] The issue is not whether the pseudopatients should have been
admitted to the psychiatric hospital in the first place. […] The issue is the
diagnostic leap that was made between a single presenting symptom, halluci-
nation, and the diagnosis, schizophrenia (or, in one case, manic-depressive
psychosis). That is the heart of the matter. (p. 466, emphasis added)
Yet despite his insistence here that his 1973 objection was limited only to a
“diagnostic leap” from single symptom to diagnosis, many readers both lay and
professional nevertheless felt that insanity itself, and not merely its diagnosis, had
been put on trial in his experiment. It is not hard to see why. First there was the
provocative title Rosenhan gave his essay. As several critics immediately wrote in to
Science to object (Rosenhan
1973b
), sanity and insanity are legal concepts, not
medical ones, but here was a professional psychologist using them without warning
or apology—and doing so in the single most prestigious journal of the physical
sciences. And then there was the preface he led off with. Although Rosenhan stated
that his aim was to reform and refine the precision of psychiatric diagnoses and
emphatically not to question the validity of mental disorder itself, he began his paper
with a highly rhetorical and philosophical preface. It is filled with provocative or
borderline heretical suggestions about the nature of mental illness itself. He starts
with an especially arresting question: “If sanity and insanity exist, how shall we know
them?” (
1973a
, p. 250)
Rosenhan returns to these philosophical reflections at the end of the article, where
he concludes with a series of equally arresting observations and contentions:
ï [W]e continue to label patients “schizophrenic,” “manic-depressive,” and “in-
sane,” as if in those words we captured the essence of understanding. The facts of
the matter are that we have known for a long time that diagnoses are often not
useful or reliable, but we have nevertheless continued to use them. We now know
that we cannot distinguish sanity from insanity.