Microsoft Word Jurnal 1 13 ed doc

Fəlsəfə və sosial-siyasi elmlər – 2013, № 1
 
 
 
 
132
work was “Scientia Crucis”, a study of Saint John of the Cross in which 
philosophy, theology and mysticism converge. On the 2
nd
 of August 1942 
she was arrested and deported to Auschwitz; the study of the Spanish 
mystic, which she had begun the previous year, was to remain unfinished
1
. 
 
2. The basis of individuality: Edith Stein from Thomas 
Aquinas to Duns Scotus 
 
The centrality of the anthropological theme is an interest that Edith 
Stein shared with the cultural context of her time, but what made her 
approach original was her attempt to complete Husserl’s phenomenology 
with the intuitions and themes of medieval philosophy. This was not limited 
to Aristotelian-Thomist thought, but also included thinkers of other schools. 
This was brought to light recently by Father Francesco Alfieri's study, “La 
presenza di Duns Scoto nel pensiero di Edith Stein. La questione 
dell’individualità”
2
, which seeks to reconstruct the various sources of 
reference from which Stein was able to build a unified whole and thereby 
                                                 
1
 The reconstruction of the figure of Saint John of the Cross presented in this work, 
observes the author, is not a classic biography, since the Scientia Crucis is part of the larger 
project of a ‘philosophy of the person’, to which other writings by Stein had already 
contributed. Indeed, she points out that what is stated about the ‘I’, freedom and the person 
«does not derive from the teaching of our Holy Father John of the Cross. Of course there 
are certain points of departure to be found in him. Expositions on them, however, were far 
from his main intention and his thinking processes» (E. S
TEIN
, Kreuzeswissenschaft. Studie 
über Johannes vom Kreuz, neu bearbeitet und eingeleitet von U. Dobhan, Geleitwort von 
K. Mass, ESGA  18, Herder, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 2007
3
, p. 3; English translation The 
Science of the Cross. A Study of Saint John of the Cross, by von J. Koeppel, introduction by 
K. Kavanaugh, ICS Publications, Washington (DC) 2002, p. 5). Again in the first few lines 
of the Preface, she points out that «Constructing a philosophy of the person [...] has been 
made a task only in modern philosophy» (ibid). The study of John of the Cross is thus 
consistent with the research project she had begun with her first writings on empathy. See 
G. P
ULINA
, L’angelo di Husserl, pp. 76-77. 
2
 F.  A
LFIERI
,  La presenza di Duns Scoto nel pensiero di Edith Stein. La questione 
dell’individualità, Thesis ad doctoratum in philosophia assequendum, Pontificia Universitas 
Lateranensis, Vatican City 2011, pp. 332 (English edition in preparation). I thank Father 
Alfieri for allowing me to consult, ahead of its publication, the English translation of the 
work by George Metcalf. Citations from this work are from the English version while page 
numbers refer to the Italian edition. 

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133
address what the author himself refers to in the Introduction as a “clear gap” 
in the studies conducted to date
1
. 
In the context of historiographical reconstruction, the issue of 
individuality in Stein’s work
2
 has generally been considered by scholars and 
commentators in terms of continuity with Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. It 
is true that Stein’s works contain many passages or whole chapters in which 
the comparison with the Aristotelian-Thomist perspective is evident. It 
should be pointed out however that Stein's contacts with these two large 
authors of the past were largely mediated by secondary sources, with the 
exception of her direct experience of Aquinas’ De Veritate and some works 
by Aristotle such as Metaphysica. Moreover, Father Alfieri’s study reveals 
that in addition to her relationship with the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of 
thought, just as intense and constructive were the contacts that Stein sought 
to establish with Duns Scotus, although here too, she did not always succeed 
                                                 
1
 Of the very few studies published on this topic, see: F. B
OTTIN
, Tommaso d’Aquino, 
Duns Scoto e Edith Stein sulla individuazione, in Il Santo 49 (2009), pp. 121-129. See also 
the paper by P. J. S
CHULZ
, Sulla soggettività della persona umana. Il contributo di Edith 
Stein alla teoria dell’identità, in Rivista Teologica di Lugano 12 (2007), pp. 511-530. 
2
 In philosophical terminology, ‘individuality’ refers to those aspects of a thing which, 
though they really belong to it, nevertheless are not included in its definition, insofar as the 
definition concerns its universal aspects. Individuality is thus ‘that which makes the 
singular singular’, i.e. unique in its reality. The search for its origin and basis is the essence 
of the issue at the heart of the “principle of individuation”, which was fiercely debated in 
medieval philosophy. The “principle of individuation” is understood as the metaphysical 
principle, intrinsic to the individual, that is and gives us the reason for its individuality. 
According to Thomas Aquinas, as well as Aristotle, what distinguishes individuals of the 
same species from each other is matter, considered not as pure power, but in relation to 
quantity and extent, the division of which gives rise to number. For this reason, the basis of 
individuation is, according to Thomas Aquinas, “materia signata quantitate”, i.e. matter 
which, because of quantity, has an extent, with parts that are unmistakable in themselves 
and can be designated from outside. Concerning individuation of the human person, the 
reference to matter is not sufficient; further qualification is required. Aquinas' definition, 
according to which «omne individuum rationalis naturae dicitur persona» (S. Theol. I, q. 
29, a 3, ad 2) recalls that of Boetius, according to whom «persona est naturae rationalis 
individua substantia» (De duabus naturis et una persona Christi, chapter 3: Migne, PL, 64, 
col. 1345). One of the characteristics of the ‘person’ cited by philosophers in the Scholastic 
tradition, is non-communicability, understood in the sense indicated by Aquinas as the 
characteristic that prevents a single being from being divided into many others and from 
being united with others (In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, ad 6). 

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