COMMISSION
OF
INQUIRY
INTO
SAFETY
AND
HEALTH
IN
THE
MINING
INDUSTRY
33
during the year 1992 / 93 the total number of
fatalities in New South Wales,
Australia was four. According to the Annual Report for 92/93 of the Department of
Mineral Resources, New South Wales, coal production in the State for that period
was 84 million tons, and the number of persons employed was 15 820 for 91/92.
The fatality rates in South Africa and in Australia are 0.91 (ten year average,
excluding explosions) and 0,25 per 1 000 employed respectively. It is true that the
proportion of surface mined coal is somewhat higher in NSW than in South Africa,
but the less favourable underground conditions would
tend to compensate for this
advantage.
The second largest cause of injuries is falls of ground. The Commission did not
have much evidence with regard to this problem, which prevents the formulation of
specific comments.
The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that this matter be further investigated.
3.3.2
The Explosion Hazard in Coal Mines
Two of the most important lines of defence against coal mine explosions involve the
avoidance of ignitions of methane, and the containment of the damaging effects that
can occur if an ignition develops into an explosion.
-prevention of Methane Ignitions.
The evidence before the Commission indicated that the majority of ignitions
occurred in bord and pillar workings. These ignitions
were initiated almost
exclusively near the working faces or in the goaf. It was argued that South African
coals are harder to cut and therefore there is a greater likelihood that sparks are
generated in the course of coal cutting. If a greater frequency of sparking is
expected in South African collieries during coal cutting then much greater vigilance
must be exercised to ensure that if sparks do occur, they do not encounter fuel to
initiate an ignition or an explosion.
The primary site for the prevention of ignitions is the working face. The greatest
problem is likely to be encountered at or near the coal faces in bord and pillar
workings. Due to the chequer-bord layout the faces are
away from the main airflow
much of the time. Unless determined efforts are made to achieve improvements, the
ventilation of these headings is likely to remain inadequate to clear methane and
dust.
The aspects that require attention include distance from cross ventilation, minimum
air velocity, height of working, recirculation, air quantity and quality,
coursing of air
from one working face to another and of course, the methane content of the air near
the cutting picks.
Evidence placed before the Commission and observations during visits appeared to
indicate that insufficient vigilance is applied by management and the inspectorate to
ensure the satisfactory control of the ventilation of working faces in bord and pillar
workings. Less opportunity arose to examine the measures applied to control
methane in goaf areas, but history and the evidence of Mr M J Deats of Eskom
suggested that this problem also requires attention.
COMMISSION
OF
INQUIRY
INTO
SAFETY
AND
HEALTH
IN
THE
MINING
INDUSTRY
34
-control of Coal Dust Explosions.
The Chamber of Mines in its submission stated categorically
that the recent
explosions which have devastated some of the collieries were methane explosions.
No evidence was presented to support this assertion, which was disputed by others.
The Commission feels that the possibility of the involvement of coal dust in the
explosions cannot be excluded. To explain the largest explosions it is necessary to
postulate either the presence of a widespread accumulation of methane in a mixture
with air within the explosive range, or the involvement of coal dust in the
propagation. While the former explanation may be true of some of the disasters, it
would reveal an incredible failure on the part of management if major accumulations
of methane were the principal fuel of all explosions. Consequently
the contribution
of coal dust to the severity of at least some of the explosions cannot be disregarded,
it is necessary, therefore, to intensify measures to prevent the spread of explosions.
The primary measures of protection against the propagation of coal dust explosions
are;
-the cleaning up of all coal dust in the face area that can be lifted into the air to form
a dust air mixture. Only very small quantities of coal dust are required to create this
mixture;
-dust abatement by wetting; and
-stone or rock dusting so that inert dust is mixed with the coal dust in sufficient
quantity to make the mixture inert.
In addition to these
measures in many countries, especially where longwall mining is
practised, stone dust barriers or water barriers are also mandated. A notable
exception in this regard is the USA where such barriers are not prescribed. In
Australian coal mines barriers are used in conveyor belt roadways only. The current
South African regulations make the use of barriers optional.
The use of barriers has been the subject of much international debate. There can be
little doubt that if they can be applied effectively, they are an important defensive
measure. The debate has centred around the effectiveness of barriers in particular
situations. Experts argue that, where the bord and
pillar system is the primary
method of mining, a multiplicity of drives is available and they are laid out on a
chequer-board pattern. The application of barriers is cumbersome and expensive
and, at the same time, provides doubtful protection. In the European type of
longwall mining, where limited numbers of entries (gates) are used, the efficiency of
barriers is not in doubt.
The COMMISSION RECOMMENDS that:-
-methods of face ventilation should be subjected to an immediate and aggressive review;
-the relevant provisions of
US Code of Federal Regulations, Mineral Resources, Title 30 (Part 75 -
Mandatory Safety Standards - Underground Coal Mines, Sub part D ventilation, para 75.3.) should
be studied in detail;