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time afforded by the Maltese negotiator to look over basic intelligence
requirements such
as blueprints, aircraft status, location of the terrorists,
location of the hostages, and what
sort of weapons the terrorists were carrying. They did not take advantage of the injured
hostages thrown on the tarmac for debriefing and gathering valuable information. Force
777 deployed their sniper-observer teams at the same time as
the assault force element,
denying themselves the capability of the snipers providing initial intelligence of the target
area, covering fires for the approach, or last minute intelligence during the approach to
the target. Finally, they miscalculated the specific requirements
for the breaching charge
by not studying the blueprints and finding out how many explosives were needed to blow
the door.
b. Surprise
Force 777 did not exploit the element of surprise to gain precious
moments during their initial entry. They erroneously thought
that a big explosion and
smoke would compensate for the lack of stun grenades and that it would be enough to
disorient the terrorists and give the assault force the surprise advantage. Once they
entered the aircraft, Force 777 was surprised to find that six rows
of seats had been blown
up from their breaching charge and that over 20 hostages were dead.
c. Operator’s
Skills
Force 777 was not ready or capable of conducting an assault of this nature.
They developed a last minute plan, and it was poorly executed. Their shooting skills and
techniques inside the aircraft say little of their knowledge of CQB. The last thing needed
inside
a target during CQB is smoke, and Force 777 was throwing smoke grenades
everywhere and shooting at anything that moved. The sniper force was undisciplined and
erroneously shot at anyone coming out of the aircraft without first positively identifying
them.
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