160
were not even fitted with telescopic sites, and none had infrared or thermal sites (Reeve,
2000, p. 116). They did not have proper firing positions or direct
line of sight with the
terrorists; instead, the pilots and aircrew were in their way. As the firefight broke out, a
police officer standing at the base of the air traffic control tower was shot in the head by
one of the terrorists, as he tried to support the sniper element with a sub machinegun.
Nevertheless, the worst mistake for this element was having only five snipers for eight
terrorists. After several investigations covering
the disaster, it was determined that some
of the Israeli hostages were killed by the Germans’ erratic gunfire.
The concept of an open-air option to end a hostage siege is a high-risk
option considered in hostage rescue operations. For this specific reason, it
is considered
only when the skills of the sniper elements are highly effective, and the unit is very
comfortable with its standard operating procedures responding to contingencies. The
order should never have been given to open fire once it was determined that there were
eight and not five terrorists holding the Israelis. The plan should have been aborted and
another option considered.
To make matters worse, the chaos that ensued during the
firefight and the mad infantry attack by the assault element show a lack of discipline and
expertise by all in the assault force. The safety of the hostages was of secondary
importance to the
German authorities at the time; the focus was to kill the terrorists.
Six months after the disaster at the airfield, the Germans vowed they
would not be taken by surprise again and authorized the creation of the
Grenzschutzgruppe 9
(GSG-9 or Border Protection Group)
counterterrorist unit, which
was deemed operational in April and was responsible for the success of operation FIRE
MAGIC in 1977 (see case study D).
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