Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis

6. 
Close Quarter Battle 
Close quarter battle (CQB) is intrinsic to hostage rescue operations. FM 100-25, 
Doctrine for Special Operations, defines CQB as sustained combative tactics, techniques, 
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Information gathered on 20 March 2004 during phone interview with Patrol Officer Petras from the 
Tactical Negotiations Team, Policy and Procedures, Mt. Lebanon Police Department, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. 

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and procedures employed by small, highly trained SOF units using special purpose 
weapons, munitions, and demolitions to recover specified personnel, equipment, or 
material. Characteristics of CQB include surprise, speed, and violence of action, and the 
application of precise discriminatory engagement of targets to gain specific, short-term 
objectives. This type of operation requires highly advanced detailed planning, 
synchronization, and integrated assault skills, including advanced marksmanship, 
explosive entry techniques, and special tactics and procedures to gain surprise. CQB may 
be conducted in peacetime operations in highly sensitive environments. Prevention of 
collateral damage is a critical consideration (FM 100-25, 1999, p. Glossary-7).
C. 
FOUR PRINCIPLES FOR HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS 
1. Intelligence 
[Intelligence is] the product resulting from the collection, processing, 
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation or available 
information concerning foreign countries or areas. It is information and 
knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, 
investigation, analysis, or understanding (Joint Pub 1-02, 2003, p. 261). 
The principle of intelligence as factor in the biorhythm model is defined as the 
timely, detailed, tailored, integrated, prioritized, rapidly updated, and focused intelligence 
vital to hostage rescue force targeting and mission planning process (Joint Pub 3-05.5, 
1993, p. II-12). The specific intelligence requirements for a hostage crisis are very 
specific and often very different from conventional or SOF missions. The target 
intelligence details such as the specifics of possible breaching points, blueprints and 
diagrams of the structure, exact location of the hostages and terrorists, established 
routines, all demand very accurate and real time intelligence that uniquely serve the 
operator on the assault force. To attain this level of detail, technical and human 
intelligence collection assets must take priority during the siege in order to answer the 
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR)
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.
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CCIR are a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being 
critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision-making process that affects 
successful mission accomplishment (Joint Pub 3-0, 2001, p. III-26) 

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The collection of intelligence by human agents, known as human 
intelligence or HUMINT, can fill in many of the gaps in the knowledge 
gained by technical collection. The U.S., however, traditionally has been 
weaker at HUMINT than at technical intelligence (TECHINT) gathering 
(Vandenbroucke, 1993, p. 153).
Technical intelligence collection during the hostage siege focuses but it is not 
limited to audio and video surveillance devices, which can collect and provide real time 
information on what is happening inside the target. The issue at hand is being able to 
plant these devices inside the target location in order to receive accurate data on the 
hostages, the terrorists, and the target area configuration. To bridge the intelligence gap 
when these devices cannot be used, it is essential to employ HUMINT
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assets in and 
around the target area, to collect and report the details not answered through TECHINT
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means. Both collection means must be monitored constantly to pick up any changes 
inside the crisis site such as movement of hostages from one location to another and the 
condition, weapons, strength, and capabilities of the terrorists. 
Sniper-observer teams provide another excellent means of reconnaissance and 
surveillance of the target area, and can serve as the emergency assault element in case 
any triggers
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are set off during the initial stages of the siege. These teams are force 
multipliers around the target area, in that they can provide expert advice on the tactical 
situation by technical and human surveillance means; at the same time, they give the 
commander an additional course of action for an emergency assault option. Above all, 
sniper-observer teams are operators first; the information gathered by them is 
immediately considered processed intelligence by any competent counterterrorist task 
force. 
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HUMINT is the collection by a trained HUMINT collector of foreign information from people and 
multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, 
personnel, and capabilities. It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both 
passively and actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements and 
cross-cue other intelligence disciplines (FM 2-0, 2004, p. 6-1). 
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TECHINT is intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of threat and foreign military 
equipment and associated material. 
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Triggers during a hostage crisis are established by the Counter Terrorist Task Force (CTJTF) 
commander to set off actions according to the approved plan. These can be the moving of hostages to a 
different location, a fire on the target area, or the actual killing of a hostage or hostages.

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Operational security (OPSEC
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) is another critical aspect of the intelligence 
principle in hostage rescue operations that is closely tied to deception and surprise. The 
commander of the rescue force, as well as the government and all other agencies 
involved, must constantly be thinking about operational security measures to protect the 
force and the plan from being compromised. Strict OPSEC is a force multiplier for 
hostage rescue forces and cannot be overlooked. Operational security measures were 
very sloppy during the failed attempt to rescue the Israeli athletes during the Munich 
Olympics of 1972. There was no control over media or any security cordon of the area, 
causing the German police forces to expose their plan on national television as they were 
attempting to conduct a hasty assault against the Black September terrorists. On the 
contrary, a perfect example of strict OPSEC is Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR in 
Lima, Peru. Throughout the 126 days of planning and preparation prior to the assault, the 
rescue force and the tunnel diggers were kept in an undisclosed location in total secrecy, 
while rehearsing and preparing for the daring assault, on a full size replica of the target 
area (see Chapter III for detailed case study).