15
a long-term commitment to achieve the desired result. Alternatively, SO
may be principally offensive, usually of high physical and political risk,
and
directed at high-value, critical, and often time-sensitive targets (Joint
Publication 3-05, 1998, p. I-4).
A hostage rescue is a mission specifically tailored for SOF. However, the unique
skills required to be successful in hostage rescue operations require a higher degree of
expertise not found in regular SOF units. The principle of operator’s skills as a factor in
the biorhythm is defined as those unique skills and attributes required by the hostage
rescue force to successfully dominate and eliminate the threat on a target area, while at
the same time safely rescuing a hostage/s. Hostage rescue operations are the most
difficult type of special operations missions. They require absolute precision and demand
a specific type of force with attributes and capabilities that distinguish them from
conventional forces or even regular SOF. The special skills
required by a rescue force
are even more technical and sophisticated than those required of regular SOF units.
Specialized shooting techniques, breaching, technical and tactical surveillance, and close
quarter battle, are all special skills specific for hostage rescue. A competent rescue force
takes months to create and requires resources and capabilities not encountered in a
regular unit. The Joint Pub 3-05 defines these qualities and attributes as the SOF
“truths”:
(1) Humans are more important than hardware; (2) Quality is better than
quantity; (3) SOF cannot be mass-produced; and (4) Competent SOF
cannot be created after emergencies arise (p. II-3).
The most important part of a rescue operation is the
physical act of actually
saving the hostage. In order to do this, the skill level of the rescue force must be high.
Hostage operations involve the use of surgical precision fires from snipers as well as
from every operator and breacher in the assault force. An error while taking a shot or
calculating a charge to blow a door
21
is not an option. This can lead to disaster for the
21
A
n anemic explosive charge will not help achieve entry and gives terrorists time to murder their
hostages and defend themselves. This was the case when Israel's Sayeret Matkal tried to rescue a kidnapped
Golani infantry brigade soldier, Nachshon Vaxman, in 1994. The charges used were too small and failed to
open the door of the apartment forcing the team to set new charges. By this time the terrorists had already
executed Vaxman and were waiting when SM finally charged through the door. They managed to kill the
assault team leader before being killed themselves (Information retrieved from
specwarnet.net/world/ct.htm, international CT units site on 20 January 2004).
16
entire operation. Assaulters are required to be able to shoot
at a terrorist with exact
precision, while moving through obstacles, and be able to discriminate between the
terrorist and the hostage being held at gunpoint. Each rescue member must be able to
engage a terrorist with killing shots on his very first try, with two rounds to the chest
(known as the “double tap”) followed by one to the head, if required (usually if the
terrorist is wearing body armor). If the rescuer misses, the terrorist will have time to
either shoot back or,
even worse, kill the hostage, causing the operation to fail.
Another dimension to the operator’s skill that is specific to close quarter battle
(CQB) operations is the operator’s
state and presence of mind
. Not only is the operator
required to maximize violence of action, use accurate and selective fires, be flexible, and
in tremendous physical condition, but his mental state of mind must carry him through
the impossible; he must believe he is
indestructible inside kit
22
. Once the assault begins,
he must show no fear and continue to his designated point of domination in each specific
room on the target, regardless of what happens in his sector. The rescue force must be
comfortable working with one another, knowing exactly how each member of the force is
going to react during any given situation, depending on each other for their lives.
We were isolated in an undisclosed location for almost four months.
During that time, we rehearsed and trained on a full size replica of the
Japanese Ambassador’s residence for most of the day, everyday. I got to
the point were I could walk the whole assault blindfolded.
I knew exactly
who would be to my left and right, how many steps I had to take to a door,
and how many seconds it would take me to walk from one room to the
next (Personal interview with Major Felix Diaz
23
, Army Special Forces,
Peru, 19 September 2003).
22
The term “kit” refers to all equipment, to include body armor and weapon, carried by an operator or
a regular soldier. The term has been adopted from the British.
23
Major Felix Diaz gave me a personal tour of the mock up site while in Peru. During the actual
assault, a full size brick wall crumbled on top of him; a breaching charge was placed on
a door that was
booby trapped by the MRTA with a large amount of explosives causing a tremendous explosion, knocking
down the entire brick wall. The explosion sent Major Diaz flying approximately 30 feet and covered him
in bricks, but he was able to regain his composure and continue the assault.
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The very nature of the CQB fight takes combatives
24
to a new level, making the
operator’s psyche critical for his survival. If the operator has any second thoughts as he
enters a room or a structure during the assault, he will second-guess himself allowing the
enemy just enough time to fire a shot back at him or at the hostage. He might even stop
the flow of the assault force, creating chaos and confusion
inside the target area, allowing
the terrorists to regain their initiative. When an operator dons his protective body armor
and special equipment, a “switch is turned on” in his mind—he must believe that he is
indestructible and can face any odds.
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