Neg China Reaction da 1NC

Impacts

Biodiversity Loss

South China Sea expansion kills coral reefs causing massive loss of biodiversity—the Coral Triangle is threatened

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(Deutsche Welle news interview of David Rosenberg, visiting fellow at the Australian National University, 4/16/15 “Beijing’s South China Sea projects ‘highly disruptive’ to local ecosystems” accessed 7/29/15 from http://www.dw.com/en/beijings-south-china-sea-projects-highly-disruptive-to-local-ecosystems/a-18387012 LC)

The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs said on April 13 that "China's massive reclamation activities are causing irreversible and widespread damage to the biodiversity and ecological balance of the South China Sea." It also said that the destruction of coral reef systems resulting from Beijing's land reclamation projects is estimated to lead to economic losses to coastal states valued at $100 million annually.¶ Recently published satellite images show that China is quickly reclaiming land around a submerged reef within an area the Philippines views as its exclusive economic zone. Reclamation is well advanced on six other reefs in the Spratlys. Beijing claims almost the entire South China Sea, rejecting rival claims from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei and triggering territorial disputes.¶ In a DW interview, David Rosenberg, a visiting fellow at the Australian National University (ANU), talks about the impact the building projects and territorial disputes are having on the ecology and about how the international community should react to China's ambitions in the region.¶ DW: What environmental impact are China's land reclamation projects having on the South China Sea?¶ David Rosenberg: The current Chinese and Taiwanese construction projects in the Spratly Islands are primarily military installations. But they are small in size. Itu Aba, the largest land feature in the Spratly Islands, has less than half a square kilometer in total area. It is occupied by Taiwan which is expanding its port there to accommodate frigates and coast guard cutters, and is also making improvements to its 1,200 meter runway.¶ In the short term, the environmental impact of all these building projects is highly disruptive to local ecosystems due to sand dredging, coral mining, and cement pouring. The long-term impact is not yet clear.¶ What economic impact could the destruction of the coral reefs have on the Spratlys?¶ It is difficult in the short term to attribute any specific economic losses to coral reef destruction. In the long run, however, the costs could be catastrophic. Coral reefs are the foundation of the maritime food chain. They provide the habitat and spawning grounds for numerous fish species, including many of the world's most valuable and productive stocks of tuna and shrimp.¶ The "Coral Triangle" formed by the South China Sea, the Sulu Sea, the Sulawesi Sea and adjacent waters is widely recognized as the global center of marine biodiversity. The area also has extraordinary scientific value in learning more about the evolution of life on earth, as Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace discovered generations ago in the Malay Archipelago.

Loss of ocean biodiversity means extinction – oxygen production is lost

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(Jerry Coyne, professor U Chicago department of Ecology and Evolution, John L. Hoekstra, Associate professor, Harvard Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, 9/24/7 “The Great Dying” In New Republic, accessed 7/29/15 from http://www.newrepublic.com/article/environment-energy/the-greatest-dying LC)

Aside from the Great Dying, there have been four other mass extinctions, all of which severely pruned life's diversity. Scientists agree that we're now in the midst of a sixth such episode. This new one, however, is different - and, in many ways, much worse. For, unlike earlier extinctions, this one results from the work of a single species, Homo sapiens. We are relentlessly taking over the planet, laying it to waste and eliminating most of our fellow species. Moreover, we're doing it much faster than the mass extinctions that came before. Every year, up to 30,000 species disappear due to human activity alone. At this rate, we could lose half of Earth's species in this century. And, unlike with previous extinctions, there's no hope that biodiversity will ever recover, since the cause of the decimation - us - is here to stay. To scientists, this is an unparalleled calamity, far more severe than global warming, which is, after all, only one of many threats to biodiversity. Yet global warming gets far more press. Why? One reason is that, while the increase in temperature is easy to document, the decrease of species is not. Biologists don't know, for example, exactly how many species exist on Earth. Estimates range widely, from three million to more than 50 million, and that doesn't count microbes, critical (albeit invisible) components of ecosystems. We're not certain about the rate of extinction, either; how could we be, since the vast majority of species have yet to be described? We're even less sure how the loss of some species will affect the ecosystems in which they're embedded, since the intricate connection between organisms means that the loss of a single species can ramify unpredictably. But we do know some things. Tropical rainforests are disappearing at a rate of 2 percent per year. Populations of most large fish are down to only 10 percent of what they were in 1950. Many primates and all the great apes - our closest relatives - are nearly gone from the wild. And we know that extinction and global warming act synergistically. Extinction exacerbates global warming: By burning rainforests, we're not only polluting the atmosphere with carbon dioxide (a major greenhouse gas) but destroying the very plants that can remove this gas from the air. Conversely, global warming increases extinction, both directly (killing corals) and indirectly (destroying the habitats of Arctic and Antarctic animals). As extinction increases, then, so does global warming, which in turn causes more extinction - and so on, into a downward spiral of destruction. Why, exactly, should we care? Let's start with the most celebrated case: the rainforests. Their loss will worsen global warming - raising temperatures, melting icecaps, and flooding coastal cities. And, as the forest habitat shrinks, so begins the inevitable contact between organisms that have not evolved together, a scenario played out many times, and one that is never good. Dreadful diseases have successfully jumped species boundaries, with humans as prime recipients. We have gotten aids from apes, sars from civets, and Ebola from fruit bats. Additional worldwide plagues from unknown microbes are a very real possibility. But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that should trouble us. Healthy ecosystems the world over provide hidden services like waste disposal, nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best rendered by ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and accident, humans have introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into monoculture. Fast-growing zebra mussels, for example, have outcompeted more than 15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes and have damaged harbors and water-treatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated by single species (often genetically homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments, soils will erode and become unproductive - which, along with temperature change, will diminish agricultural yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced forest cover, ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of clean water spells disaster. In many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion.

South China Sea Nuclear War

Instability causes South China Sea war

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(J. Michael, senior fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, 7/10/14 “Where Would Beijing Use External Distractions?” in The Diplomat, accessed 7/29/15 from http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/where-would-beijing-use-external-distractions/ LC)

Throughout history, embattled governments have often resorted to external distractions to tap into a restive population’s nationalist sentiment and thereby release, or redirect, pressures that otherwise could have been turned against those in power. Authoritarian regimes in particular, which deny their citizens the right to punish the authorities through retributive democracy — that is, elections — have used this device to ensure their survival during periods of domestic upheaval or financial crisis. Would the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose legitimacy is so contingent on social stability and economic growth, go down the same path if it felt that its hold on power were threatened by domestic instability?¶ Building on the premise that the many contradictions that are inherent to the extraordinarily complex Chinese experiment, and rampant corruption that undermines stability, will eventually catch up with the CCP, we can legitimately ask how, and where, Beijing could manufacture external crises with opponents against whom nationalist fervor, a major characteristic of contemporary China, can be channeled. In past decades, the CCP has on several occasions tapped into public outrage to distract a disgruntled population, often by encouraging (and when necessary containing) protests against external opponents, namely Japan and the United States.¶ While serving as a convenient outlet, domestic protests, even when they turned violent (e.g., attacks on Japanese manufacturers), were about as far as the CCP would allow. This self-imposed restraint, which was prevalent during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, was a function both of China’s focus on building its economy (contingent on stable relations with its neighbors) and perceived military weakness. Since then, China has established itself as the world’s second-largest economy and now deploys, thanks to more than a decade of double-digit defense budget growth, a first-rate modern military.¶ Those impressive achievements have, however, fueled Chinese nationalism, which has increasingly approached the dangerous zone of hubris. For many, China is now a rightful regional hegemon demanding respect, which if denied can — and should — be met with threats, if not the application of force. While it might be tempting to attribute China’s recent assertiveness in the South and East China Seas to the emergence of Xi Jinping, Xi alone cannot make all the decisions; nationalism is a component that cannot be dissociated from this new phase in Chinese expressions of its power. As then-Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi is said to have told his counterparts at a tense regional forum in Hanoi in 2010, “There is one basic difference among us. China is a big state and you are smaller countries.”¶ This newfound assertiveness within its backyard thus makes it more feasible that, in times of serious trouble at home, the Chinese leadership could seek to deflect potentially destabilizing anger by exploiting some external distraction. Doing so is always a calculated risk, and sometimes the gambit fails, as Slobodan Milosevic learned the hard way when he tapped into the furies of nationalism to appease mounting public discontent with his bungled economic policies. For an external distraction to achieve its objective (that is, taking attention away from domestic issues by redirecting anger at an outside actor), it must not result in failure or military defeat. In other words, except for the most extreme circumstances, such as the imminent collapse of a regime, the decision to externalize a domestic crisis is a rational one: adventurism must be certain to achieve success, which in turn will translate into political gains for the embattled regime. Risk-taking is therefore proportional to the seriousness of the destabilizing forces within. Rule No. 1 for External Distractions: The greater the domestic instability, the more risks a regime will be willing to take, given that the scope and, above all, the symbolism of the victory in an external scenario must also be greater.¶ With this in mind, we can then ask which external distraction scenarios would Beijing be the most likely to turn to should domestic disturbances compel it to do so. That is not to say that anything like this will happen anytime soon. It is nevertheless not unreasonable to imagine such a possibility. The intensifying crackdown on critics of the CCP, the detention of lawyers, journalists and activists, unrest in Xinjiang, random acts of terrorism, accrued censorship — all point to growing instability. What follows is a very succinct (and by no means exhaustive) list of disputes, in descending order of likelihood, which Beijing could use for external distraction.¶ 1. South China Sea¶ The South China Sea, an area where China is embroiled in several territorial disputes with smaller claimants, is ripe for exploitation as an external distraction. Nationalist sentiment, along with the sense that the entire body of water is part of China’s indivisible territory and therefore a “core interest,” are sufficient enough to foster a will to fight should some “incident,” timed to counter unrest back home, force China to react. Barring a U.S. intervention, which for the time being seems unlikely, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has both the numerical and qualitative advantage against any would be opponent or combination thereof. The Philippines and Vietnam, two countries which have skirmished with China in recent years, are the likeliest candidates for external distractions, as the costs of a brief conflict would be low and the likelihood of military success fairly high. For a quick popularity boost and low-risk distraction, these opponents would best serve Beijing’s interests.

South China Sea war goes nuclear

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(Avery, professor University of Pennsylvania department of Political Science, China's Real and Present Danger. Foreign Affairs [serial online]. September 2013; 92(5):136-144. Available from: Military & Government Collection, Ipswich, MA. Accessed July 30, 2015 LC)

Uncertainty about what could lead either Beijing or Washington to risk war makes a crisis far more likely, since neither side knows when, where, or just how hard it can push without the other side pushing back. This situation bears some resemblance to that of the early Cold War, when it took a number of serious crises for the two sides to feel each other out and learn the rules of the road. But today's environment might be even more dangerous.¶ The balance of nuclear and conventional military power between China and the United States, for example, is much more lopsided than the one that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States. Should Beijing and Washington find themselves in a conflict, the huge U.S. advantage in conventional forces would increase the temptation for Washington to threaten to or actually use force. Recognizing the temptation facing Washington, Beijing might in turn feel pressure to use its conventional forces before they are destroyed. Although China could not reverse the military imbalance, it might believe that quickly imposing high costs on the United States would be the best way to get it to back off.¶ The fact that both sides have nuclear arsenals would help keep the situation in check, because both sides would want to avoid actions that would invite nuclear retaliation. Indeed, if only nuclear considerations mattered, U.S.-Chinese crises would be very stable and not worth worrying about too much. But the two sides' conventional forces complicate matters and undermine the stability provided by nuclear deterrence. During a crisis, either side might believe that using its conventional forces would confer bargaining leverage, manipulating the other side's fear of escalation through what the economist Thomas¶ Schelling calls a "competition in risk-taking." In a crisis, China or the United States might believe that it valued what was at stake more than the other and would therefore be willing to tolerate a higher level of risk. But because using conventional forces would be only the first step in an unpredictable process subject to misperception, missteps, and miscalculation, there is no guarantee that brinkmanship would end before it led to an unanticipated nuclear catastrophe.¶ China, moreover, apparently believes that nuclear deterrence opens the door to the safe use of conventional force. Since both countries would fear a potential nuclear exchange, the Chinese seem to think that neither they nor the Americans would allow a military conflict to escalate too far. Soviet leaders, by contrast, indicated that they would use whatever military means were necessary if war came--which is one reason why war never came. In addition, China's official "no first use" nuclear policy, which guides the Chinese military's preparation and training for conflict, might reinforce Beijing's confidence that limited war with the United States would not mean courting nuclear escalation. As a result of its beliefs, Beijing might be less cautious about taking steps that would risk triggering a crisis. And if a crisis ensued, China might also be less cautious about firing the first shot.¶ Such beliefs are particularly worrisome given recent developments in technology that have dramatically improved the precision and effectiveness of conventional military capabilities. Their lethality might confer a dramatic advantage to the side that attacks first, something that was generally not true of conventional military operations in the main European theater of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Moreover, because the sophisticated computer and satellite systems that guide contemporary weapons are highly vulnerable to conventional military strikes or cyberattacks, today's more precise weapons might be effective only if they are used before an adversary has struck or adopted counter-measures. If peacetime restraint were to give way to a search for advantage in a crisis, neither China nor the United States could be confident about the durability of the systems managing its advanced conventional weapons.¶ Under such circumstances, both Beijing and Washington would have incentives to initiate an attack. China would feel particularly strong pressure, since its advanced conventional weapons are more fully dependent on vulnerable computer networks, fixed radar sites, and satellites. The effectiveness of U.S. advanced forces is less dependent on these most vulnerable systems. The advantage held by the United States, however, might increase its temptation to strike first, especially against China's satellites, since it would be able to cope with Chinese retaliation in kind.

Japan Rearmament

Chinese dominance causes Japanese rearmament

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(Lee J, Masters in Peace Operations “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America” American Military University, Accessed 7/29/15 from http://lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf LC)

From a national security standpoint, Marquand (2004) states that Chinese military action¶ could also destabilize Asia, giving nationalist factions in Japan “every excuse they need”,¶ according to one Japanese scholar, to develop the nuclear weapons capability that many in¶ Tokyo are already in favor of. He lists another economic liability of invasion as the possibility¶ that the Japanese would do everything in their power to redirect the markets of Asia, including¶ their own, away from China, even at the expense of losing their own money in trade. A further¶ economic and national security risk that Marquand (2004) notes is the possibility that Russia ¶ could use Chinese aggression as an excuse to sell oil exclusively to Japan, as Russia is not¶ desirous of China developing quickly into a superpower and China reportedly [as of then] only¶ has a 20-day reserve and is 75 percent reliant on Middle Eastern oil, which could have¶ disastrous repercussions. Additionally, he notes that China has no desire to destroy its relationship with the U.S.

Japanese rearmament triggers nuclear war with North Korea

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(Ellen, White House correspondent and bureau chief for the Talk Radio News service. She is also Washington bureau chief and political editor for Talkers Magazine. In addition, Ratner is a news analyst at the Fox News Channel. 1/17 “Engage North Korea!” accessed 7/29/15 from http://www.wnd.com/2003/01/16781/ LC)

Remember your history. As long as the United States was a guarantor of security to both South Korea and Japan (hostile as those two are to one another), the Japanese never had to worry about rearming. This was a benefit to everybody, starting with the Japanese. They were spared the expense of massive military budgets and so could focus on their economy. China, North Korea and South Korea as well as Russia – remember that the Japanese military soundly defeated them in the 1904 Russo-Japanese War – also benefited. Memories were lucid and bitter about the havoc once wreaked by a militarily ambitious Japan. Better to keep Tokyo focused on a percolating economy. It was win-win for the entire region.¶ That is now threatened by North Korea’s brazen stupidity. By rattling the nuclear saber, withdrawing from non-proliferation treaties and tossing out U.N. inspectors, the North Koreans are on the verge of making one of the colossal blunders of world history. If North Korea is not reined in, then it is likely that Tokyo will rearm – and experts predict that with Japan’s high-tech, industrial economy, they could assemble a full nuclear arsenal and bomb delivery systems within three years.¶ This would be a disaster. Not only would it trigger a new, intra-Asian arms race – for who could doubt that if Japan goes nuclear, China and North Korea would be joined by South Korea and even Taiwan in building new and more weapons? Likewise, given the memories, who could doubt that such a scenario increases the risks of a nuclear war somewhere in the region? By comparison, the old Cold War world, where there were only two armed camps, would look like kid stuff.

Asian Instability

U.S.-Sino relations key to East Asia stability

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(Doug, Senior Fellow at Cato Institute, 5/25/10 “Engaging China to Maintain Peace in East Asia”, accessed 7/13/15 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11845 LC)

How to maintain the peace in East Asia Washington must engage the PRC on both issues. America's relationship with Beijing will have a critical impact on the development of the 21st century. Disagreements are inevitable; conflict is not. China is determined to take an increasingly important international role. It is entitled to do so. However, it should equally commit to acting responsibly. As the PRC grows economically, expands its military, and gains diplomatic influence, it will be able to greatly influence international events, especially in East Asia. If it does so for good rather than ill, its neighbors will be less likely to fear the emerging superpower. Most important, responsible Chinese policy will diminish the potential for military confrontation between Beijing and Asian states as well as the U.S. In return, Washington should welcome China into the global leadership circle if its rise remains peaceful and responsible. American analysts have expressed concern about a Chinese military build-up intended to prevent U.S. intervention along the PRC's border. But the U.S. cannot expect other states to accept American dominance forever. Any American attempt to contain Beijing is likely to spark — predictably — a hostile response from China. Instead, Washington policymakers should prepare for a world in which reciprocity replaces diktat. The U.S. could encourage Chinese responsibility by adopting policies that highlight the importance of the PRC's role in promoting regional peace and stability. Such an approach is most needed to deal with the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. For instance, Beijing could play a critical role in restraining and ultimately transforming the North. So far the PRC has declined to apply significant pressure on its long-time ally. In fact, North Korea's Kim Jong-il recently visited China, presumably in pursuit of additional economic aid and investment. His quid pro quo might have been a professed willingness to return to the Six-Party nuclear talks. But few analysts believe there is much chance of a nuclear deal whether or not these negotiations proceed — and almost certainly no chance unless the PRC is prepared to get tough with the North, including threatening to cut off generous food and energy shipments. To encourage Beijing, Washington should suggest that China would share the nightmare if an unstable North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal.

East Asian instability leads to World War III

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(Jonathon S., national security reporter for McClatchy and Knight-Ridder, “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts”, Knight-Ridder News Service, 3-11, Lexis/Nexis)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster."