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his most experienced noble, Shayasta Khan, to crush him. Two years of ceaseless military campaigns made the Mughals master of the extreme north of Konkan, but in April 1663 Shivajl made a daring night attack on Shayasta Khan's camp at Puna. It cost Shayasta Khan his thumb and showed that Shivajl was still a formidable opponent. Shayasta Khan was transferred to Bengal, but before he left, Shivajl plundered Surat continuously from 17 to 21 January 1664. Only the English and Dutch merchants were able to defend their factories. Prince Mu'azzam was appointed commander, but before the Mughal forces could relieve the town the Marathas decamped with enormous booty. Jaswant Singh, who collaborated with both Shayasta Khan and Prince Mu'azzam, was a total failure.

In October 1664 the Emperor recalled the Prince and commissioned his ablest Rajput general, Mirza Raja Jai Singh, to annihilate Shivajl. Jai Singh made plans to attack from all possible directions and started fighting in the east, where he could easily threaten. Bijapur. Marching deep into Shivaji's territory, he seized Purandar and forced Shivajl to sign a treaty in June 1665, ceding four-fifths of his territory and promising to serve the Emperor loyally. Shivajl also agreed to visit the Emperor at Agra. The prominent Mughal mansabdars could not reach an understanding with Shivajl. The Mughal governors expected him to call on them as a zamindar, while Shivajl expected them to treat him as undisputed ruler of the Marathas.54 At the imperial court the Emperor's order to stand with the mansabddrs behind Jaswant Singh, whom he had previously defeated, shocked him. The Mughals considered 5,000 to be a very high rank for a new entrant, but Shivajl, who had humbled both Shayasta Khan and Jaswant Singh, expected a mansab of at least 7,000. The Emperor viewed the award of the mansab legalistically as was his wont, while Shivajl correctly related it to his political standing and prestige in the Deccan. Sensing Shivaji's reluctance to compromise, Aurangzib placed him under house arrest, and Jai Singh's son unsuccessfully attempted to-pacify him. Palace intrigue and pressure from the supporters of Shayasta Khan and Jaswant Singh prevented Aurangzib from resolving the misunderstandings. Before the Emperor could take further action, Shivajl escaped to the Deccan on 28 August 1666.

Jai Singh was still fighting in Bijapur but he was frustrated by a dearth of funds and lack of co-operation from the Muslim nobles; his Afghan colleagues openly condemned war against another Muslim state as sacrilegious. The Emperor did not understand Jai Singh's problems and recalled him. Jai Singh died on his way to court on 6 September 1667. He had won remarkable victories over

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Shivaji in the face of strong opposition from home. In Bijapur itself 'Ali' 'Adil Shah II (1652-72) had grown into a wise statesman and an enterprising general, who unhesitatingly crossed swords with Shivajl and his guerrillas. Only after his death was Bijapur plunged into civil war; even then the Mughal generals failed to penetrate it. When he returned to the Deccan, Shivajl made peace with the new Mughal viceroy, Prince Mu'azzam. His son, Shambhaji, was given a mansab of 5,000 and was allowed a free hand to conquer Bijapur. Shivajl remained at peace with the Mughals from 1667 to 1669 while he devised laws for the Maratha government and consolidated his power. Then, in 1670, he recovered the forts surrendered under the Purandar treaty. In the middle of October 1670 the Marathas again attacked Surat and plundered it mercilessly. The English, Dutch, and French factories were spared, but the Muslim and Hindu traders were totally ruined. Not only were sixty-three lakhs of rupees lost, but trade and commerce were totally dislocated. Their conquests gave the Marathas a safe route from Kalyani up northern Konkan to Surat. In 1672 Shivajl imposed chauth (a levy) of four lakhs of rupees on the Mughal territories under his control, equivalent to a quarter of the Emperor's revenue from them. To Shivajl this was not blackmail but a tax on his Mughal subjects towards their country's defence. This arbitrary levy became the principal factor in the expansion of Maratha power.

The Mughal viceroy resisted Maratha attacks vigorously but he was unable to capture the elusive guerrilla bands. In the wake of the chaos following 'All 'Adil Shah II's death in early December 1672, Shivajl seized Panhala and Satara and then burst into west Bijapur and Kanara, plundering and devastating the country. Shivajl crowned himself king in his Ra'igarh fort on 17 June 1674 assuming the title Chhatrapati (Lord of the Umbrella, or King of Kings).55

Two years later the new Bljapuri Sultan, Sikandar 'Adil Shah, made a treaty with Shivajl promising to pay him a heavy annual subsidy for protection against the Mughals. Shivajl also made formal peace with the Mughals, freeing himself to concentrate on his Karnataka conquests. Early in 1677 Shivajl collected a subsidy from Abu'l-Hasan Qutb Shah of Golkonda to raise an army and an artillery battery. He penetrated into Karnataka, the Mysore plateau, and Madras, conquering Jinji, Vellore, the adjoining districts, and some one hundred forts between 1677 and 1678. Out of the fabulous booty from that land of gold, Abu'l-Hasan, who had borne all the expenses, received nothing. Shivajl died on 15 April 1680, leaving a vast empire covering roughly half of the Deccan.

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Shivaji was a great administrator and, like his contemporaries, a despotic ruler. His central and provincial governments were based on the systems of the Deccani sultans and Vijayanagara. Chauth, which was really a military tax, was already being levied in western India. An additional tax of 10 per cent, called sardeskmukhi, was also collected by Shivaji, as the hereditary head deshmukh (chief) or sardeshmukh of his country.

Shivaji's army drew its main supplies from neighbouring kingdoms. From July to September the troops lived in cantonments in their home territory, but from the day of Dasehra (early October) they spent eight months at war, collecting chauth, sardeskmukhi and plunder. Shivaji directed the aggression and unreliability of the Maratha chieftains and stipend holders into fruitful channels. Neither did he neglect the navy, whose crews were recruited from among the low-caste Hindus of the Bombay coast. Shivaji was recognized as the protector of brahmans and cows, as the architect of Hindu self-rule, and as the defender of Hindu religion and culture. Many distinguished Hindu saints blessed him and exhorted their disciples and followers to support him. The Maharashtra terrain enabled Shivaji to train his soldiers in guerrilla tactics and to encircle and annihilate his enemies.

Shivaji died without nominating a successor. An influential minister crowned his younger son, Rajaram, a boy of ten, at Raygarh. Shivaji's elder son, Shambhaji, who had been imprisoned in Panhala fort because of his licentiousness, contested this unjust supersession. Seizing Panhala and Raygarh forts, he deposed Rajaram and crowned himself Maratha king on 16 January 1681.56

Shambhaji started his reign by sacking Burhanpur and giving refuge to Prince Akbar. The Emperor's arrival at Aurangabad early in April 1682 frustrated his plans to fight the Mughals. Shambhaji's subsequent wars against the Siddis, descended from Ethiopian slaves, around Janjira, his invasion of Goa in 1683-4, and minor skirmishes until 1685 gave the Emperor sufficient respite to consolidate his forces in the Deccan.

Aurangzib decided to invade Bijapur, where the administration was deteriorating under Sikandar 'Adil Shah. Prince Mu'azzam did not share the Emperor's imperialistic ambitions and he and other nobles were severely reprimanded by Aurangzib. The Emperor moved to Ahmadnagar to direct operations. Parts of Bijapur were annexed, and military outposts were established to facilitate the assault on Bijapur fort. In April 1685 the imperialists laid mines near the fort. The Emperor moved to Sholapur. Although provisions were scarce, Mughal reinforcements kept arriving. The defenders' numbers dwindled, and on 22 September

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1686 Sikandar 'Adil Shah surrendered. The 'Adil Shahl dynasty was at an end. Bijapur was made the seat of the Mughal provincial governor but in a few years the city and its suburb, the fabulous Nauraspur, were desolate. Sikandar died in captivity in 1700, less than thirty-two years old.57

Now it was the turn of Abu'l-Hasan Qutb Shah (1672-87) of Golkonda. He professed obedience to Aurangzib but had secretly supported the Sultan of Bijapur. His brahman minister, Madanna, who controlled the administration on behalf of his royal master, was pro-Maratha. Although the Emperor used the Sultan's fraternization with Bijapur and the Marathas as an excuse to annex Golkonda, his principal motive was to seize its fabulous wealth. On 28 June 1685 Aurangzib ordered Prince Mu'azzam to march against Golkonda. Hyderabad was easily captured and the citizens mercilessly plundered. Madanna and his brother Akanna were killed by the leading Qutb Shahl nobles, who accused them of causing Aurangzib's invasion. At the Prince's request, the Emperor consented to pardon Abu'l-Hasan, provided he paid an enormous sum as tribute. The Emperor had no intention of honouring this agreement, however, and arriving near Golkonda at the end of January 1687, he ordered siege operations against the formidable fort. Prince Mu'azzam, who had hoped to take credit for securing Golkonda's capitulation without war, was condemned as a traitor and imprisoned with his entire family. The Turani commanders attempted to seize the fort by an escalade but failed. Rain and famine took a heavy toll of the garrison, but the Mughal losses were appalling. At the end of June the imperialists exploded their mines; the vigilant garrison had dug a tunnel from their side leading the Mughals' trail of gunpowder back under their own camp, and a large number of Mughals were killed. Abu'l-Hasan's loyal nobles cut offsupplies to Aurangzib, but others deserted him. Famine and pestilence raged during the protracted siege. At the end of September 1687 a treacherous Afghan opened the postern gate of the fort to the Mughal army. The garrison fought bravely but was overpowered. Abu'l-Hasan was captured. The spoils taken at Golkonda amounted to nearly 70 million rupees in cash, besides masses of gold, silver, and jewels. The state revenue was 28,700,000 rupees.58

In February 1687 Prince Akbar left for Iran, to the Emperor's relief. Shambhaji was now sunk in debauchery and was mainly concerned with foiling the attempts of the chiefs on his own life. On 11 February 1689 he was taken captive at Sangameshwar, twenty-two miles from Ratnagiri, by some conscientous Mughal officers. His minister Kavi-Kulash and twenty-five important commanders were also seized. They were brutally tortured and put to death. The

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Marathas crowned Rajasram as their new king at Raygarh, but the Mughals invaded it, and he fled to JinjI. Shambhaji's family, including his son Sahu, were captured. Aurangzib gave Sahu the mansab of 7,000 he had thoughtlessly denied his grandfather.

In seven years Aurangzib had annihilated all his enemies. Although the Maratha power concentrated under Rajaram at JinjI and the consolidation of the Bljapur and Golkonda conquests called for serious attention, these were purely provincial problems. The prime minister, Asad Khan, urged the Emperor to move to northern India so that the world might know that nothing more remained for the Emperor to do in the south. Aurangzib rejected the suggestion and so missed the chance to heal the wounds of the ravaged Deccan. He misjudged the strength of the Maratha guerrillas and mistakenly believed that he could coerce the Mughals into fighting an aggressive war indefinitely. The situation deteriorated. The plunder from Bljapur and Golkonda relieved the Emperor temporarily from the heed to utilize his reserves, but it was not sufficient to cover the cost of the last phase of the Deccan wars.

Moreover, the Rajput nobility was disgusted with the absorption of the Marathas into the Mughal mansabdari system. Even the most high-ranking Bijapuri and Hyderabadi nobles were social misfits in the traditional Mughal hierarchy. The reputation of the Mughal war machine for invincibility was naturally undermined by the rebellions of the zamindars in northern India and the ravages of the marauding bands of Marathas in the Deccan. Bhim Sen, a native of Burhanpur, who served the Mughals under the Bundela chief, Rao Dalpat, gives a most realistic analysis of the Maratha rise at the end of the seventeenth century. He comments that the governments of Bljapur and Hyderabad had stationed some 80,000 to 150,000 horsemen in their respective forts and territories. After their overthrow by the Mughals, not more than three to four thousand horsemen were permanently deployed at either place. Jahangir and Shahjahan had assigned their conquered territory to eminent nobles possessing vast resources, but Aurangzib was forced to rely on petty chieftains. The lawless elements were not to be scared by minor fawjdars, who in any case preferred to make peace with them rather than fight indefinitely.

The zaminddrs grew increasingly powerful. They joined the Marathas, and their combined forces made revenue collection extremely difficult for the jdgirddrs. The imperial conquest of the Maratha forts had led the homeless Maratha soldiers to transfer their families to Mughal territories, leaving them free to fight unhampered. By the end of the seventeenth century the Maratha

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guerrillas had obtained a permanent hold over the Deccan. They controlled all the roads and had grown rich from robbery and violence.59 The two most successful Maratha generals were SantajT Ghorpade and Dhanajl Jadava.

JinjI, where Rajaram had fled, withstood a Mughal siege of about eight years but it was seized in January 1688 by the Mughal general Zu'lfaqar Khan. Rajaram took shelter in Satara, where the Maratha commanders defended the fort valiantly. Only after Rajaram's death in March 1700 was the fort surrendered. Sham-bhaji's son, Sahu, was already in Aurangzib's custody, so Rajaram's widow, Tara Ba'i, who had acquired considerable civil and military experience, acted as regent for her own son, Shivajl II. She was successful in stopping the internecine Maratha wars, leaving them free to ravage the inadequately defended imperial territories. Aurangzib was now so deeply involved in his scheme to conquer the inaccessible Maratha forts that he could not withdraw without great loss of face.

At the end of 1699 the Marathas crossed the Narbada for the first time. Three years later they reached the vicinity of Ujjain. The lawless Afghans there, aroused by these events, also rebelled. In 1706 the Marathas attacked Gujarat and sacked Baroda. They even hovered around the Emperor's camp at Ahmadnagar.

The Marathas appointed their own revenue collectors and road officials in their conquered regions. The merchants paid them more than three or four times the amount the oppressive imperial officials had been able to exact. They also varied their fighting techniques. Manucci says: 'At the present time they possess artillery, musketry, bows and arrows, with elephants and camels for all their baggage and tents. They carry these last to secure some repose from time to time as they find it convenient. In short, they are equipped and move about just like the armies of the Mogul.'60

Tempted by the regular transfer of wealth from north to south along the highway passing through their territory, the Jats organized themselves into fierce predatory bands. Churaman, Rajaram's son and successor, strengthened the Jat fort of Sinsani near Bharatpur, and they fearlessly sacked regions around Agra and Delhi. Akbar's tomb at Sikandara was dug open and burnt in the hope of obtaining hidden treasure. The loyal Rajput chief Bishan Singh Kacchwaha siezed Sinsani in 1704, but the Jat roving bands remained undeterred.

Guru Tegh Bahadur's son, Guru Gobind (1675-1708), the tenth Guru of the Sikhs, was only nine years old when his father was executed. He grew up to excel in both martial arts and spiritual leadership. He reinterpreted the Sikh ideologies to justify military

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action. The Sikhs who accepted the rite of baptism which he devised were known as the Khalsa (Pure) and were given the title of Singh (Lion).

The rajas in the Panjab hills considered Sikh military power a threat to their rule and appealed to the Emperor to overthrow them. The early attacks by the Mughal army from Lahore and Sirhind, in collaboration with the hill rajas, failed to subdue the Sikhs. A Mughal reinforcement then cut off supplies to the Sikh stronghold of Anandpur. On an assurance of safety from the Mughals, the Guru evacuated the fort with his family, but the Hindu hillmen overtook him. A handful of Sikhs perished fighting to save the Guru and his family. Two of his sons were killed, but the Guru himself was saved by two Afghans. His remaining two sons were savagely executed by Wazir Khan, the Sirhind fawjdar. A pursuing Mughal column then engaged the Guru at Khidrana but was defeated. The Guru retired to Talwand! Sabo (now called Damadama) and repeatedly wrote to the Emperor condemning his fawjdar's. atrocities. But the Emperor refused to interfere with his local officer's measures.

The Sikhs and the imperial troops clashed again at Chamkaur. The Sikh temple in Sirhind was demolished, but in retaliation the Sikhs pulled down mosques and killed their imams. Prince Mu'az-zam, who had been released in 1695 and appointed governor of Kabul in place of Amir Khan, reached an understanding with the Sikhs. Large numbers'of them left the Panjab for the Peshawar region, but the Barakza'T Afghans made short work of them. Prince Mu'azzam was subsequently ordered to expel the Sikhs who had taken refuge in his province. The Guru left for the Deccan to lay his complaints against the fawjdar before Aurangzib but he had reached only Rajasthan when the Emperor died.61

In 1686 war had also broken out between the Mughals and the English merchants. The English trade in Bengal, in raw silk, taffetas, and saltpetre, had grown tremendously. In 1668 the East India Company had exported goods worth £34,000; this rose in 1675 to £85,000, in 1677 to £100,000, and in 1680 to £150,000. Their request that duty on their imports should not exceed the annual amount fixed by Prince Shuja' was unreasonable. They also complained that illegal taxes were imposed by local officials, and the Emperor redressed this grievance. In 1684—5 a local judge in Qasimbazaar (Bengal) decreed an award of 43,000 rupees against an Englishman, Job Charnock. The Mughal troops occupied his factory in order to collect the amount. Charnock escaped in April 1686 to Hugli, where the English forces, comprising Englishmen, Portuguese half-breeds, and Rajputs, numbered four hundred. The

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Company had already decided to protect itself by force and had seized some strategic centres on the Indian coast. In Bengal, Charnock assumed control of English affairs. The fawjdar of Hugli, however, was not intimidated. He put the local market out of bounds to English troops and stopped the English from trading. Three English soldiers who tried to defy his orders were imprisoned. The subsequent English attempt to rescue them sparked off the war between them and the Mughal administration of Hugli. English ships seized Mughal vessels and caused serious damage to the town but they withdrew to Satanuti (modern Calcutta) when the Mughal cavalry arrived. In February 1687 the English seized the island of Hijll, on the east coast of Medinipur district. They sacked Balasore, committing many atrocities. In May 1687 a Mughal army recaptured Hijll, but the governor, Shayasta Khan, took no further action. At the end of January 1689 Captain Heath, who had replaced Charnock, arrived in Chatgaon (now Chittagong in Bangladesh). He was determined to seize its fort and make it the base for English trading. The Company's council of war, however, refused to approve his offensive measures, and he retired to Madras.

War on the west coast between the English and the Mughals broke out later. The Mughals demanded a one per cent import duty in lieu of jizya. In response, in April 1687 the Company transferred its factory from Surat to Bombay, blockaded Mughal ports on the western coast, and seized their ships. The movement of Mughal pilgrim boats was also affected. The Collector of Customs responded by posting troops around the factory, placing the chief of the Surat council virtually under house arrest. The English retaliated, but the Mughals proved too strong for them. The English director was forced to surrender. The Emperor pardoned the English in February 1690 and restored their old privileges in Indian territory on payment of compensation of 150,000 rupees and the return of the captured Indian ships. English trade in Bengal was also revived. Charnock returned to Satanuti and in February 1691 laid the foundations of Calcutta. An imperial order of February 1691 allowed the English to carry on their trade in Bengal on payment of 3,000 rupees in lieu of customs and other dues.62

This was the only Mughal achievement before Aurangzib's death on 3 March 1707 at the age of eighty-nine. His failures are ascribed to his bigotry and narrow-minded religious policy. Indeed, 'ulama' domination in forming his administrative policies gave rise to immeasurable complications. What caused the real breakdown, however, was his unrealistic estimate of the Deccan problems. His obstinate decision to stay there after 1689 made him

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The Mughal Empire at the end of the seventeenth century

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the helpless captive of his own inflexibility. After Prince Akbar's rebellion Aurangzib never trusted his remaining three sons and he shivered at the memory of Shahjahan's last days. His main concern was as much to neutralize his sons' intrigues as to. destroy the Marathas.

The Emperor had denied himself any leisure and comfort in life. He presided over the court of justice twice a day, but the stream of complaints was endless. On one occasion he cried out bitterly to an intensely dissatisfied complainant, 'If you do not find your grievances redressed, pray the Almighty to grant you some other ruler!' His orthodoxy and piety evoked no enthusiasm among his nobles and sons. Sycophants ceaselessly glorified his rare ability to combine the external pomp of a lord with the soul of a mystic, while the Emperor in his turn reinforced this fusion of temporal and spiritual power by issuing amulets, which he believed would avert crises. Eminent sufis like Shah Kalimu'llah of Delhi condemned him as a hypocrite.63 The eruption of communal and sectarian conflicts at the end of his reign indicates that the wheel had come full circle and Mughal leadership was returning to the point from which Akbar had started. The Mughal imperial institutions stood in need of another Akbar - someone who was strong but also imaginative, wise and sympathetic. There was no dearth of talent among the Irani, Turanl, Rajput, and even the Maratha leaders. Under another Akbar, religious and communal tensions would have disappeared. Leaders such as the Irani, Zu'lfaqar Khan, the Turanl, Chin Qulich Khan, and the Rajput, Sawal Jai Singh, could have saved the Mughal government from its precipitous fall, but only under a new Akbar.

FALL OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

Before his death Aurangzib is said to have left a will partitioning his vast empire among his three surviving sons, although after his victory over Dara Shukoh he had rejected a similar suggestion made by his elder sister. The eldest, Muhammad Mu'azzam, who emerged successful in the war of succession after killing his two brothers, was sixty-four years old when he gained the throne. Unlike his father he was flexible in state politics, but his concessions to the Maratha leaders were half-hearted, and the new boundaries were unenforceable. The Emperor, who assumed the title Bahadur Shah, vacillated in reconciling even the Rajputs. In October 1708 Guru Gobind was assassinated while travelling with