V o L u m e I : a d

John W. Vessey, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, later recalled in

a letter to the publisher Simon and Schuster: “When Americans watched the

stunning success of our armed forces in Desert Storm, they were watching

the Abrams vision in action. The modern equipment, the effective air sup-

port, the use of the reserve components and, most important of all, the

advanced training which taught our people how to stay alive on the battle-

field were all seeds planted by Abe.”

Lewis Sorley

See also

AirLand Battle; Persian Gulf War; United States Army; Vietnam War

References

Buckley, Kevin. “General Abrams Deserves a Better War.” New York Times Magazine,

5 October 1969.

Colby, William, with James McCargar. Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s

Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam. Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989.

Davidson, Phillip B. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio,

1988.

Palmer, General Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lex-

ington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984.

Sorley, Lewis. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last

Years in Vietnam. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999.

———. Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times. New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1992.

———. Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968–1972. Lubbock: Texas Tech Uni-

versity, 2004.

U.S. secretary of state (1949–1953) and chief architect of U.S. foreign policy

in the formative years of the Cold War. Born on 11 April 1893 in Middletown,

Connecticut, to British parents, Dean Acheson attended the prestigious

Groton School and graduated from Yale University in 1915. He earned a

degree from Harvard Law School in 1918 and went on to serve as private

secretary to Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis from 1919 to 1921. After

his Supreme Court stint, Acheson joined a Washington, D.C., law firm. He

entered public life in 1933 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt named

him undersecretary of the treasury. Acheson resigned soon thereafter, how-

ever, over a disagreement concerning gold and currency policies. In 1940 he

authored a key legal opinion that led to the Lend-Lease program. In 1941,

he became assistant secretary of state and then undersecretary of state in

1945.

The possessor of a brilliant legal mind, a regal bearing, and a biting wit,

Acheson initially favored a policy of postwar cooperation with the Soviet

Union. But he quickly reversed his view and, along with George F. Kennan,

54

Acheson, Dean Gooderham

Acheson, Dean

Gooderham

(1893–1971)

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became one of the chief proponents of the Cold War con-

tainment policy. Unlike Kennan, who believed that the

contest with the Soviet Union was primarily political in

nature, Acheson stressed the military dimension. Sobered

by the failure of democratic nations to halt the Axis powers

in the 1930s, Acheson advocated a policy of developing

military strength before negotiating with the Soviet Union.

After the USSR detonated its first atomic bomb in Septem-

ber 1949, he played a leading role in persuading President

Harry S. Truman to move ahead with the development of

the hydrogen bomb.

Acheson also played a critical role in implementing

major Cold War initiatives in Europe. When the British

informed the United States in early 1947 that they no

longer possessed the financial means to support Greece

and Turkey, Acheson pushed the Truman administration

to take quick action, warning that if the United States did

not supplant British power in the eastern Mediterranean,

the result would likely be Soviet control of the region. Tru-

man then announced his Greco-Turkish aid package and

enunciated the Truman Doctrine to augment the con-

tainment policy. Acheson aggressively promoted the 1947

Marshall Plan to aid West European recovery efforts and

to resist pressures that might lead to communist regimes

there. Despite his role in creating the United Nations

(UN), Acheson did not believe that it could prevent Soviet

aggression or the spread of militant communism. Instead, he trusted military

power and saw the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the best

means of defending the West from the Soviets. NATO had the added bene-

fits of strengthening U.S. ties with Europe, quelling internal unrest, and

binding West Germany to the alliance.

When Acheson was sworn in as secretary of state on 21 January 1949, he

was already recognized as the key architect of postwar foreign policy. As

such, Truman, a great admirer of Acheson, gave him wide latitude in foreign

policy matters. During his tenure in office, Acheson pushed through the

implementation of NSC-68 and won Senate approval for continued station-

ing of American troops in Europe and for extensive military aid to the NATO

allies. He failed, however, to secure European approval for German rearma-

ment, which was stymied by French opposition.

Acheson’s tendency to view international affairs largely from a European

perspective hampered his efforts to deal with rising nationalism in the devel-

oping world. His attachment to a world united by imperial prosperity and

order created unnecessary problems for the Western Allies as well as for

emerging nations. Asia, possessing no significant industrial base outside of

Japan, ranked low among Acheson’s priorities. He based American policy

on the tenuous—and as it turned out faulty—premise that communist China

was the puppet of the Soviet Union. He sided with the French regarding

Acheson, Dean Gooderham

55

As U.S. secretary of state from 1949 to 1953, Dean

Acheson played a key role in formulating American

foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. 

(Library of Congress)

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