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ended before the turn of the century, however, with the establishment of an

independent Afghanistan that divided the regional ethnic groups in the area

between Russia, British India, and Afghanistan. As elsewhere in the world,

artificial borders mandated by European empires left residual problems that

festered throughout the twentieth century.

The Cold War caught Afghanistan between the Soviet Union, naturally

interested in a country on its southern border with ethnic connections to

Soviet Central Asian republics, and the United States, which was fearful of

communist expansion. The American containment policy sought to encircle

communist Russia and China with an interlocking system of alliances includ-

ing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central Treaty Orga-

nization (CENTO), and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),

and so Afghanistan found itself wedged between the West and the East.

After 1933, Afghanistan’s King Muhammad Zahir had tried to enhance

his position by dealing with the Soviets as a counter to the British in India.

After World War II, the United States displaced Britain as the Western force

in Asia, and Afghanistan continued to court the Soviets as a counter to West-

ern imperialism. An agreement with the Soviets in 1950 provided Afghanis-

tan with substantial economic support and promises of oil shipments, albeit

interrupted by disputes over the Pashtun border with Pakistan.

At the time, proponents of containment envisioned an interlocking sys-

tem of alliances to surround the communist world. NATO was the first in

1949 to secure Western Europe. In 1954 CENTO and SEATO surrounded

the southern and eastern flanks of the communist bloc. Never fully realized,

the idea was to link the three through multilateral collective security guar-

antees. CENTO included Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and the linchpin Turkey, which

was also a part of NATO. Pakistan was also a member of SEATO and thus

tied to NATO through Turkey. Afghanistan was not included in any of these

mechanisms.

In 1953 Mohammad Daoud Khan, a member of the Afghan royal family,

became prime minister. Daoud secured a Soviet economic development

loan of $3 million in 1954 that preceded a 1955 visit by Soviet leaders Nikita

Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin, who promised another $100 million. The

United States refused military aid to Afghanistan but did assist in improving

the Qandahar Airport. The Soviets then promised military aid and a military

aircraft facility at Mazir-e-Sharif. For a time, it seemed that Afghanistan was

the fortunate beneficiary of Cold War rivalries.

Daoud’s tenure ended in 1963 when Zahir resumed direct rule. The

details of Daoud’s fall are not entirely clear, although several factors were

involved including inflation, continued tensions with Pakistan, popular oppo-

sition to Daoud’s secular government, and the king’s desire to broaden par-

ticipation in government. The king ruled directly for a decade, during which

time a leftist political opposition movement gained momentum, led by Babrak

Karmal of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDA). Political

unrest and a severe drought resulted in a military coup in 1973 that placed

Daoud back in power, now as head of a republic with support from Karmal.

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Daoud, a moderate leftist, surprised many by seeking U.S. financial aid

through the shah of Iran. The Soviets were also providing aid; Daoud visited

the Soviet Union in 1974 and again in 1977.

Daoud continued to play both superpowers against each other and in the

meantime developed closer ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia. By 1978, Daoud

lost Karmal’s support on the Left and the Islamist fundamentalists’ support

on the Right. That same year, Daoud’s government was overthrown. Karmal

and Nur Muhammad Taraki now led a new government with strong ties to

the Soviets. The two Afghan leaders soon split, however, and in 1979 the

Soviet Union sent troops to support Karmal.

Meanwhile, local tribal leaders took advantage of the turmoil, as did

Islamic fundamentalists who feared that Soviet rule would result in a wholly

secular regime. This dynamic forced the Soviets to back Karmal’s regime

with 150,000 troops and massive military aid. Sensing Soviet vulnerability,

the United States provided arms and covert aid to the Afghan mujahideen

(guerrilla insurrectionists). The parallel to Vietnam is not without merit. In

Vietnam the communist power provided sufficient aid to the North Viet-

namese and their Viet Cong allies to keep the United States bogged down in

Afghanistan

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Afghan resistance fighters return to a village that has been destroyed by Soviet forces, 25 March 1986. (U.S. Department

of Defense)

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a protracted struggle until 1973. In Afghanistan, the United States supplied

aid to keep the Soviets pinned down until 1989, when they gave up and

withdrew.

In neither case was the outcome predictable, however. The North Viet-

namese united Vietnam but then gradually moved closer to the United States.

Afghanistan was plunged into a long civil war that ended in 1996 when the

repressive Taliban regime came to power, cultivating ties to the terrorist al-

Qaeda movement. Ironically, the Taliban and al-Qaeda had received training

and arms from the United States during the Afghanistan War. Ultimately,

Afghanistan became a tragic victim of the Cold War, with implications that

went far beyond the end of the Cold War in 1991.

Daniel E. Spector

See also

Afghanistan War; Containment Policy; Middle East Regional Defense Organizations;

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Origins and Formation of; Pakistan; South-

east Asia Treaty Organization; Soviet Union; United States; Vietnam War

References

Dupree, Louis. Afghanistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. New York:

Kodansha, 1992.

Nyrop, Richard F., and Donald M. Seekins, eds. Afghanistan: A Country Study/Foreign

Area Studies. Washington, DC: American University, 1986.

War that destroyed the U.S.-Soviet détente of the 1970s; inaugurated a new,

dangerous stage in the Cold War; and badly weakened the Soviet military

and economic establishments. The Soviet-Afghan War represented the cul-

mination of events dating to April 1978, when Afghan communists, sup-

ported by left-wing army leaders, overthrew the unpopular, authoritarian

government of Mohammad Daoud and proclaimed the People’s Democratic

Republic of Afghanistan. Although the extent of Soviet involvement in the

coup remains unclear, Moscow certainly welcomed it and quickly established

close relations with the new regime headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who

was committed to bringing socialism to Afghanistan.

With the ambitious, extremely militant foreign minister Hafizullah Amin

as its driving force, the Taraki regime quickly alienated much of Afghan-

istan’s population by conducting a terror campaign against its opponents and

introducing a series of social and economic reforms at odds with the religious

and cultural norms of the country’s highly conservative, Muslim, tribal soci-

ety. Afghanistan’s Muslim leaders soon declared a jihad against “godless

communism,” and by August 1978 the Taraki regime faced an open revolt, a

situation made especially dangerous by the defection of a portion of the army

to the rebel cause.

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Afghanistan War

(1979–1989)

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