PHILOSOPHY
347
We must therefore, I think, bid a definitive good-by to dogmatic
theology. In all sincerity our faith must do without that warrant.
Modern idealism, I repeat, has said good-by to this theology forever.
Can modern idealism give faith a better warrant, or must she still
rely on her poor self for witness?
The basis of modern idealism is Kant’s doctrine of the Trans-
cendental Ego of Apperception. By this formidable term Kant
merely meant the fact that the consciousness “I think them” must
(potentially or actually) accompany all our objects. Former skeptics
had said as much, but the “I” in question had remained for them
identified with the personal individual. Kant abstracted and deper-
sonalized it, and made it the most universal of all his categories,
although for Kant himself the Transcendental Ego had no theo-
logical implications.
It was reserved for his successors to convert Kant’s notion of
Bewusstsein überhaupt, or abstract consciousness, into an infinite
concrete self-consciousness which is the soul of the world, and in
which our sundry personal self-consciousnesses have their being. It
would lead me into technicalities to show you even briefly how this
transformation was in point of fact effected. Suffice it to say that in
the Hegelian school, which to-day so deeply influences both British
and American thinking, two principles have borne the brunt of the
operation.
The first of these principles is that the old logic of identity never
gives us more than a post-mortem dissection of disjecta membra,
and that the fullness of life can be construed to thought only by
recognizing that every object which our thought may propose to
itself involves the notion of some other object which seems at first
to negate the first one.
The second principle is that to be conscious of a negation is
already virtually to be beyond it. The mere asking of a question or
expression of a dissatisfaction proves that the answer or the satis-
faction is already imminent; the finite, realized as such, is already
the infinite in posse.
Applying these principles, we seem to get a propulsive force
into our logic which the ordinary logic of a bare, stark self-identity
in each thing never attains to. The objects of our thought now act
within our thought, act as objects act when given in experience.
348
THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
They change and develop. They introduce something other than
themselves along with them; and this other, at first only ideal or
potential, presently proves itself also to be actual. It supersedes the
thing at first supposed, and both verifies and corrects it, in develop-
ing the fullness of its meaning.
The program is excellent; the universe is a place where things
are followed by other things that both correct and fulfill them; and
a logic which gave us something like this movement of fact would
express truth far better than the traditional school-logic, which
never gets of its own accord from anything to anything else, and
registers only predictions and subsumptions, or static resemblances
and differences. Nothing could be more unlike the methods of
dogmatic theology than those of this new logic. Let me quote in
illustration some passages from the Scottish transcendentalist whom
I have already named.
“How are we to conceive,” Principal Caird writes, “of the reality in
which all intelligence rests?” He replies: “Two things may without difficulty
be proved, viz., that this reality is an absolute Spirit, and conversely that
it is only in communion with this absolute Spirit or Intelligence that the
finite Spirit can realize itself. It is absolute; for the faintest movement of
human intelligence would be arrested, if it did not presuppose the absolute
reality of intelligence, of thought itself. Doubt or denial themselves pre-
suppose and indirectly affirm it. When I pronounce anything to be true,
I pronounce it, indeed, to be relative to thought, but not to be relative
to my thought, or to the thought of any other individual mind. From the
existence of all individual minds as such I can abstract; I can think them
away. But that which I cannot think away is thought or self-consciousness
itself, in its independence and absoluteness, or, in other words, an Absolute
Thought or Self-Consciousness.”
Here, you see, Principal Caird makes the transition which Kant
did not make: he converts the omnipresence of consciousness in
general as a condition of “truth” being anywhere possible, into an
omnipresent universal consciousness, which he identifies with God
in his concreteness. He next proceeds to use the principle that to
acknowledge your limits is in essence to be beyond them; and
makes the transition to the religious experience of individuals in
the following words: —
“If [Man] were only a creature of transient sensations and impulses, of
an ever coming and going succession of intuitions, fancies, feelings, then
PHILOSOPHY
349
nothing could ever have for him the character of objective truth or real-
ity. But it is the prerogative of man’s spiritual nature that he can yield
himself up to a thought and will that are infinitely larger than his own.
As a thinking, self-conscious being, indeed, he may be said, by his very
nature, to live in the atmosphere of the Universal Life. As a thinking
being, it is possible for me to suppress and quell in my consciousness every
movement of self-assertion, every notion and opinion that is merely mine,
every desire that belongs to me as this particular Self, and to become the
pure medium of a thought that is universal — in one word, to live no
more my own life, but let my consciousness be possessed and suffused by
the Infinite and Eternal life of spirit. And yet it is just in this renunciation
of self that I truly gain myself, or realize the highest possibilities of my
own nature. For whilst in one sense we give up self to live the universal
and absolute life of reason, yet that to which we thus surrender ourselves
is in reality our truer self. The life of absolute reason is not a life that is
foreign to us.”
Nevertheless, Principal Caird goes on to say, so far as we are
able outwardly to realize this doctrine, the balm it offers remains
incomplete. Whatever we may be in posse, the very best of us in
actu falls very short of being absolutely divine. Social morality,
love, and self-sacrifice even, merge our Self only in some other
finite self or selves. They do not quite identify it with the Infinite.
Man’s ideal destiny, infinite in abstract logic, might thus seem in
practice forever unrealizable.
“Is there, then,” our author continues, “no solution of the contradiction
between the ideal and the actual? We answer, There is such a solution,
but in order to reach it we are carried beyond the sphere of morality into
that of religion. It may be said to be the essential characteristic of reli-
gion as contrasted with morality, that it changes aspiration into fruition,
anticipation into realization; that instead of leaving man in the inter-
minable pursuit of a vanishing ideal, it makes him the actual partaker of
a divine or infinite life. Whether we view religion from the human side
or the divine — as the surrender of the soul to God, or as the life of God
in the soul — in either aspect it is of its very essence that the Infinite
has ceased to be a far-off vision, and has become a present reality. The
very first pulsation of the spiritual life, when we rightly apprehend its
significance, is the indication that the division between the Spirit and
its object has vanished, that the ideal has become real, that the finite
has reached its goal and become suffused with the presence and life of
the Infinite.
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