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THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
In all sad sincerity I think we must conclude that the attempt to
demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliver-
ances of direct religious experience is absolutely hopeless.
It would be unfair to philosophy, however, to leave her under
this negative sentence. Let me close, then, by briefly enumerating
what she can do for religion. If she will abandon metaphysics and
deduction for criticism and induction, and frankly transform her-
self from theology into science of religions, she can make herself
enormously useful.
The spontaneous intellect of man always defines the divine
which it feels in ways that harmonize with its temporary intellec-
tual prepossession. Philosophy can by comparison eliminate the local
and the accidental from these definitions. Both from dogma and
from worship she can remove historic incrustations. By confronting
the spontaneous religious constructions with the results of natural
science, philosophy can also eliminate doctrines that are now known
to be scientifically absurd or incongruous.
Sifting out in this way unworthy formulations, she can leave
a residuum of conceptions that at least are possible. With these she
can deal as hypotheses, testing them in all the manners, whether
negative or positive, by which hypotheses are ever tested. She can
reduce their number, as some are found more open to objection.
She can perhaps become the champion of one which she picks
out as being the most closely verified or verifiable. She can refine
upon the definition of this hypothesis, distinguishing between what
is innocent over-belief and symbolism in the expression of it, and
what is to be literally taken. As a result, she can offer mediation
between different believers, and help to bring about consensus of
opinion. She can do this the more successfully, the better she dis-
criminates the common and essential from the individual and local
elements of the religious beliefs which she compares.
I do not see why a critical Science of Religions of this sort might
not eventually command as general a public adhesion as is com-
manded by a physical science. Even the personally non-religious
might accept its conclusions on trust, much as blind persons now
accept the facts of optics — it might appear as foolish to refuse them.
Yet as the science of optics has to be fed in the first instance, and
continually verified later, by facts experienced by seeing persons; so
PHILOSOPHY
353
the science of religions would depend for its original material on
facts of personal experience, and would have to square itself with
personal experience through all its critical reconstructions. It could
never get away from concrete life, or work in a conceptual vacuum.
It would forever have to confess, as every science confesses, that
the subtlety of nature flies beyond it, and that its formulas are but
approximations. Philosophy lives in words, but truth and fact well
up into our lives in ways that exceed verbal formulation. There is
in the living act of perception always something that glimmers and
twinkles and will not be caught, and for which reflection comes
too late. No one knows this as well as the philosopher. He must fire
his volley of new vocables out of his conceptual shotgun, for his
profession condemns him to this industry, but he secretly knows
the hollowness and irrelevancy. His formulas are like stereoscopic
or kinetoscopic photographs seen outside the instrument; they
lack the depth, the motion, the vitality. In the religious sphere, in
particular, belief that formulas are true can never wholly take the
place of personal experience.
In my next lecture I will try to complete my rough description
of religious experience; and in the lecture after that, which is the
last one, I will try my own hand at formulating conceptually the
truth to which it is a witness.
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THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
LECTURE XIX
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
W
E have wound our way back, after our excursion through
mysticism
and philosophy, to where we were before: the uses
of religion, its uses to the individual who has it, and the uses of the
individual himself to the world, are the best arguments that truth is
in it. We return to the empirical philosophy: the true is what works
well, even though the qualification “on the whole” may always have
to be added. In this lecture we must revert to description again, and
finish our picture of the religious consciousness by a word about
some of its other characteristic elements. Then, in a final lecture,
we shall be free to make a general review and draw our independent
conclusions.
The first point I will speak of is the part which the æsthetic life
plays in determining one’s choice of a religion. Men, I said awhile
ago, involuntarily intellectualize their religious experience. They
need formulas, just as they need fellowship in worship. I spoke,
therefore, too contemptuously of the pragmatic uselessness of the
famous scholastic list of attributes of the deity, for they have one
use which I neglected to consider. The eloquent passage in which
Newman enumerates them
1
puts us on the track of it. Intoning
them as he would intone a cathedral service, he shows how high
is their æsthetic value. It enriches our bare piety to carry these
exalted and mysterious verbal additions just as it enriches a church
to have an organ and old brasses, marbles and frescoes and stained
windows. Epithets lend an atmosphere and overtones to our devo-
tion. They are like a hymn of praise and service of glory, and may
sound the more sublime for being incomprehensible. Minds like
1
Idea of a University, Discourse III. § 7.