Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

 

Evaluating the situation, they reacted with alarm in the USSR to the statements of Islamic 

fundamentalists that if they came to power they would carry the struggle to the territory of Soviet Central 

Asian republics under Islamic slogans. Iranian political scientists regarded the situation in the following 

manner: “The Kremlin is so tied down in supporting the Kabul Marxists that they already cannot avoid direct 

military support to their protégé…In addition, Moscow is frightened by the prospect of the influence of a new 

Iran, not only in Afghanistan but also in Azerbayjan and Central Asia. Moscow’s creature in Kabul is, in the 

Kremlin’s opinion, an important outpost against the idea of the unity of all Muslims.”

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Of course, now these circumstances seem immaterial and the fears exaggerated – could they really talk about 

some transfer of the struggle to Soviet Central Asia? The Soviet Union was a great power. The Islamists could not 

have then engaged in such recklessness although one cannot fail to consider that the situation in and around the DRA 

was explosive. It could have not failed to influence the then Soviet leadership, which thought that the decision to 

deploy troops would save the PDPA regime from inevitable destruction. And those people are not correct who depict 

Brezhnev, Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko as fools…As I see it, they were not. They were simply placed in 

conditions where they could not fail to support a “fraternal” Party; our allies, the other Communist parties, would not 

have understood this. But they did not have sufficient statesmanship (or moral fortitude and perseverance in defending 

their opinion about the inadvisability of deploying troops) and they did not find another way out. But this step, it 

seemed to them, solved all problems. The Soviet leaders did not consider how dangerous it was to disrupt the balance 

of power in the country and the region which had existed for centuries, no matter on what basis it was built. 

 

 

But the fates and lives of people were never considered in the entire history of the Soviet Union. They were 

“laid on the altar of the Fatherland” when necessary and when unnecessary.  So it was in time of war and in time of 

peace. People were considered as a human factor.  Having used them in whatever extreme situation (war, Chernobyl), 

they simply forgot about them. It is appropriate to note that among the troops in Afghanistan there were no sons and 

grandsons of the people who sang the praises of the troops. They preferred that other people’s children perish. 

 

 

For a long time the foreign security policy of the USSR was constructed to a considerable degree on the basis 

of ideological dogmas. They acted as the criteria of correctness in evaluating the decisions then being made. It is to 

them that the state and national interests of the country were subordinated. The postulates of proletarian 

internationalism predominated. It is sufficient to recall East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), 

etc. 

 

 

It needs to be noted that the experience of Afghanistan taught the Soviet leaders something all the same. 

During the worsening of the situation in Poland in 1980-81, when the question of deploying Warsaw Pact troops there 

to protect Socialist gains arose, perhaps the main reason why this was not done was our presence in Afghanistan. It is 

possible that this averted still more casualties. As they say, perhaps it was in this respect, at least, a blessing in 

disguise. 

 

 

 

 

The wisdom of a politician consists in averting the launching of a war by all available means and finding a 

peaceful resolution of conflict. Any compromise needs to be sought and the maximum permissible concessions made 

to keep the peace. But if a decision has already been made to begin combat operations it is not necessary to entertain 

illusions that it will cost few casualties. History has more than once shown: it is impossible to play at war; it needs to 

be fought properly. But the Soviet troops in Afghanistan conducted combat operations on a comparatively limited 

scale, in keeping with a policy developed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff called low-intensity conflict. This wore down 

the USSR economically and morally. 

 

 

It is strange, if this is not to blaspheme, that the complaints of politicians who launched the war are heard that 

women, children, and old men died who were no way at fault…They “did not want this – the military is not able to 

efficiently fulfill its responsibilities to destroy only armed formations”. One can discuss this sitting in offices but it 

doesn’t happen that way in war. The barbaric nature of modern war consists precisely of the weapons being used 

inflicting more damage on the civilian population than on troops. And recently this is the norm. For example, in local 

conflicts from 1945 to 2000 losses came to more than 40 million, more than 35 million of whom were civilians. In 

Afghanistan 85 percent of the dead were civilians. At the same time the deaths of soldiers and officers is accepted 

quietly for some reason, as if they were robots and not someone’s father, son, or brother. In my view politicians should 

be guided by the principle of individual responsibility; it provides for the right to make a decision but imposes full 

 

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responsibility for the results of this decision. One must always remember this when sending people to their deaths or 

launching precision bombing and missile strikes on military targets. 

 

Before the Deployment of Soviet Troops to the DRA: The Abortive Operation Against Amin 

 

 

A special group of generals and officers from all branches of the Armed Forces worked in the General Staff’s 

Main Operations Directorate (GOU), where I served in 1979. It supported the deployment of the 40

th

 Army to 

Afghanistan. It is this group which prepared the draft directives of the Soviet Defense Minister and Chief of the 

General Staff for mobilization and to support the deployment of troops to the DRA; planned and implemented the 

movement of troops, equipment, weapons and materiel to the Afghan border; carried out organization measures; and 

also constantly kept track of the military-political situation in Afghanistan, making analyses…And although the 

“insiders” [posvyashchennye] worked “behind closed doors” many General Staff officers knew about their work. 

Therefore the deployment of Soviet troops to the DRA was no surprise to them. Can it be verified whether CC CPSU 

Politburo members and candidate members knew nothing about this, as they stated then? 

 

 

At the beginning of December reinforcement in the form of a special purpose KGB “Zenit” detachment 

arrived in Bagram. According to their cover story, they were a technical group of the “Muslim” battalion.  The newly-

arrived group was headed by Colonel Aleksandr Golubev. By the start of December the strength of “Zenit” in 

Afghanistan was about 130 men. Overall command was exercised by Col.Aleksey Polyakov. The main complement of 

the detachment was housed in three villas in Kabul rented by the Soviet Embassy. 

 

 

At the same time the accelerated insertion of small military subunits into Afghanistan was begun. Other 

subunits headed by its commander Lt. Col Nikolay Serdyukov were added to the battalion of the 345

th

 Parachute 

Regiment already in Bagram. In particular, the 9

th

 Company of Sr. Lt. Valeriy Vostrotin was inserted on 1 December. 

On 7 December Babrak Karmal and Anahita Ratebzad arrived in Afghanistan illegally on a Tu-134 aircraft; they 

remained among the Soviet paratroopers under the protection of officers of Group “A” of the USSR KGB 7

th

 

Directorate headed by Yuriy Izotov. According to Izotov:  

At the beginning of December I was summoned by the deputy chief of the group, Mikhail 

Mikhaylovich Romanov; at that time our commander Gennadiy Nikolayevich Zaytsev was in the 

hospital. Romanov said that I was to go on an assignment for three days and there would be three 

people with me – Golovatov, Kartofel’nikov, and Vinogradov. Afterwards they put us in a car and 

we went to the First Main Directorate. Robert Ivanovich Ivon said that we were going on an 

assignment in three days. They drove us to a First Main Directorate dacha where [KGB Deputy 

Chief] Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov talked with us. He brought two people to us, very dark-

complexioned, a man and a woman, and said: ‘Yuriy Antonovich, the responsibility for them is on 

your head. If a single hair falls from their head you will lose yours’. Then he introduced them – 

Karmal, Anahita. He introduced me to them – Major Yuriy Antonovich Izotov. Where were we 

flying to? Unknown. They drove us to Vnukovo and put us in the Tu-134 of Yuriy Vladimirovich 

Andropov. We flew to Tashkent and were quartered in the dacha of CC CPSU Politburo member 

Rashidov. We spent a day there and they flew to Bagram. Where we were just meters from landing 

the lights at the airfield were turned off and the pilots landed the aircraft blind. We landed safely. An 

Embassy representative met us and then escorted us to a hard stand where mud huts had been 

constructed. Anahita and Babrak lived in one and we in the other. The next day they took us to a 

warehouse where we received military uniforms. We were in Bagram for two weeks. Two men stood 

at a post for two hours then rested for two hours. It was –25 C

o

 at that time because this was a 

mountainous region, the Hindu Kush mountains. There were very primitive conditions – they 

delivered food to us from the airborne battalion - a pot of buckwheat kasha. The truth is, the 

sometimes brought either jars of honey or Pakistani jam from the Embassy. The thing is that when 

we planned for the flight I decided with Mikhail Vasil’yevich Golovatov to take food with us. We 

took 100 rubles from Mikhail Mikhaylovich Romanov and bought food – cheeses, sausages, and 

canned goods. We also fed Karmal and Anahita with this food. 

 

Another group of special forces headed by Valeriy Shergin guarded other Afghans - Nur Ahmad Nur, Aslan 

Muhammad Watanjar, Said Muhammazh Gulyabzoy, and Asadulah Sarwari. 

 

 

According to Gen. Nikolay Guskov of the Airborne Forces Operations Group General:  

 

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