Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

When the aircraft was coming in for a landing and was already at the first beacon the lights 

suddenly went out at the whole airfield. As a rule, military transport and combat aircraft landed at 

Bagram, but this was a Tu-134. The aircraft landed in complete darkness. True, the plane’s landing 

lights were on. The aircraft commander was forced to deploy the drag chute but the aircraft rolled 

almost to the very edge of the runway.  Even I began to worry. 

 

 

Then the aircraft’s passengers were placed in bunkers at the airfield. By the way, B. Karmal 

and Anahita took the bunker which I had previously occupied. They lived there three days. Of 

course, we did not then know who he was; no one told me about this officially. Andropov and 

Ustinov had just said to take steps to provide security. But they warned me secretly that he was the 

future replacement of Amin. 

 

 

According to Mikhail Golovatov, an officer of Group “A”:  

There was an instruction at one of the suburban First Main Directorate facilities. Initially 

Kryuchkov instructed us and then presented our wards. We were told that we were flying out for 

three days. When we were flying into Bagram the illumination at the airfield was turned off, 

including on the runway. The pilots made a “blind” landing of the plane. It almost went off the 

runway. After the plane stopped we got out and took up a defensive position around it; we were 

ready to go into battle if necessary. 

 

 

Whey did they bring Karmal to Afghanistan? The thing is that in the middle of December it was planned to 

implement an action to remove Amin from power with two battalions and a KGB special detachment; therefore the 

new leadership had to be in the DRA by that time. This operation was prepared very secretly. A strictly limited circle 

of people knew about it. From the memoirs of Vadim Kirpichenko: “The mission was assigned – support the 

Parchamists with everyone at our command in order to carry out a coup and ensure that they came to power because 

Amin had become dangerous.” 

 

 

According to a statement of the Chief Military Adviser Sultan Magometov, when he talked with Ustinov via 

special (secure) communications, the latter was interested in this: “How are preparations going to implement the plan 

to remove Amin from power?” This question put Magometov into a corner since he was completely uninformed of 

what this plan was. Then Ustinov told him to get all the details from Lt. Gen. Ivanov. However when the Chief 

Military Adviser turned to the KGB representative about this plan the latter replied that he did not have the slightest 

notion about it. Magometov started to argue that it was necessary to act together and that CC CPSU Politburo member 

Ustinov had called him about this…Some time later Ivanov, having obviously conversed with Andropov, invited 

Magometov back and showed him the plan of operations developed by KGB officers. The Chief Military Adviser then 

became indignant, saying that this was not a plan but a “worthless scrap of paper,” so they postponed the operation at 

his insistence. 

 

 

Numerous highly-placed KGB representatives having worked in Kabul, the Chief of the Airborne Troops 

Operations Group, the Chief Military Adviser in the DRA, and officials of the military attaché’s office ended up in a 

difficult position. They were in no position to carry out the assigned mission with the men and equipment they then 

had in Kabul. A cable to Moscow was sent over the four signatures of the Soviet representatives with an evaluation of 

the situation in Afghanistan and the conclusion that they could not remove Amin from power with the forces available 

in Kabul and they would not vouch for the success of the coup without military support. In case of failure Afghanistan 

would be lost to us forever and the Soviet Embassy destroyed  (this danger was confirmed 15 years later – author’s 

note). They requested reinforcements to carry out the operation in Kabul and were promised such reinforcement. 

According to Kirpichenko’s statement this telegram was the fruit of collective work and the result of a comprehensive 

analysis and calculations. 

 

 

According to information provided by “Zenit” officer Major Yakov Semenov it is known that on 11 

December in Bagram Deputy Commanding General of the Airborne Troops Lt. Gen. N. Gus’kov assigned the “Zenit” 

troops the mission of seizing “Objective Dub [Oak]. A company of the “Muslim” battalion was to operate with the 

“Zenit” troops. As was explained later, “Objective Dub” was the codename of Amin’s residence in the center of 

Kabul. There was no plan of the palace or its defense system. It was known only that the place was defended by about 

2,000 guardsmen, too many for 22 “Zenit” troops and a company of the “Muslim battalion”. 

 

 

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The radio and television building guarded by a tank company, four infantry combat vehicles [BMP], and four DShK 

[machine guns] were to be seized by a platoon of Sr. Lt. Vladimir Sharipov’s company and a small group of “Zenit” 

forces led by Anatoliy Ryabinin.  One squad headed by a sergeant was selected to seize the security service building. 

Similar forces were selected to seize other objectives in Kabul. Each commander knew only his own combat mission. 

 

 

Preparatory organizational measures were held for two days: information was acquired, scouting was done, 

plans and diagrams of building security were drawn up, and coordination issues specified… At 1530 on 13 December 

subunit commanders were summoned to the command to receive the combat mission –the order for combat operations 

had arrived. They were to advance from Bagram to Kabul and seize Amin’s residence and other objectives by storm 

according to a schedule. It is not hard to guess how all this adventure would have ended. I think it would have been a 

complete failure; they would have only sacrificed people in vain. Fortunately, a “stand down!” order followed at 1600. 

 

 

On 14 December a second battalion (commanded by Major Tsyganov) and a reconnaissance company 

(commanded by Sr. Lt. Popov) of the 345

th

 Parachute Regiment were transported to Bagram. They also were to 

participate in the operation. By way of illustration, the reconnaissance company was assigned the mission of 

blockading an artillery brigade. But the operation was postponed. According to some information supposedly a leak 

had occurred and Amin had quickly left his residence. By unanimous opinion if the operation had begun on 14 

December without the support of the airborne units it would have inevitably failed. 

 

 

According to what “Zenit” officer Valeriy Kurilov said about preparations for the operation:  

On the evening of 11 December Yasha Semenov ran into our tent. He had been an 

instructor in tactics among us at KUOS [Advanced Officers’ Training Courses]  but was now the 

commander of our detachment. He was short and strong with an Oriental face, a very pleasant and 

sociable guy. 

 

 

He said that we needed to go to the command tent for a meeting. When we arrived there 

officers from the “Muslim” battalion, senior officers of our subgroups, some military people we 

didn’t know, and some airborne officers were already sitting there on folding aluminum chairs. 

 

 

Yasha started to describe to us the plan of combat operations in which we were to 

participate. When the question touched on the worst imaginable, quite specific things, we all became 

somewhat sick. According to the plan he described, tomorrow or the day after we were to climb into 

the armored personnel carriers [BTR] of the “Muslim” battalion, cover the distance to the Afghan 

capital in a night march, and rush into Kabul. There we were to split up into small groups, and attack 

and seize all the vital government facilities. 

 

 

Supposedly local people were anxiously waiting at these facilities for us to show up; all of 

them there would surrender to us and come out with hands raised. They ought not to even shoot. 

Moreover, all the people were ready to rise up then and there to fight the Amin regime; we needed 

only to appear at the outskirts of the city and we would be joined by huge masses of people ready to 

throw out the rotten tyrant and his henchmen. Everything had been looked after and arranged. 

 

 

The most difficult building was assigned to “Zenit” and a platoon of the “Muslim” battalion 

who were to seize Amin’s residence in the Arg Palace in the center of Kabul. 

 

 

According to plan we, operating on five armored personnel carriers, were to remove the 

front of the palace gate using armor, quickly neutralize the two tanks (which were reportedly dug 

into the earth up to their turrets) and two or three BMPs standing inside the gates with grenade 

launchers, then divide right and left along narrow paths along a four-story barracks where the guards 

were housed, and blockade them. An interpreter was to climb onto the armor and announce into a 

megaphone (the megaphones were delivered later) that the anti-popular regime of bloody Amin has 

fallen, suggest the guards surrender, and come out of the barracks without their weapons with hands 

raised. According to available information the guards would not offer resistance… 

 

 

We needed to display maximum friendliness, goodwill, and smiling and if someone tried to 

make unnecessary noise and shoot, if someone’s nerves failed him, then they would investigate the 

 

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