Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

 

In the opinion of Yu. I. Drozdov: “The decision that was made on 27 December was an improbably difficult 

decision. This decision matured over a number of months. It was the result of an analysis of the historic and 

intelligence information and the actions of neighboring states by the highest political leadership of the country”. 

 

The Preparations to Storm Taj-Bek Palace 

 

 

The most difficult and important target to be seized was the Taj-Bek Palace. On the evening of 25 December 

a reception was held in the “Muslim” battalion for the command of the Afghan brigade. They prepared a pilaf; it is 

true there were problems with the alcoholic drinks. The KGB officers helped out. They brought in a box of 

“Posol’skoy” vodka, cognac, various delicacies (caviar, fish) – the cuisine turned out beautifully. 

 

 

There were 15 people from the security brigade including Commander Jandad and the Deputy for Political 

Affairs Ruzi. During the reception [we] tried to get the Afghans to talk.  Toasts were raised to Soviet-Afghan 

friendship, combat collaboration… Sometimes soldiers serving the reception served Soviet officers water instead of 

vodka. The deputy for political affairs was especially talkative; in the spirit of openness he told “Captain Lebedev” 

that Taraki had been smothered on Amin’s order. This was important information. Jandad quickly gave an order and 

the deputy for political affairs left for somewhere…We parted, if not as friends, at least as good acquaintances. 

 

 

On the evening of the same day General Drozdov held a meeting with commanders of the KGB sabotage 

reconnaissance groups regarding the results of reconnoitering the targets and determined the location for each of them 

during the seizure of Taj-Bek. Everyone was ready. Only the layout of the Palace was lacking. 

 

 

The next day the advisers to Amin’s personal guard, officers of the KGB 9

th

 Directorate, led the scout-

saboteurs into the Palace where they surveyed everything, and Yu. Drozdov compiled a story-by-story layout of Taj-

Bek. However, at his request the adviser to the brigade commander Yuriy Kutepov refused a request to reduce the 

Palace guard. 

 

 

Officers of “Grom” and “Zenit” Romanov, Semenov, Fedoseyev, and Mazayev surveyed the terrain and 

nearby firing positions. Not far from the Palace on a vantage point was a restaurant (casino) where senior officers of 

the Afghan army frequently congregated. The special forces visited there under the pretext of needed to book New 

Year’s reservations for our officers. From there Taj-Bek was clearly visible and they looked over all the approaches to 

it and the locations of all the security posts carefully. The truth is, it almost ended tragically for them. According to 

Romanov: “Yasha and I were taken prisoner before the operation itself. The problem was that we had no information 

about the Palace and not done any scouting but it was necessary to go into battle. You don’t lead people blindly. I 

selected a “GAZ-66” [truck] and took Mazayev and Fedoseyev with me. However an Afghan security battalion 

disarmed us and took us prisoner. The situation was dramatic and the group could have been left without 

commanders. The whole operation had been put in jeopardy only because we wanted to see with our own eyes where 

the tanks, firing positions, etc. were. 

 

 

A road led past the Palace into the mountains. In the mountains there was a famous exclusive restaurant with 

a swimming pool. According to the cover story I, the subunit commander, was inviting the officers to a New Year’s 

party and wanted to reserve a table. We made our way there and noted everything that was necessary. The restaurant 

was closed. 

 

 

They took us to a room and suggested we await our fate. Our driver spoke some Dari and I advised him: 

“Listen. If there’s anything, advise us”. 

 

 

We said to the Afghans through the driver that we were wasting time, let’s see the restaurant and what 

service you offer. They called the restaurant owner. We selected the appliances, the glassware, and ordered a menu 

for 20 people. As a result they believed us. Well, we also worked out arguments that we were guarding Amin…The 

truth is, they tried to check this. 

 

 

I wasn’t using my surname, nor was Yasha, it seems. But he had a document that he was in Amin’s guard but 

I had no other documentation besides my officer’s badge. I had nothing to present and this deepened suspicion. My 

nerves were on edge for we were already in position with our groups and there were only hours left until the operation 

and we were here…But evidently fate took pity on us and we got out somehow”. Actually, because of their independent 

 

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action the commanders of the s almost put the entire operation in jeopardy. From the account of Vladimir Fedoseyev 

about this same episode: “On 26 December Mikhail Mikhaylovich, Zhenya Mazayev, Yakov Semenov, and I went to do 

some reconnoitering since there was information that a “wild” division was preparing to advance on the location of 

Amin’s palace in his defense. It was already clear that we would take part in one or another measure in the assault on 

the Palace. We left early in the morning about 8 and passed one guard post but they stopped us at the second; we 

talked with the Afghans a bit and they let us pass on. The cover story for the trip was that we were going to the 

restaurant located above to buy provisions for the New Year. And we accordingly invited [them]. I don’t know whether 

the Afghans caught on to the ruse or whether indeed they weren’t born yesterday but they didn’t say anything and 

gave us the opportunity to pass onward. The restaurant turned out to be closed. We turned around and began to go 

back but when we approached the second guard post an Afghan army officer invited us in as a guest and we spent 

about four hours there with him talking about life and drinking tea. There were attempts to take our weapons but at 

that moment we had AK-74’s which we liked very much and naturally we didn’t hand the weapon to them. Tension was 

quite high. As soon as we got approval to leave this guard post we breathed a sigh of relief. We passed the next guard 

post without stopping. We arrived back at our place in the subunit safely”. The cover story under which they had gone 

to the restaurant did not stand up to any criticism since it was in complete contradiction with local conditions and 

Afghan reality. The problem was that Soviets never visited the restaurant and Afghans celebrate New Year’s on a 

completely different date – 21 March. 

 

 

The same day Kozlov, Karpukhin, Boyarinov, Shvachko, and Klimov brought in two representatives of the 

future government of Afghanistan from the Embassy to the “Muslim” battalion’s location. 

 

 

 Klimov recalled: “Right before the assault we brought in future members of the Afghan government to the 

location of the “Muslim” battalion. Ehval’d Kozlov, Boyarinov, Karpukhin, Shvachko, and I took part in this 

operation. They issued weapons and grenades to us. I got in the vehicle right away and began to screw the fuses into 

the grenades. Kolya Shvachko and Boyarinov were in the back seat with me with Karpukhin and the driver in front. 

 

 

We drove to the Soviet Embassy at about 7 P.M. in two Jeeps. We arrived at the Embassy and had to wait. All 

the senior officers, our leaders, got out of the Jeeps but we remained as escorts. We had to wait quite a long time. At 

about 11:00 or 11:30 P.M. we again went to the “Muslim” battalion’s area.  We went back in a single column. A 

single Jeep was at the front and back and in the middle was a truck with Soviet license tags. In general it was an 

ordinary “heated truck” – a duct protruded and there was a little window in the back in which some faces appeared 

from time to time. We had to pass several Afghan security posts and stop at each of them. We were very tense and 

ready for immediate action because they said that in case it was necessary to force our way through we should open 

fire and not stop. We were carrying two leaders of the future Afghanistan under the floor and therefore if they had 

been stopped at the posts and their identity then discovered our fate would have been somewhat different. 

 

 

The most difficult situation developed at the last security post in front of the entrance to the grounds adjacent 

to the Taj-Bek Palace.  For about ten minutes the officer who was the post commander detained us in front of the 

traffic control barrier. We sat and observed, ready to enter into combat at any moment. Evidently it was a special post. 

It was well reinforced and under cover of tanks. So in that case our small group would have been in a tight spot there. 

The officer didn’t let our vehicles through for a long time. He was saying something to Kozlov through an interpreter 

and then went into a room and evidently began to call on the phone and report to someone. All this time our nervous 

tension was increasing but an expenditure of energy was improbable. Finally the traffic barrier was raised and our 

vehicles passed without inspection in any event. Obviously the Afghans did not want to spoil relations with the 

“Shuravi [Soviets]” and they displayed caution. But this carelessness, as during the assault on the Palace – put them 

in a corridor with a machine gun and it could cut us all down – helped us. In any event, there is a God. 

 

 

Then M. Romanov assigned Kolya Shvachko and I to guard them [the future Afghan leaders]. They lived in a 

room next to our barracks. No one except us we allowed to go there so that no one find out about their presence. We 

carried food to them, played checkers, etc. We guarded them for a couple of days and then took part in the assault in 

Amin’s palace”. 

 

 

Late in the evening Kolesnik, Drozdov, and Shvets again discussed all the subtleties of the operations to seize 

Taj-Bek, devoting special attention to issues of coordination and command and control. Constant agent and visual 

observation was set up inside and outside the target. 

 

 

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