Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

 

When we crossed the Soviet border in flight we heard an order to prepare our weapons and 

be ready for any surprises on landing; possibly we would have to go into combat immediately. 

 

 

We landed at Bagram at night. We were met there by our guys from the groups of Yuriy 

Izotov and Valentin Shergin who were guarding the new government of Afghanistan in hardstands… 

 

 

Only in the second half of 24 December was Kolesnik informed that the decision had been approved and that 

the battalion would carry out the mission in full strength with the reinforcements. But none of the leaders in 

Afghanistan at that time had signed this plan. It was obvious that already the vicious practice was formed of leaders 

giving verbal orders and then denying their own words. They simply said, “Act!” Thus they had to go into battle 

without a written order. Such “activity” acquired its widest usage in Gorbachev’s time. 

 

 

Major Khalbayev began right away to carry out the first-priority measures of preparing for the assault while 

Col. Gen. Magometov and Col. Kolesnik were summoned for talks with Headquarters [trans. note: Moscow]. What 

caused the delay became clear only much later. 

 

 

The problem was that Marshal Ustinov was holding a meeting of the command staff of the Defense Ministry 

at this time in Moscow at which he announced the decision made by the CC CPSU Politburo to deploy troops to 

Afghanistan. At the meeting were deputies to the Minister, the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed 

Forces and the Commanding General of the Airborne Troops, and several chiefs of main and central directorates. The 

Defense Ministry issued the order to deploy an airborne division and an independent airborne regiment of the Airborne 

Troops, a motorized rifle division of the Turkestan Military District, and an independent motorized rifle regiment of 

the Central Asian Military District to Afghanistan. At the same time the order was given to bring a number of 

formations and units of the Ground Forces into full combat readiness as well as aviation units of military districts 

bordering the DRA for a possible increase in the size of the grouping of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. On the copy of 

the points of the speech at this meeting preserved in the General Staff Archives there is a notation in red pencil made 

by Ustinov: “Special importance and secrecy.” 

 

 

By that time a total of about 100 formations, units, and installations had been deployed, including the HQ of 

the 40

th

 Army; a composite air corps; four motorized rifle divisions (three in the Turkestan Military District and one in 

the Central Asian Military District); artillery, surface-to-air missile, and airborne assault brigades; independent 

motorized rifle and missile artillery regiments; and signals, intelligence, logistics, and repair units. An airborne 

division, an independent airborne regiment, and airfield technical and airfield support units were brought up to full 

strength. 

 

 

More than 50,000 officers, sergeants, and soldiers were called up from the reserves to bring units up to 

strength and about 8,000 vehicles were sent from the economy…Mobilization measures of such scale had never before 

been conducted in the Turkestan and Central Asian Military Districts. Accordingly, local governments, directors of 

enterprises and farms [khozyaystva], draft boards, and military units turned out not to be prepared for them. 

 

 

For example, during the first days of mobilization no one paid attention to the quality of the specialists filling 

out the subunits – everyone was confident that the usual inspection was being done and everything would end after 

reports of its conclusion. But when the commanders and draft boards were notified about possible further operations 

there began an emergency replacement of reservists already called up and sent to units. A keen shortage of scarce 

specialists (tank and BMP driver-mechanics, anti-tank guided missile and radar operators, and gunners [of artillery 

pieces]). Such a situation is explained by the fact due to poor knowledge of the Russian language soldiers from the 

Central Asian republics, as a rule, served out their draft obligation in construction or motorized rifle units where they 

could not acquire the required specialties. 

 

 

A great number of the reservists were not found because of poor recordkeeping in draft boards, violations of 

the residential passport system, confusion in street names…Many reservists avoided receiving [call-up] notices under 

various pretenses, fleeing their places of residence [or] presenting false certifications of illness. Many reserve officers 

never had served in the army and had no practical skills in military specialties – they had trained in military 

departments of higher educational institutions. In short, the troops encountered a whole series of serious problems in 

their first months in Afghanistan and during the war this was always fraught with unforeseeable consequences. 

 

 

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But all the same, in spite of difficulties, by the end of 24 December the main forces of the 40

th

 Army were 

somehow prepared for deployment to Afghanistan. The formations and units designated to operate as a reserve force 

continued to be formed. For example, the 201

st

 [Motorized Rifle] Division stationed in Dushanbe (commanded by 

Colonel Vladimir Stepanov) began to mobilize only on the evening of 24 December. Having received their 

mobilization equipment over the period of three days and completed a march, by the end of 28 December it had 

formed up in Termez. The decision was made to bring the division’s personnel up to strength from units of the Group 

of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Central Group of Forces. The registered reservists [pripisnoy sostav] were 

replaced during January and at the end of the month the 201

st

 MSD was deployed to the northern regions of the DRA. 

 

 

Here is the opinion of Yevgeniy Chazov:  

It seems to me that the only mistake he made and did not recognize until the end was the 

Afghan war. A poor politician and diplomat, as a representative of the old Stalinist “guard” thought 

that all issues could be decided from a position of strength. While I saw how Andropov rushed about 

in connection with the Afghan war and who understood his mistake in the end, Ustinov always 

remained imperturbable and evidently was convinced of his correctness. 

 

Varennikov also thinks the Defense Ministry played the leading role in making the decision to deploy troops 

to Afghanistan. It should be said that the attitude in the army toward Ustinov was ambiguous in military matters. 

[While] admiring his services in organizing and running the defense industry, they had a skeptical attitude toward him 

as a military leader. Is it possible that the Defense Ministry wanted to demonstrate his resolution by this action? 

 

 

Directive Nº 312/12/001 signed by Ustinov and Ogarkov and sent to the field on 24 December 1979  

enumerated specific missions for the deployment to Afghanistan. In particular, they explained:  

The latest appeal of the government of Afghanistan has been favorably considered 

considering the military-political situation in the Middle East. The decision has been made to deploy 

several contingents of Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of the country to the territory 

of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to give international aid to the friendly Afghan 

people and also to create favorable conditions to interdict possible anti-Afghan actions from 

neighboring countries…

17

 

[Translator’s note: Previously published in “Plamya Afgana, Iskon, Moscow, 1999, p. 153 and 

previously translated] 

 

 

The troops were further given the missions of marching to and accommodations in Afghanistan. Participation 

in combat operations was not envisioned. Specific combat missions to suppress rebel resistance were given to 

formations and units only a bit later in Defense Directive Nº 312/12/002 of 27 December. 

 

 

Having familiarized himself with the Directive, Marshal Sokolov told a Deputy Chief of the General Staff’s 

Main Operations Directorate,  Lt.General German Burutin: “Eloquently written, it says nothing; everything in it is in 

order but it doesn’t say WHEN you can use weapons.” 

 

 

Very little time was devoted to carrying out all the measures associated with the deployment of troops to the 

DRA – less than a day. Such haste could not have failed to have subsequently had a negative effect. Much turned out 

to be unready and not well thought out, which led to additional losses. 

 

 

 

…S. Magometov and V. Kolesnik were summoned to the government communications telephone by 

Akhromeyev. They arrived at the field telephone station which had been set up in the “Klub-eh-Askari” Stadium not 

far from the American Embassy. It was the evening of 24 December. They entered the government communications 

telephone booth and started to call S. Akhromeyev. The operator refused to connect Col. Kolesnik for a long time 

because “he was not on the special lists” but then she connected them all the same, apparently having asked 

Akhromeyev beforehand. Akhromerev ordered them to report their decision. Having heard them out he began to ask 

questions about its justification and estimates. He was interested in the smallest details. In the course of the 

conversation he made comments and gave orders. Then Magometov talked with Akhromeyev. He was given the 

                                            

17

 Ibid. f. 48, op. 3570, d. 6. [Translator’s note: Previously published in “Plamya Afgana, Iskon, Moscow 1999, p. 253 

and previously translated] 

 

40

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