Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp
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Only Kolesnik, Shvets, and Khalbayev in the battalion knew the new mission. The KGB special subunits were also preparing to assault Taj-Bek. The signal to begin the operation in Kabul was the demolition of the “communications lines conduit.” According to Aleksey Polyakov, who headed the “Zenit” group in Kabul:
[Translator’s note: The Russian root “divers-“ can apply to both sabotage and diversionary operations and is translated here as best suits the context] In starting to carry out the mission we first of all tried to identify the place in the Kabul communications system which was most vulnerable and easily accessible and also would not require much time to place an explosive device to obtain a great effect from the diversion. A Soviet communications specialist was found through security officer Bakhturin with whose aid we managed to determine the location of the central line communications center. The long-distance and local communications lines were laid out from this center which had their source in a specially-constructed bunker or, to put it more simply, conduit. The entire communications system in Kabul had been organized under the supervision of West German specialists and therefore the arrangement of this conduit and the principle of the cable distribution in it were a mystery to us. They began with scouting this conduit. It was situated 5-6 meters from the communications center building right on a sidewalk but the entrance to the center was on the opposite side. Opposite the conduit, across the road, was an Afghan bank and 30-50 meters away at a street intersection was a traffic control post, but in front of the conduit, along our travel route, was a hotel (about 100-120 meters [away]). There were no other residential structures near the conduit. However the conduit was under constant observation by the communications center security post. This imposed additional difficulties. A brief visual survey gave this result: the conduit hatch was covered by a rectangular concrete slab about 10 cm thick with four holes which initially appeared to us that they should go all the way through. But it turned out in fact the holes in the slab did not go through. In the process of further surveillance they had to use an elementary method such as depicting smoke around the conduit. In this regard I took a handkerchief with Afghan coins from my pocket along with a lighter. With the set of coins I determined the diameter of the openings, their depth, and, what is interesting, the holes were not strictly aligned vertically but at an angle of about 15 cm from one another. There was a guy in the detachment nicknamed “Kulibin” [Valeriy Volokh] – author’s note). On arrival at the villa I summoned him and told him about the situation. “Kulibin” did not let us down. On the second or third day he brought in two tongs which he had fashioned in the Soviet Embassy repair shop. We had to test them in action. We needed to find an analogous conduit in Kabul to do this. Such a conduit was soon found on the edge of the Afghan capital. The entire diversionary group actually drove to the site of the conduit’s local in the dark in three UAZ [military transport] vehicles. Unexpectedly two taxis formed up with us in the center of Kabul and started to follow persistently. We figured: surveillance was sitting on our tail. What were we to do? Along the route near the conduit in question was a small store near which we stopped under the pretext of buying vegetables or fruit. The taxi drivers also stopped and approached us. We purposely spoke loudly in Russian and distracted the taxi drivers while the reconnaissance personnel tested the tongs. They turned out to be necessary. After testing our “diversionary” instrument we made further plans for the diversion and began to implement them. First and foremost, they closely studied all the routes of approach to and withdrawal from the target, the presence of military units and institutions, fixed security posts, traffic control posts, mobile patrols,
43 and also level of vehicle and cart traffic along the way in daytime and nighttime. Then they calculated the time to approach along the routes studied. At the conclusion of the preparatory measures I reported our readiness to carry out the diversion at the assigned target. New unforeseen circumstances unexpectedly appeared. First, a stationary two-man police post appeared around “our” conduit and second, we received information from the Soviet specialist that there was water in the conduit but its depth was not known. They began to calculate the required quantity of explosives for assured destruction of the conduit but then on the recommendation of Ehval’d Kozlov they decided to use the entire 40 kg of explosives available. To forestall attempts by the Afghans to remove our charge from the conduit in case they noticed it we planned to lower a smoke grenade with tear gas into the conduit together with the charge. Thus all the verification and preparatory measures for the diversion were finished. Simultaneously with the work on “our target” we were searching for cable communication lines laid out on the surface in the direction of Amin’s residence and the Afghan Army General Staff. Soon the Army communications cable line was discovered. Moreover, we found a metal box about 0.5 m x 1 m through which this cable passed… SOVIET TROOPS ENTER AFGHANISTAN How it began…
The plan of operations for the deployment of our troops which was developed by the General Staff provided for the deployment of two motorized rifle divisions along two axes; the 5 th from Kushka to Herat and Shindand and the 108 th , from Termez to Pul-e Khumri and Kunduz. Simultaneously the 103 rd Airborne Division and the rest of the 345 th
On the night of 24 December the Commanding General of the Turkestan Military District Col. Gen. Yuriy Maksimov reported to Ustinov and Akhromeyev by telephone regarding the readiness of the troops to carry out the assigned mission and then sent them a cable with a readiness report.
pontoon bridge. Troops and equipment were to cross over this very bridge…The Commanding General of the 40 th
Army Lt. Gen. Tukharinov met in Kunduz with the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the DRA Armed Forces General Staff Gen. Babajan and Abdullah, the elder brother of Amin.
border by the troops of the 40 th Army and aircraft of the Air Forces to begin at 1500 25 December (Moscow time).
The deployment of Soviet troops began precisely at the set time. The first to cross were scouts and the airborne assault battalion of Capt. Leonid Khabarov, who were ordered to seize the Salang Pass; next the remaining units of the 108 th Motorized Rifle Division under the command of Maj. Gen. Konstantin Kuz’min came across the pontoon bridge. Simultaneously, Military Transport Aviation aircraft began the airlift and debarkation of the units of the 103
rd Airborne Division (commanded by Maj. Gen. Ivan Ryabchenko) and the remnants of the 345 th Independent Parachute Regiment at the airfields of the capital and Bagram.
Three hundred forty-three sorties were made to carry the personnel and equipment and it took 47 hours to unload the Airborne Forces units and subunits (the first plane landed at 1625 25 December and the last at 1430 27 December). Col. Gen. [of Aviation] Ivan Gaydayenko supervised Military Transport Aviation operations. Unfortunately they were not without losses – at 1933 on 25 December an Il-76 struck and mountain and exploded
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