Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

 

Before the start of operation “Shtorm-333” the KGB special forces knew the target to be seized (Taj-Bek) 

thoroughly: the most suitable approach routes; the sentries’ routine; the overall strength of the guard force and Amin’s 

bodyguards; the location of machine gun “nests”, armored vehicles, and tanks; the internal structure of the rooms and 

mazes of the Palace; the location of the radiotelephone… 

 

 

Before assaulting the Palace, as I have already said, the KGB  was to have exploded a “conduit”, in actuality 

the central secure center for communications with the most important DRA military and government facilities. The 

scaling ladders, equipment, weapons, and ammunition were prepared. The combat equipment was also carefully 

inspected and prepared under the supervision of the Deputy Battalion Commander for Technical Affairs Senior 

Lieutenant Eduard Ibragimov. The main thing was secrecy and stealth. 

 

 

The Taj-Bek Palace was located on a high steep hill overgrown with trees and shrubbery and all approaches 

to it were mined. Only a single road led to it, which was guarded around the clock. The Palace itself was also not an 

easily accessible structure. Its thick walls were capable of withstanding an artillery strike. If you add to that that the 

surrounding terrain was within range of tanks and large-caliber machine guns then it becomes clear that it was not at 

all easy to seize it. 

 

 

On the morning of 27 December Drozdov and Kolesnik in an old Russian custom before battle washed 

themselves in a bathhouse and changed their underwear. A mobile bathhouse was set up for the remaining soldiers. 

Fresh underwear and striped undershirts [Translator’s note: Soviet special forces and paratroopers wore these 

distinctive undershirts] were issued. Each of them again reported their readiness to their commander. Boris Ivanov got 

in touch with Moscow and reported that everything was ready for the operation and then handed the phone to Yuriy 

Drozdov. Andropov said, “Are you going yourself? Don’t take unnecessary risks, think about your own safety, and 

take care of your people”. He had a similar conversation with Vasiliy Kolesnik. 

 

 

At midday Colonel Kolesnik, General Drozdov, and the battalion commander again went visited the positions 

and informed the officers in the concerned units about the operations plan. Then he explained the order of the 

operations. Kolesnik ordered that one of the “Shilkas” be moved to a more advantageous position at twilight. 

 

 

When they were reconnoitering they saw Jandad and a group of officers in their binoculars studying the 

defense of the “Muslim” battalion. Lt. Col. Shvets went to them to invite them to dinner, supposedly in honor of the 

birthday of one of the officers, but the brigade commander said that they were conducting an exercise and would come 

in the evening. Then Shvets asked that the Soviet military advisers be allowed to leave and be taken away with them. 

He thus saved many lives. After the assault on the Palace Jandad would say: they received information about our 

intentions [but] didn’t believe it, but decided to reconnoiter in any case …Obviously they reported to Moscow about 

the Afghans’ scouting activities. They were told: begin the assault at 1500. 

 

 

Having received this information they quickly gathered all the company, assault group, and fire support 

subunit commanders on the second floor of the barracks. General Drozdov gave a favorable assessment of the situation 

and revealed the overall mission, making an estimate of the Taj-Bek guard force’s men and equipment. Colonel 

Kolesnik issued a combat order to the subunits, assigning each of them a specific mission, described the procedure of 

coordination, identification, and signals. Major Khalbayev, the commander of the “Muslim” battalion and the 

commanders of subgroups Romanov and Semenov assigned combat missions to subunit and subgroup commanders 

and organized preparations for the assault. All the soldiers were in a determined mood. No one refused to take part in 

the assault on the Palace. According to Karpukhin, a soldier of the “Grom” group: “Gennadiy Yegorovich Zudin wrote 

everything down scrupulously from the beginning before the start of the assault – to whom he gave two grenades, 

whom he gave three, and how many rounds. But then he spit and said, ‘Yes, go ahead and take all you want’. And we 

took the entire load of ammunition. There was some aloofness in the man. You know, such a feeling had developed that 

he would soon leave this life. Zudin was about 10 years older than us and was sort of considered the granddaddy. He 

was then 42 years old. Probably life experience was telling and evidently a person with years takes situations 

associated with risk to life more seriously. I didn’t understand this then, but I do now. I wanted all this to end quickly. 

It was impossible to refuse but by nature this was not the question then although many, it is true, said that it was 

necessary to talk our commanders out of it saying ‘This is crazy, we can’t do anything and everyone will die there’. I 

won’t name names as there’s no point in it. Let them all remember this themselves if they wish. I remember it. Of 

course we understood –it’s possible to say anything you want but you have to do it all the same. And there was no 

alternative for us because if a decision has been made it needs to be carried out”.  

 

49

---