Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

battalion commander, displayed wonders of resourcefulness and diplomacy in order to feed the personnel in such 

difficult conditions and keep them warm. 

 

Before Amin changed his residence in Arg he moved to the Taj-Bek Palace and ended up under the “wing” of 

the “Muslim” battalion. In Daud’s time the HQ of the Central Army Corps was located here. 

 

The security system in the Palace was carefully thought out. It was organized under the supervision of our 

specialists from the KGB 9

th

 Directorate headed by Yu. Kutepov. A personal guard consisting of relatives and 

especially trusted people was on duty inside. They wore a special uniform distinct from the others: there were white 

bands on their caps, white belts and holsters, and white cuffs on the sleeves. They lived in direct proximity to the 

Palace in an adobe structure next to the building where the HQ of the security brigade was located. A second line of 

defense was formed by seven posts, each of which had four sentries armed with a machine gun, grenade launcher, and 

automatic weapons. They worked  two hour watches. 

 

Outside the security ring were the deployment locations of battalions (three motorized infantry and one tank). 

They were situated a short distance around Taj-Bek. Three T-54 tanks were dug in on one of the commanding heights 

and could fire on the area adjacent to the Palace from [their] cannon and machine guns in a direct line of sight. There 

were a total of about 2,500 men in the security brigade. In addition, there was a regiment not far away whose 

weaponry included anti-aircraft artillery (ZPU-2) mounts and also a construction regiment (about 1,000 men with 

rifles). There were also other army units in Kabul: two divisions, two tank regiments, “commandos”… 

 

On 21 December Col. Kolesnik and Major Khalbayev were summoned to the Chief Military Adviser from 

whom they received an order – reinforce the Taj-Bek Palace security with subunits of the “Muslim” battalion. They 

were ordered to take up a defense in the space between the guard posts and the deployment line of the Afghan 

battalions. They immediately began to carry out the mission. 

 

They quickly established contact with the security brigade commander Major Jandad, an aide-de-camp of 

Amin’s, and  coordinated the location of defensive positions and all issues of cooperation with him. Jandad presented 

them with a miniature Japanese radio for communications with him. The brigade commander himself spoke Russian 

tolerably well (although he concealed this) inasmuch as he had studied in the USSR, initially in Ryazan’, at the 

Airborne School, and then at the Frunze Military Academy [trans. note: This is where promising mid-level ground 

forces commanders study]. According to the cover story Colonel Kolesnik was “Major Kolesov”, the Deputy for 

Combat Training to the Battalion Commander and Lieutenant Colonel O. Shvets was “Major Shvetsov”, an officer of 

the Special Department [trans. note: This department is responsible for counterintelligence and was subordinate to the 

KGB]. One of those in the group (Drozdov) became “Captain Lebedev”, Khalbayev’s Deputy for Technical Affairs. 

The Afghans still expressed surprise at the fact that he was that old and still a captain. 

 

After coordinating all the issues they got to work on practical measures. They planned combat operations and 

assigned missions to the companies. The scouted withdrawal routes and the positions of the subunits…In particular 

there was a natural obstacle along one of the routes – an irrigation ditch. They built a small bridge together with 

soldiers of the brigade – they laid concrete girders and then put slabs on them. This work took two days. On the 

evening of 22 December they invited the brigade command to a comradely dinner. 

 

On 22 and 23 December Ambassador Tabeyev informed Amin that his request for Soviet troops to be sent to 

Afghanistan had been granted in full in Moscow. They were ready to begin deployment on 25 December. Amin 

expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and gave instructions to the DRA Armed Forces General Staff to give 

assistance to the deploying troops. 

 

Meanwhile new subunits arrived in Bagram; in particular a special KGB group, “Grom” (30 men), was 

transferred there, manned with officers of the elite “A” (“Al’fa”) subunit. According to  Major Mikhail Romanov, 

commander of the “Grom” group:  

At that time I was deputy commander of the antiterror subunit, “A”. Our commander, 

Colonel Gennadiy Nikolayevich Zaytsev, was in the hospital and the command entrusted me with 

forming a group from the subunit’s officers which could fulfill a special mission of the Soviet 

government in Afghanistan without fail. 

 

 

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They told [us] about it on the morning 22 December, I formed the group during the day, 

and the next morning we flew out. 

 

No one knew anything in [our] families when we left for there. Only my wife knew, 

perhaps. She was a KGB employee, now a retired major. But she is a creature of habit and a brave 

woman. And, too, then there was still no feeling of danger yet… 

 

In the second half of 23 December Kolesnikov and Khalbayev were summoned to the Soviet Embassy. The 

commander of a “Zenit” subgroup, Semenov, arrived with them. There they initially reported the results of the work 

which had been done to Col.Gen. Magometov and then went into the office on the 2

nd

 floor where the KGB mission 

was located. Generals Vadim Kirpichenko and Boris Ivanov there were interested in how security at Taj-Bek was 

organized and examined the Palace security plan. After Col. Kolesnikov reported the solution to the security plan, they 

suggested that he think about alternative actions in case they suddenly had to not guard it but seize it. They added in 

this context that part of the battalion personnel could perform one mission but they would attach a company of 

paratroopers and two KGB special forces groups to them. In short, they said, go ahead and think and tomorrow come 

and report your ideas. The adviser to the security brigade commander Col.Popyshev also received a mission to develop 

his own alternative plan of operations as a person who knew the Palace security system well. And with that they 

parted. 

 

They made decisions all night. They calculated long and meticulously. They understood that this was a real 

mission and the reason that they were here and came to the conclusion: if they take two companies and one company 

(less a platoon) out of the battalion, which Gen. Kirpichenko warned about, then they could not seize the Palace, even 

considering his reinforcements and the factor of surprise. The correlation of men and equipment was 1:15 in favor of 

the Afghans…All the men and equipment of the battalion needed to be in action although they were obviously also 

insufficient. There were 520 men in the battalion plus a company of paratroopers (80 men), and also two groups, 

“Zenit” and “Grom”, of 24 men each. According to various estimates the Afghans had more than 2,500 men alone 

active in Palace security. And next to them were located an anti-aircraft artillery regiment and a construction regiment. 

The chief reliance was made on the surprise and the daring of the operations. A plan was developed proceeding from 

this [calculation]. The battalion chief of staff Ashurov entered this plan on a map with an explanatory note. 

 

On the morning of 24 December Col. Popyshev was first to report. From his very first words it became clear 

that he had approached his mission only perfunctorily according to the “what would you like?” principle, since it was 

not he who had to carry out the mission. He argued that that the men and equipment allotted were sufficient but he 

could not confirm his statements with figures. Then Col. Kolesnik reported the decision to seize the Taj-Bek Palace. 

He justified the necessity for the entire battalion with all the attached men and equipment to take part in the assault and 

described the plan of operations in detail. After long discussion they told the battalion command: “Wait”. They had to 

wait quite a long time.  The leaders of the operation did not know then whether there would be promised 

reinforcements or not. Gen. Kirpichenko called Kryuchkov in Moscow and was interested in how this issue was being 

decided. The latter assured him that an airborne division would arrive as reinforcement. 

 

According to Sergey Popov, an officer of group “A”:  

Part of the guys of our antiterrorism subunit had gone to Afghanistan earlier but the 

principle of secrecy held and we did not know much about this. When the mission was given to our 

group to fly to Afghanistan the leaders of the subunit selected the candidates for the trip themselves. 

Gennadiy Zudin should not have flown but they convinced Robert Petrovich Ivon to include him in 

the list. 

 

 

We warned relatives that we were going to Yaroslavl’ Oblast for exercises and possibly we 

would not be in Moscow for New Year’s. We received special forces summer uniforms, winter fur 

[uniforms], equipment, and attaché cases with weapons. An entire day was spent in assemblies.  We 

arrived at the airfield the next morning. When we climbed the ramp to the plane we were 

photographed. Having noticed this the representative of the Special Department took the camera 

from the photographer and exposed the film. An order was given that we were should fly 

inconspicuously. The issue of secrecy remained very rigid. 

 

 

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