Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

They were afraid and held onto their posts. This can easily be confirmed by excerpts from the speeches of many Party 

and government leaders of those years. 

 

 

A CC CPSU plenum resolution “The International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union,” 

approved unanimously on 23 June 1980, said,  

The CC Plenum completely approves of the measures taken to extend comprehensive aid to 

Afghanistan in the cause of repelling armed attacks and interference from without, the goal of which 

is to smother the Afghan revolution and create an imperialist base for military aggression at the 

southern borders of the USSR. The plenum calls for a political settlement of the situation which has 

arisen around Afghanistan, which is following a policy of nonalignment. The complete cessation of 

aggression against the country and reliable guarantees against subversive acts from abroad are 

required for this…

13

 

 

This action of the Soviet Union was approved in the reports of Brezhnev and Gromyko and also in the 

speeches of participants of the CC CPSU plenum which touched on the deployment of troops to Afghanistan. The 

speech of Georgian CP First Secretary Eduard Shevardnadze from the rostrum of the CC plenum was noteworthy:  

 

In the world they know that the Soviet Union and its leader will not leave their friends to 

the whims of fate, that its word matches its deeds. 

 

Being a witness to the titanic activity of Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev, reading the transcripts of 

his conversations, fundamental works, and speeches on domestic and foreign problems you 

experience joy and pride from the knowledge that at the head of the Party and state stands a man in 

whom there are organically combined the broadest erudition, revolutionary courage, great 

humanism, and rare diplomatic flexibility. (Stormy, prolonged applause) 

 

 

The deep concern of the Soviet people when the gains of the Afghan revolution were in the 

balance is recalled. The fate of the Afghan people, the fate of our borders, our southern borders, 

disturbs them. And the courageous, the only faithful, the only wise step taken regarding Afghanistan 

was greeted with satisfaction by every Soviet citizen. Enthusiastically supporting the measures of the 

Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government described in the report of Leonid Il’ich 

Brezhnev in the name of preserving and furthering the gains of the Afghan revolution and ensuring 

the security of our southern borders, the workers of Georgia, like all the Soviet people, 

enthusiastically approve of the foreign policy actions of the CC of our Party, the Politburo, Cde. 

Leonid Brezhnev, which entirely correspond to the vital interests of our Motherland and all 

progressive humanity…

 14

 

 

Later, it is true, he spoke completely differently, advocating a fundamentally opposite position, but, as they 

say, you have to tell it like it is. It should generally be noted that Shevardnadze never was celebrated for the firmness 

of his views, changing them depending on conditions considerably more easily than a chameleon changes color. At 

that time in all his public statements, whether at congresses or plenums, he showered glorification and lavishly praised 

the wisdom and farsightedness of Party leader Brezhnev with sugar and honey to the point of indecency, lying like a 

“Caucasian” nightingale. Obviously he had thus secured for himself the opportunity to be at the helm of the Georgian 

SSR. During the period of perestroyka Shevardnadze began to direct words of praise in another direction, 

Gorbachev’s, subjecting his previous views to “critical rethinking.” Later, as President of an independent Georgia, he 

advocated completely different positions… 

 

 

The officially proclaimed main purpose of the Soviet military presence in the DRA was peacekeeping and 

was formulated unambiguously – to help stabilize the situation and repel possible aggression from without. The Soviet 

troops should have become garrisons and not gotten enmeshed in the internal conflict and combat operations. It was 

prescribed everywhere that they were to give aid to the local population, to protect them from rebel bands, and also to 

distribute food, fuel, and basic necessities. It was thought that the very presence of Soviet troops would constitute a 

powerful stabilizing factor, significantly strengthen the PDPA regime, and exert a restraining influence on the 

opposition movement…Now, of course, it is understood that such an attitude was unrealistic but then they thought it 

                                            

13

 APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 44 

14

 Ibid. 

 

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reasonable. The real purpose of the deployment of Soviet troops to Afghanistan can only be guessed. It seems to me – 

it was to remove Amin from power and liquidate him, and to provide the conditions for the appointment of Karmal as 

General Secretary of the CC PDPA and Chairman of the DRA Revolutionary Council. 

 

 

The reader himself will understand with what difficulty this decision was made. It was not hasty or impulsive 

as some journalists try to picture it. It was made only against the background of a large number of contradictory, fast-

paced, and acute factors directly affecting the Soviet Union’s vital interests and national security.  And the situation 

turned out to be far more complex and serious than was presented. As further events demonstrated, the action 

undertaken without an adequate projection and a consideration of the entire spectrum of factors affecting the 

consequences of the deployment of troops on the development of the situation in Afghanistan led to a tragedy, not just 

for the Afghan people, but for ours, too. 

 

 

The leadership of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, in particular, Ogarkov, Varennikov, and also the 

Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces General of the Army Ivan Pavlovskiy spoke out against the deployment of 

troops to the DRA before the final decision was made, warning the political leadership of the country away from the 

temptation to throw our troops into a fight with the Afghan opposition. The military leaders thought that our military 

presence would provoke the initiation of combat operations and lead to a strengthening of the rebel movement, which 

would be directed against Soviet troops, and the poor knowledge of local customs and traditions, especially Islam, and 

national ethnic relations would force us into a quite difficult position. This, in fact, then occurred, but at the time the 

political leadership did not pay attention to the arguments of the military. Sober estimations of the situation were 

regarded by the Soviet leadership as a lack of comprehension or underestimation of the political importance of the 

processes occurring in Afghanistan. They all subsequently fell into the disfavor of Defense Minister Ustinov, who 

actually removed them from “Afghan affairs” and then sent Pavlovskiy into retirement and appointed Ogarkov to the 

post of Commander-in-Chief of the Western High Command as a demotion

15

 …Sergey Akhromeyev became the 

Minister’s most trusted person. In 1983 in the post of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff he was promoted to the 

rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union (an unprecedented event in history) and in 1984 was appointed Chief of the USSR 

Armed Forces General Staff. 

 

 

There exist many opinions regarding the reasons and purposes for the deployment of troops and various 

versions are advanced. They are quite diverse and at times polar opposites. Some of them are complete fantasies. I will 

touch only on facts and documents. The “Cold War” was going on. There was a strategic military confrontation 

between two superpowers, two systems, and two military blocs. There was geopolitical competition with China, which 

was then viewed as the probable enemy.  The revolution against the Shah in Iran and the establishment there of an 

Islamic regime forced the Americans to look for new locations for military and intelligence bases. Therefore the 

massive aid to the Afghan rebels and reinforcement of US forces in the region in direct proximity to our borders could 

not have failed to alarm Soviet leaders. 

 

 

By the end of the 1970s the development of the détente process in USSR-US relations had slowed 

considerably. The administration of Jimmy Carter had unilaterally decided to halt the ratification of the SALT-II 

Treaty for an indefinite period, which was regarded in the Soviet Union as a sign of a sharp change in the overall 

military and political policy of the US. NATO considered the issue of an annual increase of its members’ military 

budgets until the end of the 20

th

 Century. The Americans created “rapid deployment forces”… 

 

 

We were also worried that a further rapprochement between the US and China was occurring on an anti-

Soviet basis. Agreements were concluded between them about an exchange of visits at the ministerial level, and by 

trade delegations and military missions; a reduction of US troops on Taiwan (while preserving the right of the US to 

sell weapons to Taiwan); Chinese support for American peace efforts in the Near East; the development by the 

Chinese of a secret channel of communications with Israel; the American use of their influence to improve ties 

between Saudi Arabia and China; the readiness of Washington to change COCOM procedures in order to ease the 

transfer of the latest technology to China; American and Chinese aid to several regimes in Africa, especially those who 

were in a position to increase the price of Soviet-Cuban military interference; also, closer cooperation on such issues 

as Afghanistan, aid to Pakistan, and assistance to the efforts of Southeast Asia to counter Soviet support to Vietnam. 

                                            

15

 [Translator’s note: However, as indicated below, Ogarkov was not removed as Chieg of the General Stadd and 

appointed to this newly-created position until 1984, shortlet Ustinov’s death] 

 

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