Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

“was removed” by his brother Abdullah (the head of the Afghan security service) himself or at the 

hands of one of his people… 

 

 

In spite of the reduction of his mental acuity [sposobnost’ kriticheskoye vospriyatiye], 

Brezhnev dealt with this event vigorously. Most of all he was indignant that back on 10 September, 

not long before these events, he had received Taraki, promised him aid and support… “What scum 

Amin is: you smother a man with whom you participated in a revolution. Who’s the leader of the 

Afghan revolution?” – he said during a meeting – “And what will they say in other countries? Can 

they really believe Brezhnev’s word if his assurances of support and protection remain [just] 

words?” Andropov spoke to me in approximately the same spirit as Brezhnev had spoken in his 

presence and in Ustinov’s presence. These comments of Brezhnev hardly played the role of catalyst 

in the invasion of Afghanistan but…after these events preparations for an invasion began… 

 

 

At that time I often had to meet with Andropov and never in all our 17 years of 

acquaintanceship had I see him in such tension. It seems to me that right before the deployment of 

Soviet troops in Afghanistan he had, in contrast to Ustinov, periods of lack of confidence and even 

bewilderment. But he trusted his sources of information very much…However everything happened 

the other way around, despite the information – the deployment of troops aggravated the situation… 

 

 

Recalling the period before the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops and the turn of 

events, I am confident that the decision about beginning the Afghan war was the work of many 

people and the assertion that only a narrow group in the leadership of the country knew is a myth…

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In my view, the key factor in the memoirs of the academician is the phrase of the CC CPSU General 

Secretary after the murder of N. M. Taraki: “Can they really believe Brezhnev’s word if his assurances of support and 

protection remain [just] words?”  And in Gromyko’s opinion, the murder of Taraki produced an additional aggravation 

of the situation, from a government which was requesting aid. This bloody act shocked the Soviet leadership. 

Brezhnev in particular took his death especially badly. Without question, the CC CPSU General Secretary expressed 

his dissatisfaction to Andropov, who had promised, but could not ensure, the security of Taraki, which put Brezhnev in 

an extremely awkward situation before the entire world. Accordingly, the KGB Chairman “pressured” his officials and 

they quickly began to work out alternatives to rectify the resulting situation. Stories appeared about Amin’s 

involvement with the CIA, the external threat to the DRA from Pakistan and Iran, the penetration of Islamic extremism 

into Soviet Central Asian republics, the intentions of the US to place American SIGINT equipment and several types 

of missiles in Afghanistan if pro-Western forces came to power there…[Translator’s note: the US lost two listening 

posts in northern Iran when Khomeini came to power]. Decisive steps were required in order to counter them. Thus, 

not so much the objective necessity as the personal factor played a key role in justifying the advisability of deploying 

Soviet troops to Afghanistan. 

 

 

On 8 December a meeting was held in Brezhnev’s office (the so-called “Walnut Room”), in which a “narrow 

circle of people” took part – Andropov, Gromyko, Mikhail Suslov, and Ustinov. They discussed the situation for a 

long time and weighed the pros and cons of deploying of Soviet troops. As evidence for the need for such a step 

Andropov and Ustinov could cite: the efforts of the US CIA (particularly Paul Henze, the Chief of Station in Ankara) 

to create a “New Great Ottoman Empire” including the southern republics of the USSR; the lack of a reliable air 

defense system in the south and thus, in case American “Pershing” missiles were stationed in the DRA, many vitally 

important objects such as the Baykonur Cosmodrome would be placed in jeopardy; the possibility of the use of Afghan 

uranium deposits by Pakistan and Iran to create a nuclear weapons; the establishment of an opposition government in 

the northern regions of Afghanistan; the joining of this region to Pakistan… 

 

 

As a result they decided to work out two options: remove Amin from power using the KGB’s capabilities and 

transfer power to Karmal; if this didn’t work, then send a certain number of troops to the DRA for these purposes. 

 

 

On 10 December 1979, Ustinov informed Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov that the CC 

CPSU Politburo had made a tentative decision to temporarily deploy Soviet troops to Afghanistan and assigned him 

the task of preparing about 75-80,000 troops. Ogarkov was very surprised at this information and said that such a 

number of troops would not stabilize the situation, that he opposed such a step, and that it was reckless. But the 

 

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Minister stopped him abruptly and said, “What are you saying, are you going to teach the Politburo? Your job is to 

follow orders….” 

 

The following day, December 11

th

, A.N. Kosygin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 

called Ogarkov and informed him that a decision was being prepared regarding the introduction of Soviet troops into 

Afghanistan. He asked his position regarding such a step. Ogarkov answered that his opinion was negative. Kosygin 

then asked him to convince Ustinov that this must not be done. Ogarkov summoned Gen. Varennikov and discussed 

this problem with him, and then called Ustinov and asked him to see him so that he could report on certain important 

documents. Having made his report, Ogarkov once again tried to state his position regarding the introduction of troops 

into Afghanistan, but Ustinov rejected this and even started screaming “Are you going to teach the Politburo? You 

must carry out orders. You’re always building intrigues! You’re systematically sabotaging my decisions! And now 

you are unhappy with what the country’s leadership is preparing. What gets decided in the Politburo is none of your 

business. Your business is the staff…” Ogarkov objected, saying that the General Staff, being an organ of the Supreme 

Command, cannot stand aside when it is making such fateful decisions for the country. This irritated Ustinov even 

more, and he started to accuse the General Staff of all possible sins, and Ustinov told Ogarkov that he will talk to him 

no longer and went into the relaxation room. Although their relations had been “cool” even before that, this, essentially 

was the final break. After this conversation with Ustinov,  Ogarkov called Kosygin and the first Deputy Foreign 

Minister G.M. Kornienko and informed them of Ustinov’s position, saying that it had not been possible to change his 

mind. 

 

That same day Ogarkov was suddenly called into Brezhnev’s office, where the “small Politburo” was 

meeting. As Varennikov related to me, before going to this meeting, they spent a long time discussing the position that 

Ogarkov should take regarding the question of introducing troops into Afghanistan. It was agreed that he would assert 

until the very last the opinion that such a move was inexpedient. As an alternative it was decided to propose the 

introduction of small sub-divisions into the DRA to protect certain objects. With that he left for the Kremlin. Ogarkov, 

now in Brezhnev’s presence, tried once again to convince the Politburo members that the problem needed to be solved 

politically, not relying of force. He referred to the Afghan tradition of resistance against foreigners on their land, 

warning about the probability of our troops being pulled into military activity, but all of this turned out to be in vain. 

“We will pit all of eastern Islam against us,” Ogarkov said. “and we will lose politically in the entire world.” But he 

was sharply interrupted by Andropov: “Mind your own business! Politics will be taken care of by us, the party, Leonid 

Ilyich!” Ogarkov tried to protest, “I am the head of the General Staff.” Andropov once again stopped him: “And 

nothing more. You were invited here not so that we could hear your opinion, but so that you could take down the 

instructions of the Politburo and organize their implementation.” The KGB Chairman was supported by Politburo 

members Gromyko, Chernenko, Suskov, Ustinov, and Kirillenko. Finally Brezhnev had his word: “It follows that we 

should support Yuri Vladimirovich [Andropov].” It was then that Ogarkov formed the opinion that the decision had 

already been discussed and decided upon ahead of time, and that his efforts were in vain.  

 

At the end of the conversation, it was agreed that for now the final decision would not be made regarding the 

immediate introduction of troops, but that the troops would prepare just in case. Ustinov took this as a directive to 

begin acting… 

 

[Translator’s note: the last half of this paragraph appears in Lyakhovskiy’s “Plamya Afgana”, previously translated for 

CWIHP].  

 

 

At the conclusion of the conversation it was decided there would be no decision about immediate military aid 

but that troops would be readied in any event. The military would be subjected to criticism in the era of glasnost but 

they could not display firmness in the defense of their views. The truth is, none of the officials even took responsibility 

for the consequences of the political decision about the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA... 

 

 

Sensing that things were taking an undesireable turn, Ogarkov made sure that he had the support of 

Ahromeev and Varrenikov.  Having prepared a written report on the Afghani problem, Ogarkov then went with them 

to try once again to change Ustinov’s mind. As Varennikov would later recall:  

Ogarkov invited Ahromeev and myself to his office and allowed us to familiarize 

ourselves with the report prepared for the minister of defense which analyzed the 

situation in Afghanistan and surrounding it, as well as our suggestions. [We were 

asked to] sign it. I remember that the report stated that the General staff believes: 

that it would be possible to refrain from introducing Soviet troops onto the 

territory of sovereign Afghanistan, which was consistent with the decision made 

earlier by the leadership of the USSR and would allow [the USSR] to avoid heavy 

 

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