Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

consideration of the CC CPSU Politburo. In addition, all these people were members of the CC CPSU Politburo 

Commission on Afghanistan. 

 

 

What was the mechanism of operation? Usually the rough drafts were made by representatives of these four 

ministries who prepared proposals for their ministers. For secondary issues no meetings were held. If the problem was 

important then Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev met together, inviting everyone who was attending to 

[ispolnyal] the materials, and worked out a common policy. When issues of special importance were decided, as a rule 

the Chief of the General Staff (Nikolay Ogarkov or his [first] deputy Sergey Akhromeyev), deputies to the Minister of 

Foreign Affairs (for example, Georgiy Korniyenko) or of the KGB Chairman (let’s say, Vladimir Kryuchkov), were 

present, reporting the proposals of the corresponding ministries and agencies. 

 

 

The leaders themselves then exchanged opinions and gave instructions, – such as changes in the documents 

which had been prepared. Then, depending on the substance and the importance of the problem, they were signed in 

turn and were sent to the CC Secretariat in the form of a CC CPSU note. The proposals were then examined at a CC 

CPSU Politburo meeting and the final decisions concerning them were made. That’s exactly how the decision to 

deploy troops in Afghanistan was done, although there were several peculiarities. The system being used, it would 

seem, would maximally consider the opinions of all parties and rely on the arguments and suggestions of various 

agencies. However, the analytic critiques and conclusions submitted by the corresponding agencies often turned out to 

be useless. The problem was that many leaders, including CC CPSU Politburo members, having their own views 

regarding the solution of one or another problem, always tried to “see which way the wind was blowing” by trying to 

find out Brezhnev’s opinion ahead of time, tailoring their opinions to him, and often ignoring the recommendations of 

analysts and experts. Such a flawed practice led to fatal mistakes. 

 

 

At the beginning of December 1979, Andropov wrote a letter to Brezhnev in which he assessed the situation 

in the DRA as critical, proposing steps to defend Soviet interests. Obviously, his letter gave a new impetus to the 

critical analysis of the issue of the need for the deployment of troops in Afghanistan. 

7

 

The note said, in part, that after Amin’s military coup in September and the killing of Taraki the 

situation in Afghanistan had taken a turn undesireable for the USSR. A difficult situation had developed in the party, 

the army, and the government apparatus, since they had essentially been destroyed through mass repressions carried 

out by Amin. At the same time troubling information had started to emerge regarding his secret activities, giving 

evidence that a political turn to the west was possible. Amin’s alleged contacts with an American agent, kept secret 

from Soviet representatives, were particularly worrisome, as were his promises to Pushtun tribal leaders to change the 

one-sided political orientation toward the USSR and to conduct “neutral politics” as well as closed meetings where 

attacks on Soviet policy and our officials, advisers, and specialists took place. According to Andropov the situation 

unfolding in Afghanistan created the danger of losing the gains of the April revolution within the borders of the 

country and a threat to the Soviet position in the DRA.  It was also noted that the mood among the population was 

growing noticeably anti-Soviet and that at the moment there was no guarantee that Amin would not take steps toward 

the West in his aspiration to hold on to personal power. The note mentioned that a group of Afghan communists living 

abroad had come into contact with a USSR KGB representative. Through this contact Babrak Karmal and Assadula 

Sarvari informed the KGB that they had developed a plan to counteract Amin, create a new party and government 

organs. Amin, however, took preventive measures, which included the mass arrest of “suspected individuals” (300 

people) many of whom were shot. Under these circumstances Karmal and Sarvari raised the question of possible 

Soviet aid, including military assistance. Andropov found it expedient to conduct the operation, the goal of which was 

to provide such aid, by using the forces and resources Soviet of the Defense  Ministry and the KGB already in the 

country. In his view, this was enough for a successful operation. Nevertheless, as a precautionary measure against any 

unforseen complications, he proposed creating a military group near the Afghan border. In the event of an escalation 

of military forces this group could settle certain issues and actively enter battle against armed bands. In Andropov’s 

opinion, conducting such an operation would facilitate the settling of all questions regarding the defense of the April 

revolution, the establishment of Leninist principals in the party and the government leadership of the DRA, and 

defending Soviet interests in that country. 

 

It seems that the note gave a new impulse for considering the introduction of Soviet troops on Afghan 

territory. It was considered at a meeting of the CC CPSU Politburo and corresponding decisions were taken. 

According to certain information, Ustinov told Andropov in the library, “You’re quite the adventurist, Yura.”  

                                            

7

 For the text, see CWIHP Bulletin 8/9, pg. 57. 

 

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