Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

Staff Nikolay Vasil’yevich Ogarkov’s, but he told me that the Minister was not consulting him and 

was talking only with Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev. 

 

New Faces in Afghanistan 

 

 

Soviet authorities soon “recommended” that Ambassador Puzanov leave Afghanistan. He was recalled to 

Moscow on the instructions of Foreign Minister Gromyko “in connection with his numerous requests.” A bit later 

Amin said openly that “the Soviet ambassador supported the opposition and harmed me.” And actually it was he who 

had harbored the “Four” in the embassy and then provided for them to be sent to the Soviet Union.  

 

 

On 8 November the First Secretary of the Tatar Oblast [Party] Committee Fikryat Tabeyev was appointed the 

new ambassador to the DRA. But no one from the Soviet leadership called Puzanov, who had returned to the USSR on 

21 November, and no one was interested in his opinion although the man had spent more than seven years in this 

country and had analyzed the situation not at all badly. “Upstairs” there, as they say, “they knew a few things 

themselves” – they assessed the ambassador’s work as a failure. That being the case, there was nothing to ask him. 

 

 

Somewhat later a similar fate befell the Chief Military Adviser to the DRA General Lev Gorelov who was 

recalled by Ustinov. A Deputy Commanding General of the Transbaykal Military District, General-Colonel Sultan 

Magometov, became the Chief Military Adviser to the DRA. The chief of the group of advisers to the MVD General 

Nikolay Veselkov was replaced by Aleksandr Kosogorskiy at Amin’s demand. Thus at the most critical moment, 

before the deployment of troops, new people appeared in Afghanistan who got there, as they say, “right off the boat 

and into the party.” 

 

 

Obviously, the CPSU CC was not satisfied with the information received from Pavlovskiy. On 22 November 

the First Deputy USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, Lieut.-Gen. Paputin, flew to Kabul, setting forth his estimate of 

the situation in Afghanistan and unnecessarily dramatizing the situation. In his report Paputin noted that the situation 

was close to critical; everything was collapsing, and the opposition would come to power any day now…This report 

evoked a sharply negative reaction from the adviser to the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the DRA Armed 

Forces, Maj.-Gen. Vasiliy Zaplatin. Paputin committed suicide on 28 December 1979 after the deployment of Soviet 

troops in Afghanistan. The newspaper “Pravda” published only his obituary only on 4 January 1980 without indicating 

the cause of death. It is hard to say what circumstances forced him to take such a serious step but stories have been 

floated about its connection with events in Afghanistan. 

 

 

The issue was placed point blank before the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Foreign Ministry, the 

KGB, and everyone who dealt with foreign policy questions: what should be tried? They feverishly searched for ways 

to solve the problem. They made forecasts of the progress of the situation in Afghanistan and developed various 

alternatives of actions and recommendations. In the process they tried to consider all the factors. Of special concern 

was the possibility of the Amin regime’s turn in an anti-Soviet direction. At the same time, preparations were being 

made through KGB channels for a move to remove Amin from power using this agency’s resources. 

 

On 26 November the new Soviet ambassador Tabeyev, arrived in Kabul and immediately became caught up 

in the maelstrom of events. 

 

 

The Soviet leadership by then had formed an opinion about Amin’s removal from power. This conclusion 

could be made on the basis of the assessments described in the CPSU CC note dated 29 November published below. 

 

Top Secret

6

                                         

SPECIAL FOLDER 

to the CC CPSU 

 

                                            

6

 APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 173, s. 118-127. As cited in A. A. Lyakhovskiy,  The Tragedy and Valor of the Afghani 

(Moscow: GPI “Iskon”, 1995), p. 102. [Translator’s note: The documents’ true date is 29 October 1979. Passages in 

small types were published in CWHIP Bulletin 8-9, pp. 157-58 and CWHIP’s Afghanistan Dossier pp. 52-53. Points 2, 

7, and 10 were added by Lyakhovskiy’s Plamya Afgana (“Flame of the Afghanistan veteran”) [Iskon, Moscow, 1999].  

 

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The situation in Afghanistan following the events of September 13-16 of this year, as the 

result of which Taraki was removed from power and then physically destroyed, remains extremely 

complicated. 

 

 

In the efforts to strengthen Amin in power, along with such superficial gestures like the 

beginning of the reworking of the draft of the constitution and the liberation of some of the people 

who had been arrested earlier, in fact the scale of repressions in the Party, army, state apparat and 

civic organizations has widened. He is clearly pursuing the removal from power of practically all 

eminent figures of the Party and government whom he views as his real or potential enemies. 

 

 

According to information which we have, at the present time the execution of a group of 

Politburo members (Zeray, Misak, Panjshiri) who are subject to fictitious accusations of "anti-Party 

and counter-revolutionary activity," is planned. At the plenum of the CC PDPA which took place 

recently, Amin introduced into the ruling organs of the Party people who are more devoted to him, 

including a number of his relatives.  

 

These actions of Amin led to a further aggravation of the split in the PDPA, the liquidation 

of the healthy nucleus in the Party, and the weakening of its influence on the social and political life 

of the country. They are even distracting the leaders of the country from solving the urgent problem 

of building a new society and from the fight against the internal counterrevolution. Moreover, 

although at the present time the military situation in Afghanistan has somewhat stabilized, there are 

no grounds to think that the rebels have rejected attempts at overthrowing the government by force. 

 

Amin’s actions are provoking growing unrest among progressive forces. If earlier the 

members of the “Parcham” faction spoke against him, now the supporters of the “Khalq” faction and 

individual representatives of the government bureaucracy, the army, intelligentsia, and youth have 

also joined them. This has generated mistrust on the part of Amin, who is looking for way to step up 

repression, which will narrow the social base of the regime to an even greater degree. A considerable 

part of the population of the country is taking a watchful and expectant position in regard to the new 

leadership and the measures they are taking. This also refers to the sentiments of army personnel. 

 

Incoming warnings about the organization of contacts by Amin with representatives of the 

right-wing Muslim opposition and the leaders of tribes hostile to the government are suspicious. In 

the course of [these contacts] he displays a readiness to settle with them about the cessation of armed 

combat against the present government under “compromise” conditions, which are actually to the 

detriment of the progressive development of the country. 

 

 

Recently there have been noted signs of the fact that the new leadership of Afghanistan 

intends to conduct a more "balanced policy" in relation to the Western powers. It is known, in 

particular, that representatives of the USA, on the basis of their contacts with the Afghans, are 

coming to a conclusion about the possibility of a change in the political line of Afghanistan in a 

direction which is pleasing to Washington. 

 

Amin’s conduct in the area of relations with the USSR ever more distinctly exposes his 

insincerity and duplicity. In words he and those closest to him are in favor of a further expansion of 

collaboration with the Soviet Union in various fields, but in fact they permit actions which run 

counter to the interests of this collaboration. Outwardly agreeing with the recommendations of 

Soviet representatives, including about the issue of preserving unity in the PDPA and DRA 

leadership, and declaring readiness to strengthen friendship with the USSR, in practice Amin does 

not only not take steps to put a stop to anti-Soviet sentiments but he himself actually encourages 

such sentiments. In particular, at his initiative a story is being spread about the supposed 

involvement of Soviet representatives in “making an attempt” on him during the 13-16 September 

events. Amin and his closest circle do not stop at slanderous inventions about the participation of 

Soviet representatives in repressive actions being conducted in Afghanistan. 

 

 

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