Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

 

It needs to be said that the strategic situation in this region at the end of the 1970s had not developed in the 

Soviet Union’s favor. The March 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, the electoral defeat of Indian Prime 

Minister Gandhi, the military coup in Iraq, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the resignation of the center-left Ecevit 

government in Turkey…All this considerably weakened Soviet positions in the Near and Middle East. The possibility 

of losing an Afghanistan “which had started on the socialist path of development” was taken very badly. They tried to 

prevent such a turn of events. 

 

 

In the assessments of Soviet analysts, events in the DRA had become part of a world revolutionary process. It 

was recommended that the USSR leadership not allow the export of counterrevolution and help the healthy forces of 

Afghanistan defend their revolutionary gains. Such a position harmonized with the moods of the Soviet leaders. The 

possibility of having a reliable ally on their southern borders tied to the Soviet Union by a common ideology and 

interests seemed too tempting. 

 

 

At that time the leader of the “Parcham” wing, Karmal,  was assuring Soviet leaders that he enjoyed the 

support of a significant part of Afghan Party members and the population (as became clear later there was no support 

or it was insignificant), who were only waiting for him to show up in Afghanistan in order to act against Amin. Karmal 

claimed that he would be able to retain power in the country. It was proposed to him that he head the struggle to 

overthrown the Amin regime. He agreed and right away became a ward [opeka] of the KGB. Karmal promised 

complete loyalty and obedience…The truth ought to be noted that similar proposals were made to Khalqis (Zeray, 

Panjshiri, Misak), but they refused. 

 

 

Meanwhile ever newer reports arrived from Kabul with a description of requests from H. Amin for the 

deployment of Soviet troops to the DRA. Not having received a favorable decision of the Soviet leadership for the 

deployment of troops to Kabul the CC PDPA General Secretary began to invite them into at least the northern 

provinces bordering the Soviet Union. He also did not oppose the deployment of just USSR MVD internal troops. In 

particular, having invited in Chief Military Adviser Magometov, on 2 December Amin declared that the rebels in 

Badakhshan were getting active aid from China and Pakistan and therefore he would request the Soviet government 

send one reinforced regiment to this province for a short time to help normalize the situation. 

 

 

REPORT FROM KABUL 

 

(Secret) 

(Urgent) 

 

 

…On 2 December 1979 H. Amin called in the Chief Military Adviser [Magometrov] and 

announced that in conditions where the rebels in Badakhshan are getting active support from China 

and Pakistan and we have no opportunity to withdraw troops from the areas of combat operations I 

request the Soviet government send one reinforced regiment to this province for a short time to help 

normalize the situation. 

 

 

At the conclusion of the conversation Cde. Amin requested that [I] transmit his request to 

the USSR Minister of Defense and said that he was ready to turn to L. I. Brezhnev about this issue… 

 

 2.12.79 

 

      Magometov 

 

 

The next day Amin again told Magometov about the desirability of sending subunits of 

Soviet Internal Troops capable of keeping order in the northern regions together with the DRA 

people’s militia.   

  

 

REPORT FROM KABUL 

 

(Secret) 

(Urgent) 

 

 

13

---

 

…On 3 December there was a meeting with H. Amin. During the conversation H. Amin 

said: “We intend to send part of the personnel and weapons of the 18

th

 and 20

th

 divisions (from 

Mazari-Sharif and Baghlan) to form people’s militia subunits. In this case, instead of the of regular 

Soviet troops into the DRA, it is better to send Soviet militia subunits which together with our 

people’s militia could ensure and restore order in the northern regions of the DRA.” 

 

 4.12.1979       Magometov 

 

[Translator’s note: The above telegrams are also found in Lyakhovskiy’s “Tragediya i Doblest’ 

Afgana”, previously translated]. 

 

 

On 4 December Lt. Gen. Vadim Kirpichenko, a deputy chief of the USSR KGB’s First Main Directorate, was 

sent to Kabul. He flew on a military transport aircraft from Chkalovskiy Airfield north of Moscow to Bagram with a 

group of officers of the Airborne Forces Operations Group headed by Deputy Commanding General of the Airborne 

Forces Lieutenant-General Nikolay Gus’kov. In Kirpichenko’s pocket was a diplomatic passport in the name of Petr 

Nikolayev. He had been given special authority since he had been appointed the senior chief to prepare the operation 

in Kabul to remove Amin from power. According to Kirpichenko, he never had to show this passport. 

 

Brezhnev decides to save “people’s” power 

 

 

The decision to deploy Soviet troops to Afghanistan to support an operation to remove Amin from power was 

made after long hesitation and an analysis of the unfolding situation. It was not impulsive, but many factors were not 

considered all the same. 

 

 

 

Having arrived in Kabul on the morning of 5 December Kirpichenko met with the senior KGB representative 

General Ivanov and they assigned responsibilities. He also informed Chief Military Adviser General Magometov of 

the planned operation to remove Amin from power. 

 

 

On 6 December a decision was made at a CC CPSU Politburo meeting: considering the develop situation and 

Amin’s request, send a detachment to Afghanistan of about 500 men from the General Staff’s Main Intelligence 

Directorate in uniforms which would not reveal an affiliation with the Soviet armed forces. It was proposed to 

transport them in military transport aviation aircraft in the first half of December. 

 

 

                                          

Top Secret

8

                                         

Special Folder 

 

 

to Cdes. Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, and Ustinov 

 

Extract From Protocol No. 176 of the Meeting of the CC CPSU Politburo of 6 December 1979 

______________________________________________________ 

About the dispatch of a special detachment to Afghanistan 

 

 

Agree with the proposal on this issue set forth in the note of the KGB USSR and the 

Ministry of Defense of 4 December 1979. No. 312/2/0073 (attached). 

CC SECRETARY L. BREZHNEV 

                                                                                                                                                

[attachment] 

                                         

Top Secret

9

                                         

Special File 

                                            

8

 APRF, f. 89, per. 25, d. 1 

9

 Ibid. As cited in A. A. Lyakhovskiy, The Tragedy and Valor of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI “Iskon”, 1995), p. 107. 

 

14

---