Aleksandr Antonovich Lyakhovskiy Working Paper pp

Thus in the person of Amin we have to deal with a power-hungry leader who is 

distinguished by brutality and treachery. In conditions of organizational weakness of the PDPA and 

the ideological immaturity [nezakalennost’] of its members the danger is not precluded that, thanks 

to the preservation of his personal power, Amin might change the political orientation of the regime. 

 

 

At the same time, judging from everything, Amin  understands that the domestic and 

foreign difficulties of advancing the Afghan revolution, the geographic factor, and the dependence of 

Afghanistan in providing for the daily requirements of the army and the economy, dictates an 

objective interest of the Afghan leadership in maintaining and developing comprehensive Afghan-

Soviet relations. Amin’s understanding of the fact that at this stage he cannot do without Soviet 

support and aid will give us the capability to exercise a certain restraining influence on him. 

 

 

In the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan and in the Afghan army healthy forces 

have been preserved who express serious concern about the developing situation in the country, 

which could lead to a loss of the gains of the April 1978 Revolution. However these forces are 

disunited and are essentially in an illegal position. 

 

 

Taking account of this and starting from the necessity of doing everything possible not to 

allow the victory of counter-revolution in Afghanistan or the political reorientation of H. Amin 

towards the West, it is considered expedient to hew to the following line:  

 

 

1. Continue to work actively with Amin and overall with the current leadership of the 

PDPA and the DRA, not giving Amin grounds to believe that we don't trust him and don't wish to 

deal with him. Use the contacts with Amin to assert appropriate influence and simultaneously to 

expose further his true intentions. 

 

 

2. Proceeding from our common policy regarding Amin at this stage and considering his 

repeatedly expressed desire to make an official or working visit to Moscow to meet with L. I. 

Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders we ought to give him a favorable reply in principle without, 

however, giving specific times for his visit right now. 

 

3. Constantly direct Amin’s attention to the need to maintain collective leadership, the 

norms of party life and law and order, and the inadmissibility of continuing unjustified repressions of 

Party, military, and other personnel. 

 

4. Through the channels of all Soviet institutions in Afghanistan intensify the study of the 

situation in the country and also of the leading figures of the Party and government apparatus and the 

command staff of the army and security agencies. In conversations with people who are well-

disposed toward the USSR and concerned for the fate of the April Revolution, do not create the 

impression that we approve of everything that is going on right now in Afghanistan and do not put 

such people off. At the same time avoid open criticism of one or another actions of the present 

Afghan leadership in order not to give Amin and his supporters grounds to accuse us of interference 

in [their] internal affairs. 

 

5. Military aid is to be given to Afghanistan in limited quantities right now. Considering the 

real situation in the country and the need for future combat operations to be waged against the rebels, 

continue deliveries of small arms, spare parts, and the minimally necessary amount of ammunition 

and auxiliary military equipment. Consider the request of the Afghan leadership for delivery of light 

small arms for the DRA people’s militia favorably. Hold off for now on deliveries of heavy weapons 

and military equipment, especially as there is no real need for them right now, but it is inadvisable to 

create excess reserves of such weapons and ammunition in Afghanistan. 

 

6. The Soviet subunits located in Afghanistan (communications centers, the parachute 

battalion, the fixed-wing and helicopter transport squadrons) and also the Soviet institutions’ 

security detachment are to continue to perform the assigned missions. 

 

 

10

---

7. In the area of economic cooperation we should adhere to a policy of fulfilling current 

obligations according to signed agreements. However we should approach all new requests coming 

from Amin to give economic and financial aid, including delivery of petroleum products, food, and 

industrial goods, very cautiously and decide these questions considering our capabilities and the 

actual needs of the Afghan side, not allowing them to create long-term reserves at our expense. 

 

8. Our advisers located in Afghanistan on behalf of the Ministry of Defense, KGB, and 

other Soviet ministries and agencies should remain there and carry out the missions assigned to them 

earlier. However, taking into account that Amin insistently pursues the point of “equal 

responsibility” of Afghan officials and Soviet representatives for the work of the corresponding 

Afghan agencies, the participation of Soviet representatives and advisers in measures of the Afghan 

side should be precluded which could cast a shadow on the Soviet Union. 

 

Requests of the Afghan side to send additional Soviet advisers of one or another specialty 

should be carefully weighed and be granted only in those cases when this would correspond with our 

interests. 

 

9. Continue the practice of mutual consultations and exchanges of opinions with Amin and 

other DRA representatives on questions of foreign policy with the idea of explaining our position on 

specific issues and also revealing the intentions of the Afghan side in foreign affairs. In necessary 

cases and in an appropriate form let Amin know of our disapproving attitude of his playing up to the 

West. 

 

At the same time, though diplomatic and also through special channels, continue to take 

measures against the interference of other countries, particularly neighboring [countries], in its 

internal affairs. 

 

10. In the Soviet press they should limit themselves mainly to reports of a factual nature 

about what is going on in Afghanistan, describing only favorably the measures of the Afghan 

government which facilitate a deepening of Soviet-Afghan cooperation, consolidate the gains of the 

April Revolution, and develop the DRA along the path of progressive socioeconomic reforms. 

 

 

11. The Soviet Embassy in Kabul, the USSR Committee for State Security [KGB], the 

Ministry of Defense, and the CPSU CC International Department are to study the policy and 

practical activities of H. Amin and his circle regarding Afghan internationalists, patriots, and also 

personnel who have undergone training in the Soviet Union and socialist countries; the reactionary 

Muslim clergy and tribal leaders; and the foreign policy ties of Afghanistan with the West, 

particularly with the US… 

 

 

Upon the availability of facts bearing witness to the beginning of a turn by H. Amin in an 

anti-Soviet direction, introduce supplemental proposals about measures from our side. 

 

 

A draft decree is attached. 

 

 

We request this be considered. 

 

 

A. Gromyko (MID), Yu. Andropov (KGB), D. Ustinov (MO) , B. Ponomarev (CC CPSU) 

 

29 November 1979  

 

 

 

This document was signed by Gromyko, KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, Ustinov, and CC CPSU 

International Department head Boris Ponomarev. Such a combination was not accidental. In fact in the 1970s, in 

connection with Leonid Brezhnev’s illness, such a government power structure was formed when these people dealt 

with all foreign policy problems at the highest level. They prepared proposals and submitted them for the 

 

11

---