from Rosen
The same day this information arrived the CC CPSU Politburo –
rather its elite, Andropov, Ustinov, and
Gromyko – unanimously made the final decision about the deployment of troops to Afghanistan. In their belief, after
the NATO decision to station medium-range missiles in Europe aimed at the USSR there was nothing to lose…
There was a record of this meeting stored in a special folder of the CC CPSU written very allegorically in the
handwriting of CC CPSU Secretary Konstantin Chernenko. In the document Afghanistan was designated by the letter
“A” and the word “measures” meant the deployment of Soviet troops to the DRA and the removal of Hafizullah Amin
from power. For a long time the record was supersecret and was kept in a special safe and only several in the highest
leadership of the country were familiar with it. It clears up much about who was the initiator and the executor of the
“measures”.
Top Secret
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SPECIAL FOLDER
Chaired by Cde. L. I. Brezhnev
Present: Suslov M. A., Grishin V. V., Kirilenko A. P., Pel'she A. Ya., Ustinov D. F., Chernenko K.
U., Andropov Yu. V., Gromyko A. A., Tikhonov N. A., Ponomarev B. N.
CC CPSU Decree Nº 176/125 of 12 December
concerning the situation in "A"
1. Approve the ideas and measures set forth by Andropov Yu. V., Ustinov D.F., and
Gromyko A. A. Authorize them to introduce amendments of non-essential nature in the course of the
execution of these measures.
Questions requiring the decision of the CC should be expeditiously submitted to the Politburo. The
implementation of all these measures is to be entrusted to Cdes. Andropov Yu. V., Ustinov D. F.,
and Gromyko A. A.
2. Charge Cdes. Andropov Yu. V., Ustinov D. F., and Gromyko A. A. to keep the CC
Politburo informed on the status of the execution of the outlined measures.
CC
Secretary
L.
Brezhnev
Nº 997 (1 page)
It is believed that this document is the CC CPSU Politburo resolution to introduce troops into the
DRA. However, anyone who is remotely familiar with the process of preparing documents and their evaluation at CC
CPSU Politburo meetings knows that there should also be a note with the suggestions of Andropov, Ustinov, and
Gromyko. In fact, such a note does not exist. Is it possible that the resulting letter from Andropov or these suggestions
were discussed orally by the Politburo? Judging by the fact that his name is first on the list [of speakers], it was
Andropov who was the initiator of the discussion regarding the planned action in Afghanistan.
On the basis of these facts and the development of the situation in Afghanistan I will take a risk and offer
another version: at this meeting the Politburo discussed questions raised in Andropov’s letter
regarding the conduct of
the operation to remove Amin using forces already in Afghanistan. If the operation had been conducted successfully it
would not have been necessary to introduce Soviet troops into the DRA. However, the goals of the operation were not
met. A telegram from Soviet representatives in Kabul stated that that it had not been possible to remove Amin using
forces already in Afghanistan. It seems that after this the necessary corrections were made [to the plan] providing for
the introduction of troops into Afghanistan to carry out a coup. It is possible that CC CPSU resolution No 176/125
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[Translator’s note: an image of this decree with translation and source information can be found in CWHIP Bulletin,
Fall 1994 p. 46]
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(dated December 12, 1979) was considered the basis for the realization of such a difficult step,
and the order to
introduce troops into the DRA was later given orally.
The record was signed by all CC CPSU Politburo members present at the meeting. No one then voted
“against”. There was still a Stalinist syndrome in effect, the principle of mutual protection. Everyone wanted to keep
his post and dissent or disagreement with the opinion of the General Secretary automatically expelled him from the CC
CPSU.
One man has always ruled in Russia, as opposed to the US where the system ruled. As one Russian writer
correctly noted, Russia is a country of masters and slaves because each master is in turn another’s slave according to
an established hierarchy. For centuries regimes, rulers, dynasties, and ideologies changed but the principle of slaves
and masters remained unchanged. In general it needs to be said that for all its long history, Russia was very rarely
fortunate to have worthy rulers. Only a handful of them can be recalled with bowed head. Little changed in Soviet
times. The CC CPSU General Secretary had authority and power of which even the czars did not dream. Everyone and
everything was dependent on him. For example, at Stalin’s order the wives of several high Party functionaries (such as
Molotov) were imprisoned and their husbands could not even say a word in defense of them. None of the services to
the Fatherland of the outstanding military leader Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgiy Zhukov could save him from
retirement when CC CPSU General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev desired it.
Kosygin, whose position regarding the deployment of troops to Afghanistan was negative, did not attend the
decisive CC CPSU Politburo meeting. His signature is missing from the document. Soon he was sent into retirement.
(He died in 1980.) This eliminates some of the interpretations regarding who made the decision. There is evidence,
however, that the meeting of the CC CPSU Politburo never actually took place. When the decision had been made by a
smaller group (Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, Suslov, Chernenko) the other members were “asked” to sign
it. That is, they found about [the decision] after the fact. According to Ponomarev, who was supposedly “present” at
the CC CPSU Politburo meeting,
Gromyko later admitted that the decision had been made behind the scenes (kuluarno). How did they
manage to do this without me when I was in charge of the International Department of the CC? No
one asked my advice... Andropov played a big part. His people found Babrak Karmal in
Czechoslovakia and prepared him to be the leader. Brezhnev had great trust in Andropov.
Thus many false rumors and different interpretations about who was responsible for this decision are
eliminated. Although there is information that a CC CPSU Politburo meeting was generally not held, yet when the
decision was made by a narrow body (Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, Suslov, Chernenko), the remaining
members of the Politburo were “asked” to sign it. The dates around the signatures of several Politburo members could
be indirect evidence of this. And no one refused – they were afraid. But this is only one version.
The account of CC CPSU Secretary Leonid Zamyatin could serve as confirmation of this:
The four were convened. Brezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov, and Gromyko, with Chernenko as secretary.
The decision was made there about the deployment of troops to Afghanistan. The materials of Yuriy
Vladimirovich Andropov were used. How did the discussion go? I cannot say. There is nothing
except the record which was handwritten by Chernenko…This is the first time in the history of the
Politburo that a decision was handwritten and not typed.
This is what it was called – on the issue about “A”. [Translator’s note: In fact, the text
reads: “K polozheniyu v ‘A’ (“Concerning the situation in ‘A’) not, as Zamyatin quotes, “K voprosu
ob ‘A’.] The letter A in quotes. There were four points, one of them concerning the deployment of
troops. Well, the formulation there was about the implementation of international aid, a limited
contingent, and so forth. There were assurances from Ustinov that this was a temporary deployment
of troops, for a maximum of three or four months, then we would withdraw them…
…There was a note of Andropov, very detailed, since there was a KGB group in
Afghanistan headed by Boris Semenovich Ivanov, a special adviser and consultant to Andropov. His
telegram was, so to say, one of the first calls [that] other methods of solving the Afghan problem
were needed, for this letter said: if we don’t support Taraki right now with the use of force then we
might lose Afghanistan; that is, Brzezinski’s theory – create a “green” underbelly below our Central
Asian republics – would be realized.
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