August 2013 Plutonium Mountain Inside the 17-year mission to secure a dangerous legacy of Soviet nuclear testing By Eben Harrell & David E. Hoffman Project on Managing the Atom

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs  |  

Harvard Kennedy School

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Now Kazakhstan and Russia became alarmed. The unfinished sarcophagus had provided an 

obvious signpost to scavengers of an area of value. The Kazakhs became desperate for action, 

and decided to go public. In June 2001, Kenley Butler, a researcher at the Monterey Institute for 

International Studies, visited Kazakhstan on a trip through the former Soviet republics.  He met 

with Vladimir Solodukhin of the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Alatau. 

 In a trip report written shortly after his return, Butler wrote, 

Solodukhin said that the world community should take immediate measures to address the 

proliferation risks presented by the Semipalatinsk Test Site. Solodukhin estimates there are 

over 290kg of plutonium…centered at Degelen. According to Solodukhin, he and another 

nuclear physicist could easily collect 5kg of plutonium [enough for a nuclear bomb] in one 

or two days using simple chemical extraction processes. Solodukhin is very troubled about 

mining operations at the site that currently extract gold, coal, beryllium and other materials, 

and about the illegal gathering of scrap metal. Bore tunnels have been breached by metal 

collectors. Mining and excavating machinery is used for both legal mining activities and 

illegal scrap metal gathering.

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Russian officials were also agitated, especially during the period when U.S. financial support 

was suspended.  In October 2001, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Ilkaev wrote 

a letter to Ryabev, the Russian first deputy minister for atomic energy, saying that while “…the 

issue of nuclear waste presence in the territory of the former [Semipalatinsk Test Site] is a com-

mon problem of the three sides (Kazkakhstan, Russia, USA)… at the present moment, when the 

works at the testing ground are suspended, its solution prospects are not clear.”

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 Ryabev, in turn, 

sent a letter to U.S. officials stating that 

the Russian scientists were concerned 

that “due to the suspension of the dome 

construction, the situation at the testing 

ground became even more dangerous 

than it had been prior to the start of our 

collaboration.”

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Hecker also heard of the stoppage from 

Russian and Kazakh officials, so he went 

to see Susan Koch, then a White House 

official at the National Security Council, 

to urge a resumption. Also at the meet-

ing was Weber, who played a behind-the-

scenes role in pushing for a resumption of 

funding.

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   Kenley Butler, Trip Report, “Almaty, Astana, Alatau,” June 2001, KAZ010600, pp. 6-12. Excerpt provided by the author.

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   Cited by Stepanyuk in “Liquidation of Consequences,” section 2.1, Operation Groundhog, p. 8.

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    At the outset, all three countries agreed that the United States would fund the project. In later years, Russia’s financial re-

sources improved considerably with oil revenues. In theory, Russia could have provided some of the funding but this was appar-

ently never given serious consideration. 

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   Hecker, communication with the authors, April 2013. Weber recalled that a major issue was getting the Kazakh parliament to 

ratify the CTR umbrella agreement with the United States. Interview with Weber, May 17, 2013.

Source: U.S. Department of Defense

Scrap metal scavengers.

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Plutonium Mountain: Inside the 17-year mission to secure a dangerous legacy of Soviet nuclear testing

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1949: The first nuclear test conducted by the Soviet Union detonates at Semipalatinsk. 

Testing continued until 1991. There were 456 tests in total.

1991: The Soviet Union collapses and Kazakhstan becomes an independent state. 

1991-2009: Local scavengers forage the testing site. They strip copper wiring and steel 

rails to sell as scrap metal. Access is unfettered in the 1990s. With U.S. and Russian threat 

reduction work in the 2000s, scavenging diminishes, but continues periodically during 

periods of inactivity at the site. In 2009, Kazakhstan adopts a law making sensitive portions 

of the testing site an “exclusion zone.” Signs and security systems are put in place.

1993: The U.S. signs a $6 million program to close portals to testing tunnels at Degelen 

Mountain. Called the Degelen Mountain Tunnel Neutralization Project, the operation is 

designed to destroy the infrastructure so testing could never be resumed. It is not targeted 

at preventing scavenging or theft of nuclear material. About 181 holes were closed.

1994: The U.S. airlifts about 605 kg (1332 pounds) of highly-enriched uranium from 

Kazakhstan in “Project Sapphire.”

1995: A team of scientists from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) visits Semipalatinsk.

1995: A LANL official, Danny Stillman, drafts a memo, “Project Amber: Elimination of a 

Potential Source of Special Nuclear Materials.” The memo warns that unsecured nuclear 

bomb fuel exists in the tunnels at Degelen Mountain and the complex could become a 

“plutonium mine.”

1998: A delegation of Kazakh scientists from Semipalatinsk visit Los Alamos National 

Laboratory. They warn the recently-retired head of LANL, Sig Hecker, that scavengers are 

scouring Degelen Mountain.

1998 (April): Hecker visits Semipalatinsk and takes photographs of the scavenging activity.

1998 (July): Hecker travels to the two main Russian nuclear weapons laboratories, 

Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. In meetings with the lab directors, Hecker presents 

evidence of scavenging at Degelen Mountain and implores Russia to take action. Radi Ilkaev, 

the director of Arzamas-16, is initially reluctant, but then offers support.

1999 (June): Hecker and Ilkaev meet at a NATO-sponsored conference in Almaty, Kazakhstan. 

Also at the meeting is a senior Kazakh scientist, Kairat Kadyrzhanov. On the margins of the 

conference, Hecker, Ilkaev and Kadyrzhanov sign a three-way agreement for a series of field 

studies that would scope out the size of the problem at Semipalatinsk

2000: Several meetings take place between the three countries to agree on implementation. 

The most prominent occurs in May when Rose Gottemoeller, then assistant secretary of 

Energy, meets Lev Ryabev, Russia’s first deputy minister for atomic energy. 

Chronology of Degelen Mountain Cleanup

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