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Afterword to the Second German Edition (1873)
“In so far as it deals with actual theory, the method of Marx is the deductive
method of the whole English school, a school whose failings and virtues are
common to the best theoretic economists.”
M. Block – “Les Théoriciens du Socialisme en Allemagne. Extrait du Journal des Economistes,
Juillet et Août 1872” – makes the discovery that my method is analytic and says: “Par cet ouvrage
M. Marx se classe parmi les esprits analytiques les plus eminents.” German reviews, of course,
shriek out at “Hegelian sophistics.” The European Messenger of St. Petersburg in an article
dealing exclusively with the method of “Das Kapital” (May number, 1872, pp. 427-436), finds
my method of inquiry severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-
dialectical. It says:
“At first sight, if the judgment is based on the external form of the presentation of
the subject, Marx is the most ideal of ideal philosophers, always in the German,
i.e., the bad sense of the word. But in point of fact he is infinitely more realistic
than all his forerunners in the work of economic criticism. He can in no sense be
called an idealist.”
I cannot answer the writer better than by aid of a few extracts from his own criticism, which may
interest some of my readers to whom the Russian original is inaccessible.
After a quotation from the preface to my “Criticism of Political Economy,” Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-
VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:
“The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena
with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to
him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and
mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him
is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one
form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law
once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in
social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by
rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of
social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve
him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the
same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of
another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same,
whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or
unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history,
governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and
intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and
intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part
so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is
civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any
result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material
phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine
itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with
another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be
investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with
respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all
is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and
concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present
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Afterword to the Second German Edition (1873)
themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the
same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx
directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the
contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own. ... As soon as
society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one
given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word,
economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in
other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of
economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A
more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among
themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same
phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different
structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual
organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g.,
denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He
asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of
population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power,
social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself
the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system
established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific
manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have.
The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws
that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism
and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of
fact, Marx’s book has.”
Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as
concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic
method?
Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to
appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their
inner connexion. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described.
If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then
it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction.
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel,
the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the
Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the
real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the
ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into
forms of thought.
The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was
still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das Kapital,” it was the good
pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre
Επιγονοι [Epigones – Büchner, Dühring and others]
who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses
Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore openly avowed
myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of
value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic
suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general